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FORENSIC SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Eurodollar system is the largest, most critical, and least understood component of the global financial architecture. With over $13 trillion in offshore dollar deposits (and tens of trillions more in synthetic dollar funding via FX swaps), it determines credit conditions for the entire non-US world—yet it operates without a formal lender of last resort, regulatory oversight comparable to domestic banking, or even comprehensive data collection.
When the Eurodollar system fails, everything fails: emerging market crises, developed economy credit crunches, global trade disruptions, and even domestic US financial instability all trace back to offshore dollar funding stress.
The FSA Question:
"How is the global dollar funding system architected such that USD liquidity can evaporate in countries experiencing no domestic crisis, requiring unprecedented Federal Reserve intervention, and what does this reveal about dollar hegemony, systemic fragility, and the hidden dependencies of the international monetary system?"
Why This Matters Now:
Every major financial crisis since 2007 has involved Eurodollar dysfunction: 2008 (global financial crisis), 2011 (European debt crisis), 2019 (repo crisis), 2020 (COVID panic). The architecture that caused these failures remains unchanged. The next crisis is not a question of if, but when—and whether the Fed will intervene again.
PHASE 1: ANOMALY IDENTIFICATION
The System Most People Don't Know Exists
Ask most people what "Eurodollars" are and you'll get blank stares. Ask finance professionals and you might get "dollars held in European banks" (partially correct but incomplete). Almost no one understands that the Eurodollar system is the foundational architecture of global dollar liquidity—larger than the US domestic banking system in many respects, yet operating in a regulatory gray zone with no formal safety net.
The Scale That Demands Explanation
Market Size (2023):
- ~$13 trillion in offshore dollar deposits (conservative estimate)
- Additional tens of trillions in synthetic dollar funding via FX swaps and cross-currency basis swaps
- "Missing dollar debt" (off-balance-sheet) approximately doubled on-balance-sheet dollar debt by 2022
- Historically estimated at $65+ trillion in total dollar-denominated credit intermediation offshore
For Context: US GDP is ~$27 trillion. The Eurodollar system is multiple times larger than the entire US economy.
The Anomalies That Reveal Hidden Architecture
Anomaly #1: The Lender-of-Last-Resort Paradox
The Eurodollar system creates dollar-denominated deposits and loans outside the United States, beyond the reach of US bank regulators and the Federal Reserve. When dollar liquidity dries up offshore:
- Foreign central banks cannot print dollars
- The Fed has no legal obligation to provide liquidity to non-US banks
- Yet dollar funding stress offshore immediately threatens US financial stability
The architectural question: How can a $65+ trillion dollar-funding system operate without a formal lender of last resort, and why does it repeatedly require emergency Fed intervention despite having no legal claim to Fed support?
Anomaly #2: The Persistent Negative Basis
According to covered interest rate parity (CIP), borrowing dollars directly should cost the same as borrowing euros (or yen, etc.), converting to dollars via FX swap, and swapping back at maturity. This is basic financial arbitrage—it should be impossible for persistent price differences to exist.
The architectural question: Why can't arbitrageurs eliminate this pricing discrepancy? What structural constraints prevent markets from functioning as theory predicts?
Anomaly #3: The Recurring Crises
1997: Asian Financial Crisis — dollar funding stress triggers regional collapse
2007-2009: Global Financial Crisis — European banks face dollar funding runs, Fed provides $580 billion via swap lines
2011-2012: European Debt Crisis — renewed dollar funding stress, Fed reopens swap lines
September 2019: Repo crisis — offshore dollar funding stress spills into US markets
March 2020: COVID panic — dollar funding crisis requires $470 billion Fed swap line usage, emergency facilities
The pattern: Approximately every 3-5 years, the Eurodollar system experiences crisis-level dysfunction requiring extraordinary central bank intervention. This is not random. It is architectural.
Anomaly #4: The "Whatever It Takes" Dependency
In both 2008 and 2020, the Federal Reserve provided unlimited dollar swap lines to select central banks. Not $100 billion. Not $500 billion. Unlimited. "Whatever it takes" to prevent Eurodollar collapse.
The architectural question: Why would the Fed—whose mandate is domestic US monetary policy—commit unlimited resources to backstop offshore dollar funding? What hidden dependencies make Eurodollar stability essential to US interests?
