---BREAKAWAY CIVILIZATION ---ALTERNATIVE HISTORY---NEW BUSINESS MODELS--- ROCK & ROLL 'S STRANGE BEGINNINGS---SERIAL KILLERS---YEA AND THAT BAD WORD "CONSPIRACY"--- AMERICANS DON'T EXPLORE ANYTHING ANYMORE.WE JUST CONSUME AND DIE.---
THE TWITIFICATION OF AMERICA BY PROFESSIONALLY CERTIFIED EDUBABBLERS MARCHES ON… ~ here ,here ...1 way or t'nother WE THE PEOPLE r fucking gonna B forced 2 put Our big~boy pants ON ....just an matter of ...Time :) r
Just
when you think it’s safe, or that Amairikun edgykayshun and its
“certified” professionals couldn’t possibly get any nuttier or loonier,
think again. This time the manifestation of twitification is coming from
Portland, an outpost of California-like trendy twittery in Oregon. The
target of the twittery?
Peanut butter and jelly sandwiches.
Yes, you read that correctly: peanut butter and jelly sandwiches.
And the “reason” for their targeting?
Well, it’s because, you see, it’s like it might like be sort of…like…
offensive to like … well, you know… like non-white students who like
eat sandwiches made of … like… stuff that’s not like bread and like
peanut butter and jelly…
Like…. you know? Consider this story from 2012: Peanut Butter And Jelly Racist? Portland School Principal Ties Sandwich To White Privilege
Now, while we all recognize that Oregon has been waging a ferocious
campaign to overtake California in resident lunacy and twittery(followed
closely in third place by Washington and Wackychusetts), and while this
recent outbreak of chronic goofiness might incline one to believe that
it has, indeed, succeeded in its objective of becoming the most
laughably loonified state in the union, and while recent polls of
British subjects suggest that, if offered, they would not take their former colonies back precisely because of the terminal goofiness of Amairikun edgykayshun (even if they had a coupon
to do so), this one really ranks just a few decimal points behind
Common Core for the sheer grandiosity of its sweeping Gates-like
vapidity(the technical term for which is Gatesidity[n. a scheme of such
grandiose banality and vapidity that it can only be accomplished by
billions of wasted dollars], a close synonym to Gatesopathy, [ n., a
terminal form of narcissistic psychopathy brought about by a fatal
combination of banality and stupidity, bucket loads of money, and a
dysfunctional need to meddle in everyone else's lives]).
But note what is going on here:
“The sandwich was reportedly mentioned in a lesson plan
last year. Verenice Gutierrez from the Harvey Scott K-8 School used it
as an example of a subtle form of racism in language, according to the
report.
“’What about Somali or Hispanic students, who might not eat sandwiches?’Gutierrez said, according to the Tribune.
‘Another way would be to say: ‘Americans eat peanut butter and jelly,
do you have anything like that?’ Let them tell you. Maybe they eat
torta. Or pita.’
“As part of a training program known as “Courageous Conversations” that has been phased into Portland schools in recent years, the Tribune reports that staff members at Gutierrez’s school have been going through trainings, classroom observations and exercises, such as reading a news article and then talking about it from the perspective of “white privilege.”
“The organization behind the program is Pacific Educational Group.
According to the group’s website, their aim is to help minority
students through initiatives that address racial educational
disparities, “intentionally, explicitly, and comprehensively.” (Emphasis
added)
The goofiness here is already in a reductio ad absurdum,
for the very next step would be for me to insist that Mexican or
Italian or Chinese or Japanese restaurants also carry “white American
male food and sandwiches” like roast beef and mashed potatoes,
otherwise, their offerings of chimichangas, tortillas, guacamole,
tempura, chow mein, or fettucini Alfredo would be “insensitive” and
“inherently and subconsciously racist” because they do not address
“cuisine disparities” of minorities, and that “menu reform” must be
“intentional, explicit, and comprehensive” (and to be really inclusive, we should include whale blubber for our Eskimo brothers… no, when it comes right down to it, all cuisine from everywhere should be represented on all menus, all the time… we should simply ban
the idea of Mexican, Italian, Chinese, German, Japanese, or any other
ethnic food altogether as being potentially offensive to everyone
else). Now, if you’re one of the sane people left in the country (and chances are, you’re not
insane if you’re not a recent product of “teacher certification” or a
“professional facilitator,”) then you probably don’t suffer from
paroxysms of umbrage at seeing a Mexican restaurant sign, and you
probably think – rightly – that my little exercise in cuisine
sensitivity is just so much insane nonsense, until it dawns on you (sane
non-teacher certified non-facilitator that you are), that the same
logic is behind the notion that peanut butter and jelly sandwiches are
racist (which implies that non-white people can’t enjoy peanut butter
and jelly without feeling offended, or, vice versa, that white people
are inherently incapable of enjoying “non-White” cuisine [whatever that is] without feelings of racial superiority, for that is the heaping steaming pile of horse puckey that her “logic” reduces to.)