PHASE 2: FOUR-LAYER SYSTEM MAPPING
LAYER 1: SOURCE (The Origin of Offshore Dollars)
Historical Origins: Cold War Architecture
The Eurodollar market emerged in the 1950s when the Soviet Union and Communist China wanted to hold dollar-denominated deposits outside US jurisdiction (to avoid potential asset seizure during the Cold War). European banks, primarily in London, began accepting these deposits and discovered they could:
- Pay higher interest rates than US banks (no Fed reserve requirements or FDIC insurance costs)
- Lend these dollars to borrowers globally at attractive rates
- Operate outside US regulatory oversight
By the 1960s, US regulatory constraints (Regulation Q interest rate caps, reserve requirements on large CDs) made the Eurodollar market even more attractive. The Interest Equalization Tax (1963) and capital controls pushed foreign dollar bond issuance from New York to London, accelerating Eurodollar growth.
The Mechanism: Synthetic Dollar Creation
Eurodollars are created through offshore fractional reserve banking:
Example:
- A Middle East oil producer sells oil for dollars and deposits $100 million with a London bank
- The London bank records $100 million Eurodollar deposit (liability) and holds a corresponding claim on the US banking system (asset)
- The London bank lends $90 million of those Eurodollars to a Brazilian oil importer
- The Brazilian firm uses the $90 million to buy oil, which gets deposited back in another offshore bank
- That bank now has $90 million to lend...
This creates a multiplier effect—the same base of US dollars supports multiple layers of Eurodollar deposits and loans, all denominated in dollars, none directly regulated by the Federal Reserve.
Modern Source Dynamics: FX Swaps as Synthetic Dollar Funding
Today, the largest source of synthetic dollar funding is the FX swap market:
A European bank needs dollars to fund dollar-denominated assets (loans, securities). Rather than borrowing dollars directly, it:
- Borrows euros in the money market
- Enters an FX swap: sells euros for dollars spot (immediate), simultaneously agrees to buy euros back forward (future date) at predetermined rate
- This creates synthetic dollar borrowing—the bank has dollars now, will return them at maturity
- The "cost" is embedded in the FX swap basis (deviation from interest rate parity)
LAYER 2: CONDUIT (Market Structure and Transmission)
Geographic Hubs: The Offshore Centers
| Center | Role | Key Feature |
|---|---|---|
| London | Primary global hub | European bank dollar operations, FX trading dominance |
| Cayman Islands / Caribbean | US bank offshore booking | Shell branches of US banks for regulatory arbitrage |
| Singapore / Hong Kong | Asian dollar market | Regional offshore dollar intermediation |
| Dubai | Middle East hub | Oil trade settlement, regional banking |
Participant Structure: The Hierarchy
Tier 1: Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs)
- Large US banks (JPMorgan, Citibank, Bank of America)
- European banks (Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, Barclays)
- Japanese megabanks (MUFG, Mizuho, SMBC)
- Role: Market makers, primary dealers, FX swap intermediaries
Tier 2: Regional Banks and Foreign Bank Branches
- US branches of foreign banks (major Eurodollar borrowers)
- Regional international banks
- Role: Net dollar borrowers, intermediaries to corporates
Tier 3: End Users
- Multinational corporations (hedging FX exposure, funding operations)
- Institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds)
- Emerging market borrowers (governments, banks, corporations)
- Role: Final dollar demand, relatively price-insensitive
The Plumbing: How Dollars Actually Flow
Method 1: Correspondent Banking
Offshore banks don't hold vault cash in dollars. They hold deposits at US banks (usually major money center banks in New York). When a Eurodollar transaction settles, it's recorded as a change in correspondent account balances at US banks.
Method 2: FX Swap Networks
Banks create synthetic dollars by entering FX swaps with counterparties—often other banks acting as intermediaries. This creates chains of interdependency: if one link breaks, the chain fails.
Method 3: Tri-Party Repo and Secured Funding
Some offshore dollar funding uses US Treasury collateral in tri-party repo arrangements. This connects offshore dollar funding directly to the US repo market (as we saw in Case Study #001).
The Segmentation Problem
- Different currency pairs (EUR/USD, JPY/USD, etc.) with different basis spreads
- Different maturities (overnight, 1-week, 1-month, 3-month, longer-term) that don't arbitrage cleanly
- Different participant access levels (GSIBs vs regional banks vs corporates)
- Geographic fragmentation (London vs Asia vs Caribbean)
Result: Dollar funding can be abundant in one segment while scarce in another, with no mechanism for efficient reallocation—especially during stress when banks hoard liquidity and interbank lending freezes.
LAYER 3: CONVERSION (Crisis Triggers and Cascade Mechanisms)
Trigger Category 1: Dollar Strength and Capital Flows
When the dollar appreciates (strengthens) against other currencies:
- Borrowers with dollar debts face higher local-currency costs to service those debts
- Investors flee emerging markets, withdrawing dollar funding
- FX swap basis widens as demand for synthetic dollars increases
- This creates a self-reinforcing loop: more dollar strength → more EM stress → more dollar demand → more dollar strength
Example: 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Thailand's baht peg breaks. Investors demand dollars. Regional currencies collapse as everyone tries to obtain dollars simultaneously. Dollar funding evaporates. Crisis cascades across Asia.
Trigger Category 2: Risk-Off Events and Safe-Haven Flows
During market stress (financial crisis, pandemic, geopolitical shock):
- Investors sell risky assets and demand safe-haven dollars
- Money market funds withdraw from banks perceived as risky (especially non-US banks)
- Interbank lending freezes as counterparty risk rises
- FX swap market seizes as dealers widen spreads or refuse to trade
Example: August 2007. BNP Paribas announces it cannot value mortgage-backed securities. European banks face "slow dollar run" as money market funds withdraw. USD LIBOR spikes. Fed opens first swap lines in December 2007.
Trigger Category 3: Monetary Policy Divergence
When the Federal Reserve tightens monetary policy (raises rates, reduces balance sheet) while other central banks remain accommodative:
- Dollar funding becomes more expensive in absolute terms
- Interest rate differentials widen, increasing FX hedge costs
- Carry trades unwind (borrowing cheap foreign currency to buy dollars)
- Cross-currency basis widens as demand for dollar funding increases
Example: 2013 "Taper Tantrum." Fed signals QE tapering. EM currencies plunge. Dollar funding stress emerges globally despite no domestic US crisis.
Trigger Category 4: Regulatory and Quarter-End Effects
Post-2008 bank regulations (Basel III leverage ratios, liquidity coverage ratios) make balance sheet expansion costly:
- Banks reduce FX swap market-making near quarter-ends (to minimize reported assets for leverage ratio calculations)
- This creates predictable spikes in FX swap basis at quarter-ends
- Arbitrage capital is constrained by regulatory costs, preventing elimination of basis deviations
Example: September 2019 repo crisis (Case Study #001). Quarter-end balance sheet constraints prevent banks from intermediating dollar funding, triggering cascade.
The Cascade Mechanism: How Local Stress Becomes Systemic
Stage 1: Initial Shock
Dollar funding stress emerges in one segment (e.g., European banks facing money market fund withdrawals)
Stage 2: Basis Widening
FX swap basis widens as demand for synthetic dollars increases. Arbitrageurs cannot eliminate basis due to balance sheet constraints.
Stage 3: Dealer Retreat
Banks reduce FX swap market-making, widening bid-ask spreads. Liquidity deteriorates. Corporates and institutional investors face difficulty rolling dollar funding.
Stage 4: Asset Fire Sales
Entities unable to roll dollar funding begin selling dollar-denominated assets (Treasuries, corporate bonds, mortgage-backed securities) to raise cash. This pushes down asset prices, triggering mark-to-market losses for other holders.
Stage 5: Contagion to US Markets
Asset sales hit US markets. Treasury yields spike (prices fall). Corporate credit spreads widen. US financial conditions tighten despite Fed domestic accommodation.
Stage 6: Fed Intervention (or Systemic Collapse)
Fed activates swap lines to provide dollars to foreign central banks, which lend to their banks. This backstops offshore dollar funding, stabilizes FX basis, halts asset fire sales.