Yes, it’s that bad in Portland, Oregon… and most of the rest of Amairikuh.
Also note what’s behind all this: the dreaded Medusa of the busybody
“facilitator” – we’ve all had our minds and hearts turned to stone by
her type of infantile nonsense at one time or another – whose head is
full of the trendy mush of pseudo-learning and mindless juvenile
“activities,” doubtless imbibed from some teacher certification program
and all of its attendant sensitivity blither. Her antennae are ever
twitching and pulsing with suspicion, eager to find some offense against
the sublime homogenization of political correctness, and the end result
of her insanely stupid intrusions into American schooling(as distinct
from education) is merely that there can never be an end to the formation of pseudo-groups to be “sensitive to”
until the culture collapses into a stew of competing special interests
to be arbitrated by her own intrusive narcissistic “training workshops”,
the only result of which is the empowerment of such lunatic
psychopaths, whose sole claim to power and authority is to “train” the
rest of us to be “sensitive” to their own made-up claptrap and
fantasized offenses. Let us be clear: these people are enemies; they are not, most decidedly not,
our friends, our children’s friends, or society’s and culture’s
friends. They exemplify, symbolize, and drive the collapse of our
culture. In a word: education in the United States is dead, and
each of us, to the extent we are able, is now responsible for
preserving the genuine hallmarks and monuments of Western civilization
and culture for ourselves and our friends and families, in direct and
subversive opposition to “the system”. In short, we must now all
educate not only ourselves, but our children, for if the pabulum in
Portland is any indicator, the system will not and cannot, because the
lunatics are running the asylum.
Let the motto be: “Beware the facilitator!” Eventually, with enough
luck and a lot of standing up against them and just REFUSAL to join
their silly mandated “training” or cooperate with them in any way, we
will be able to fire these people. That’s the only thing they deserve, and the only thing their “accomplishments” warrant.
During peak hours, Netflix accounts for more than thirty per cent of Internet down-streaming traffic in North America.Credit Illustration by Leo Espinosa
In
the spring of 2000, Reed Hastings, the C.E.O. of Netflix, hired a
private plane and flew from San Jose to Dallas for a summit meeting with
Blockbuster, the video-rental giant that had seventy-seven hundred
stores worldwide handling mostly VCR tapes. Three years earlier,
Hastings, then a thirty-six-year-old Silicon Valley engineer, had
co-founded Netflix around a pair of emerging technologies: DVDs, and a
Web site from which to order them. Now, for twenty dollars a month, the
site’s subscribers could rent an unlimited number of DVDs, one at a
time, for as long as they wished; the disks arrived in the mail, in
distinctive red envelopes. Eventually, Hastings was convinced, movies
would be rented even more cheaply and conveniently by streaming them
over the Internet, and popular films would always be in stock. But in
2000 Netflix had only about three hundred thousand subscribers and
relied on the U.S. Postal Service to deliver its DVDs; the company was
losing money. Hastings proposed an alliance.
“We
offered to sell a forty-nine-per-cent stake and take the name
Blockbuster.com,” Hastings told me recently. “We’d be their online
service.” Hastings, now fifty-three, has a trimmed, graying goatee and a
slow, soft voice. As he spoke, he was drinking Prosecco at an outdoor
table at Nick’s on Main, a favorite Italian restaurant of his, in Los
Gatos, an affluent community in the foothills of the Santa Cruz
Mountains. The sounds of Sinatra carried across the patio.