LAYER 4: INSULATION (How the Architecture Protects Itself)
Insulation Mechanism 1: Invisibility Through Complexity
The Eurodollar system's primary insulation is that almost no one understands it exists:
- The term "Eurodollar" is archaic and misleading (sounds European-specific; actually global)
- Market data is fragmented across BIS, Fed, ECB, and private sources with no unified reporting
- Off-balance-sheet synthetic dollar funding (FX swaps) is largely invisible in standard bank reporting
- Academic and policy discussions focus on symptoms (basis deviations, funding stress) without architectural analysis
Result: When crises occur, they're attributed to "market dysfunction," "liquidity shortages," or "technical factors" rather than architectural design flaws.
Insulation Mechanism 2: Distributed Responsibility (No Single Regulator)
| Entity | Jurisdiction | Responsibility for Eurodollars |
|---|---|---|
| Federal Reserve | United States | None (offshore banks not under Fed supervision) |
| Bank of England | United Kingdom | Supervises UK banks but not dollar operations specifically |
| ECB | Eurozone | Supervises euro operations; dollar operations are foreign currency |
| BIS | International | Data collection only; no regulatory authority |
| IMF | International | Crisis lending to countries; not bank-level supervision |
Architectural Feature: No single regulator has authority or responsibility for Eurodollar system stability. This is not an oversight—it's the consequence of creating an offshore dollar system specifically to escape regulation.
Insulation Mechanism 3: The Implicit Fed Backstop
Despite having no legal obligation to support offshore dollar funding, the Fed has intervened in every major Eurodollar crisis since 2007:
- December 2007: First swap lines to ECB and SNB ($20 billion + CHF 4 billion)
- September 2008: Expanded to 14 central banks, $580 billion outstanding at peak
- May 2010: Re-opened during European debt crisis
- October 2013: Converted to standing arrangements (permanent) with 5 major central banks
- March 2020: Expanded to 14 central banks (temporary), $470 billion outstanding at peak, unlimited amounts to standing partners
The Pattern: The Fed consistently provides "whatever it takes" liquidity to prevent Eurodollar collapse. This creates moral hazard—offshore dollar funding operates with the implicit guarantee of Fed backstop, encouraging risk-taking without accountability.
Insulation Mechanism 4: Narrative Framing of Intervention
When the Fed activates swap lines, the narrative is carefully managed:
- Official framing: "Supporting dollar liquidity conditions" and "maintaining flow of credit to US households and businesses"
- What's hidden: The Fed is backstopping foreign banks' dollar funding operations—operations that exist specifically to escape US regulation
- Political cover: Framed as protecting US financial stability (true) rather than bailing out foreign banks (also true but politically toxic)
Insulation Mechanism 5: The "No Good Substitute" Reality
Attempts to create alternatives to Fed swap lines have failed or remained marginal:
- IMF facilities: Too slow, too conditional, insufficient scale
- Regional arrangements (Chiang Mai Initiative): Limited to Asia, never tested at scale
- Currency swap arrangements between non-US central banks: Provide alternative currencies, not dollars
- China's digital yuan and CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System): Marginal adoption; global trade still dollar-denominated
The reality: Only the Fed can provide unlimited dollar liquidity. This creates structural dependency—the Eurodollar system operates knowing the Fed must intervene to prevent collapse, regardless of legal mandate or political preferences.
PHASE 3: FSA SYNTHESIS
The Complete Eurodollar Architecture
What FSA Reveals:
The Eurodollar system is not a market failure—it is a deliberately constructed offshore dollar-creation mechanism that operates without regulatory oversight or formal lender of last resort, yet repeatedly requires emergency Fed intervention to prevent global financial collapse.
The Four-Layer Architecture:
SOURCE: Eurodollars are created through offshore fractional reserve banking and synthetic dollar funding (FX swaps). These are not real dollars but accounting entries that depend on continuous confidence and rolling of short-term funding. The system manufactures dollars beyond the Fed's direct control or visibility.
CONDUIT: The Eurodollar market is fragmented by geography, currency pairs, maturity structures, and participant access. This segmentation prevents efficient liquidity reallocation during stress. Dollar funding can be abundant in one segment while catastrophically scarce in another.
CONVERSION: Eurodollar stress originates from multiple triggers—dollar strength, risk-off flows, monetary policy divergence, regulatory constraints—but always cascades through the same mechanism: synthetic dollar creation unwinds, asset fire sales begin, US markets experience contagion, Fed must intervene.