Blockbuster
wasn’t interested. The dot-com bubble had burst, and some film and
television executives, like those in publishing and music, did not yet
see a threat from digital media. Hastings flew home and set to work
promoting Netflix to the public as the friendly rental underdog. By the
time Blockbuster got around to offering its own online subscription
service, in 2004, it was too late. “If they had launched two years
earlier, they would have killed us,” Hastings said. By 2005, Netflix had
4.2 million subscribers, and its membership was growing steadily.
Hastings had rented a house outside Rome for a year with his wife, Patty
Quillin, and two children and was commuting to his Silicon Valley
office two weeks each month. Hollywood studios began offering the
company more movies to rent; the licensing arrangements presented a new
way to make money from their libraries and provided leverage against
Blockbuster.
By 2007, when Netflix began
streaming movies and TV shows directly to personal computers, it had all
but won the rental war. Last November, Blockbuster said that it was
going out of business; the previous month, Netflix had announced that it
had thirty-one million subscribers in the United States, three million
more than HBO, and that its stock was at an all-time high. In 2013, it
launched an original-programming series, “House of Cards,” which became a
critical hit. During peak hours, Netflix accounts for more than thirty
per cent of all Internet down-streaming traffic in North America, nearly
twice that of YouTube, its closest competitor. The Netflix Web site
describes the company as “the world’s leading Internet television
network.”
Hastings has succeeded, in large part,
by taking advantage of what he calls viewers’ ”managed dissatisfaction”
with traditional television: each hour of programming is crammed with
about twenty minutes of commercials and promotional messages for other
shows. Netflix carries no commercials; its revenue derives entirely from
subscription fees. Viewers are happy to pay a set fee, now eight
dollars a month, in order to watch, uninterrupted, their choice of films
or shows, whenever they want, on whatever device they want. “Think of
it as entertainment that’s more like books,” Hastings said. “You get to
control and watch, and you get to do all the chapters of a book at the
same time, because you have all the episodes.”
Television
is undergoing a digital revolution. Last autumn, in the company’s
annual “Long-Term View” report to shareholders, Netflix argued that “the
linear TV experience,” with its programs offered at set times, “is ripe
for replacement.” Hastings told me, “We are to cable networks as cable
networks were to broadcast networks.” But Netflix is just one of many
contenders. “It’s like little termites eating away,” Jason Hirschhorn,
an Internet entrepreneur and a former Viacom executive, told me. “I
don’t think the incumbents are insecure enough.”
In
the early days, television was both a box and the black-and-white world
that issued from it: quiz shows, soaps, Ed Sullivan, Edward R. Murrow,
“I Love Lucy.” Until the nineteen-eighties, the vast majority of the
shows were commissioned and carried by ABC, CBS, and NBC, which started
out as radio networks and were granted television licenses by the
F.C.C., with the expectation that they broadcast at no charge to
viewers. Audiences were rapt, and broadcasters made money by selling
spots to advertisers.
Today,
the audience for the broadcast networks is a third what it was in the
late seventies, lost to a proliferating array of viewing options. First
came cable-television networks, which delivered HBO, ESPN, CNN,
Nickelodeon, and dozens of other channels through a coaxial cable. Cable
operators and networks charged monthly fees and sold ads, and even
commercial-free premium networks such as HBO made money for cable
operators, because they attracted subscribers. Traditional broadcasters
saw their advertising income slow, but they compensated by charging
cable companies for carrying their content, a “retransmission consent”
fee made possible, in 1992, by the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act. Soon after, the F.C.C. relaxed rules that
restricted the networks’ ownership of prime-time programs, which opened a
new stream of revenue from the syndication of their shows to local
stations, cable networks, and other platforms.
The
advent of the Internet and streaming video brought new competitors. In
2011, Amazon made its streaming-video service, Instant Video, available
free to every customer who signs up for its Amazon Prime program, which,
for seventy-nine dollars a year, also provides free two-day shipping.
The arrangement inverts the traditional advertising model: instead of
forcing you to view commercials, video is the gift you get for shopping.
Amazon Prime subscribers number about twenty million, although the
number of those who are Instant Video viewers is certainly smaller. Last
fall, Amazon released its first original series, “Alpha House,” created
by Garry Trudeau. Apple, which popularized the purchase of digital
music, offers video sales and rentals through iTunes. It is not expected
to develop its own content.