INSULATION: The system protects itself through complexity and opacity, distributed responsibility across regulators with no unified oversight, implicit Fed backstop creating moral hazard, narrative framing that obscures bailout nature of interventions, and structural dependency on dollar dominance with no viable alternative.
Why the Architecture Persists
The Eurodollar system serves multiple interests simultaneously:
- Banks: Regulatory arbitrage (lower costs offshore), profit from intermediation, implicit Fed backstop reduces risk
- Borrowers: Access to dollar funding without going through US banks or US regulations
- United States: Dollar hegemony extends US financial influence globally, offshore dollar demand supports Treasury market, US banks dominate intermediation
- Foreign governments: Can access dollar funding for their banks/economies without direct dependence on US institutions
The problem: These benefits come at the cost of systemic fragility. The architecture that serves everyone in normal times threatens everyone during crisis.
FSA Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1: "Eurodollar crises are caused by insufficient dollar supply"
FSA Test: If true, increasing base dollar supply should prevent crises. But Fed QE increased reserves massively post-2008, yet 2019-2020 saw renewed Eurodollar dysfunction. The problem is not quantity of dollars but the architecture of offshore dollar creation and distribution. REJECTED.
Hypothesis 2: "The problem is market segmentation"
FSA Test: If true, connecting market segments would resolve dysfunction. But segmentation exists precisely because of regulatory arbitrage—offshore banks operate outside unified oversight. Connecting segments would require regulatory convergence, which would eliminate the rationale for offshore operations. Segmentation is a feature, not a bug. INCOMPLETE.
Hypothesis 3: "Eurodollar dysfunction reflects temporary market disruptions"
FSA Test: If true, crises should be random and unpredictable. Instead, they follow clear patterns tied to dollar strength cycles, monetary policy divergence, and regulatory constraints. They recur every 3-5 years. This is systematic, not random. REJECTED.
Hypothesis 4: "The Eurodollar system is architecturally fragile by design"
FSA Test: If true, we would expect:
- ✓ Recurring crises despite Fed interventions (pattern established 1997-2020)
- ✓ No single regulator with oversight responsibility (confirmed)
- ✓ Synthetic dollar creation beyond Fed visibility (FX swaps are off-balance-sheet)
- ✓ Fed "forced" to intervene despite no legal mandate (swap lines repeatedly activated)
- ✓ Moral hazard from implicit backstop (offshore dollar funding grows despite crises)
- ✓ Reform proposals fail due to conflicting interests (no structural change post-2008)
Predictive Value: What FSA Warns About
Current Risk Assessment (December 2025):
Trigger Scenarios for Next Eurodollar Crisis:
- Fed Policy Tightening: If the Fed raises rates or reduces balance sheet significantly while other central banks remain accommodative, interest rate differentials will widen, FX swap basis will spike, offshore dollar funding stress will emerge. ```
- EM Debt Crisis: Emerging markets hold substantial dollar-denominated debt. Dollar strength or capital flight could trigger sovereign defaults, forcing asset fire sales, contagion to developed markets.
- China/Japan Dollar Funding Stress: Japanese and Chinese banks are major Eurodollar participants. Stress in these systems (real estate crisis in China, financial sector stress in Japan) could trigger dollar funding runs.
- Geopolitical Shock: Major conflict (Taiwan, Middle East, etc.) could trigger risk-off flows, dollar safe-haven demand, Eurodollar funding freeze similar to March 2020.
- Regulatory Shock: Unexpected regulatory change affecting bank balance sheets (new capital requirements, leverage ratio changes) could constrain FX swap intermediation, triggering basis blowout. ```
Why These Matter:
The architectural fragility identified by FSA remains unchanged. Fed swap lines are still the only backstop. Synthetic dollar creation via FX swaps continues to grow. Off-balance-sheet dollar debt is still largely invisible to regulators. The next crisis will follow the same cascade pattern—only the trigger will differ.
The Fed's Dilemma:
Each intervention reinforces moral hazard and makes the system more dependent on Fed backstop. But refusing to intervene risks catastrophic global financial collapse. The architecture has created a "doom loop": the Fed must intervene, which encourages more offshore dollar activity, which requires larger future interventions.
PHASE 4: FSA CONCLUSIONS
What This Case Demonstrates About FSA Methodology
- Invisible Architecture Made Visible: The Eurodollar system operates in plain sight but is invisible to most analysis because no one maps all four layers simultaneously. FSA reveals the complete structure. ```
- Structural vs Episodic Analysis: Conventional analysis treats each Eurodollar crisis as a discrete event (2008, 2011, 2019, 2020). FSA reveals these are manifestations of the same underlying architecture repeatedly failing.
- Insulation Through Complexity: The Eurodollar system's primary defense is that it's too complex and opaque for most people to understand. FSA cuts through complexity by mapping structure rather than describing symptoms.
- Moral Hazard and Dependency: FSA reveals how the Fed's repeated interventions have created structural dependency—the system operates knowing it will be rescued, encouraging risk-taking that makes future crises more severe.
- No Simple Solutions: FSA shows why Eurodollar reform is nearly impossible—too many powerful interests benefit from the current architecture, and acknowledging the problem requires acknowledging systemic fragility and bailout dependencies. ```
Implications for Different Audiences
For Policymakers
- The Eurodollar system creates systemic risk far beyond individual bank risk
- Current regulatory frameworks (Basel III) address bank capital but not offshore dollar creation architecture
- Fed swap lines are treating symptoms, not causes
- Comprehensive reform would require international coordination and willingness to sacrifice regulatory arbitrage benefits
For Investors
- Eurodollar stress creates predictable patterns: FX basis widening → asset fire sales → Treasury volatility → credit spread widening
- Monitoring FX swap basis (especially EUR/USD, JPY/USD) provides early warning of offshore dollar stress
- Fed swap line activation is a clear crisis signal—not "all clear" but "system critically stressed"
- Assets dependent on smooth dollar funding (high-yield credit, EM debt, leveraged loans) are systematically vulnerable
For Emerging Markets
- Dollar-denominated debt makes you dependent on Eurodollar system stability—which you cannot control
- Fed swap lines go to major developed country central banks, not EM central banks (with rare exceptions)
- Dollar strength cycles create predictable crises for EM borrowers
- De-dollarization (local currency debt, bilateral currency arrangements) reduces vulnerability but sacrifices access to deep liquidity
For China and Strategic Competitors
- The Eurodollar system is the architecture of dollar hegemony—understanding it reveals both its power and its fragility
- Alternatives (digital yuan, CIPS, bilateral arrangements) face "network effects" problem—everyone uses dollars because everyone uses dollars
- US financial sanctions work because of Eurodollar architecture—cutting off dollar access is existential for most entities
- However, Eurodollar fragility creates strategic vulnerability—a crisis that forces the Fed to choose between domestic priorities and global dollar system stability could fracture the architecture
Unanswered Questions for Further Investigation
- What is the actual scale of synthetic dollar creation via FX swaps? (BIS data is incomplete)
- How concentrated is Eurodollar intermediation among top GSIBs? (High concentration = systemic risk)
- What would happen if the Fed refused to activate swap lines during the next crisis? (Unthinkable experiment)
- Can blockchain-based settlement systems reduce Eurodollar fragility or would they simply replicate the same architectural flaws?
- How does Eurodollar architecture interact with Treasury market structure? (Deep connection, underexplored)
- What role does the Eurodollar system play in transmitting US monetary policy globally? (Dollar dominance = exported Fed policy)
The Bottom Line
The Eurodollar system is the most important financial architecture most people have never heard of. It is larger than the US economy, determines global credit conditions, and repeatedly requires emergency central bank intervention to prevent collapse—yet it operates with no formal lender of last resort, no unified regulatory oversight, and no comprehensive data collection.
This is not an accident. It is the result of deliberate choices: regulatory arbitrage, dollar hegemony, financial innovation without accountability, and moral hazard from repeated Fed backstops.
The architecture has not been reformed because reforming it would require acknowledging that the global financial system depends on an offshore dollar-creation mechanism that benefits powerful interests at the cost of systemic fragility.
The next Eurodollar crisis is not a question of if, but when. And when it comes, the same cascade will occur: synthetic dollar funding unwinds, asset fire sales begin, US markets get hit, and the Fed will face the same impossible choice—intervene to prevent catastrophe or allow the Eurodollar system to collapse and take the global financial system with it.
FSA reveals the architecture. What we do with that knowledge is up to us.