The busiest
“television” platform in the world is YouTube, which is owned by Google
and has a billion unique visitors watching six billion hours of video
every month. Ynon Kreiz, the executive chairman of Maker Studios, the
world’s largest provider of online content, noted that its series “Epic
Rap Battles of History,” broadcast on YouTube, and which offers comical
face-offs between, say, a faux Miley Cyrus and Joan of Arc, attracts on
average forty million viewers—almost four times the viewership of the
finale of AMC’s “Breaking Bad.” YouTube makes money through what Robert
Kyncl, a vice-president at Google and the head of content and business
operations at YouTube, calls “frictionless” advertising, which allows
viewers to click on a TrueView button to skip ads and asks advertisers
to pay only when viewers watch the ad. YouTube claims that forty per
cent of its views are on mobile devices, a leap from just six per cent
in 2011.
“We now live in a world where every
device is a television,” Richard Greenfield, a media and technology
analyst for the New York-based B.T.I.G., told me. “TV is just becoming
video. My kids watch ‘Good Luck Charlie’ on Netflix. To my ten-year-old,
that’s TV.” Consumers don’t care “that a show is scheduled at eight
o’clock,” he said. Paul Saffo, a Silicon Valley technology forecaster,
says that couch potatoes have given way to “active hunters,” viewers who
“snack” and control what they watch and when.
Leslie
Moonves, the C.E.O. of the CBS Corporation, which includes CBS and
other networks, says he is untroubled. “For twenty-five years, I’ve been
hearing that network television is dead,” he told me. “We’re thriving
like never before.” CBS has been the top-ranked network in prime time
for ten of the past eleven years. On the day before we spoke, last
October, the company’s stock price had risen to nearly sixty dollars a
share, almost twenty times higher than its lowest share price in 2009.
Moonves is the most richly compensated executive in traditional media;
his total compensation in 2012 was sixty-two million dollars. He insists
that advertisers need a mass audience to introduce products, an
audience that only a broadcast network can deliver consistently. The CBS
Corporation is less dependent on commercials, which now account for
just over half of its revenues. The rest comes from its overseas sales,
which totalled $1.1 billion last year, and from licensing deals with
cable and digital platforms such as Verizon FiOS and Netflix; Netflix
pays CBS and Fox about two hundred and fifty million dollars each to let
it air programs from their archives.
Other
observers are more critical. The venture capitalist Marc Andreessen, who
co-invented Mosaic, the first commercial Internet browser—it later
became Netscape—told me, “TV in ten years is going to be one hundred per
cent streamed. On demand. Internet Protocol. Based on computers and
based on software.” He said that the television industry has managed the
transition to the digital age better than book publishers and music
executives, but “software is going to eat television in the exact same
way, ultimately, that software ate music and as it ate books.” In
2007, in an effort to combat Netflix, NBC and Fox—joined, two years
later, by ABC—created Hulu, a Web site that lets viewers watch current
and many past television shows but is subsidized by the same complement
of commercials seen on broadcasters’ Web sites. Five million viewers
subscribe to Hulu Plus, which, for eight dollars per month, offers more
current content and past shows, on multiple devices and with fewer
commercials.
Last year, Hulu began to invest
modestly in original programming. “Hulu is growing incredibly fast,”
Jason Kilar, its C.E.O. from 2008 until 2013, told me. “It generates one
billion dollars of revenue.” But Hulu has had an uneasy relationship
with its parent companies. In February, 2011, Kilar wrote a five-page
blog post that sketched out “the Hulu team’s point of view on the future
of TV.” Traditional TV, he wrote, “has too many ads,” and doesn’t serve
consumers, because viewers “want programs to start at a time that is
convenient for their schedules, not at a time dictated to them.” Hulu,
he promised, “is not burdened by that legacy.” In April of last year,
Kilar chose to leave the company, to start a new venture.
The
television industry has fared better than music and newspapers in part
because its factions are dependent on one another for revenue, and none
are eager to see the others vanish. Broadcast television has lost
viewers to cable networks but syndicates programs to them to rerun.
Cable systems battle with broadcast TV over retransmission fees but need
access to its programs. All are wary of Netflix but welcome either the
licensing fees or broadband customers. “Netflix is our friend, but also
our competitor,” Moonves said. “As is everybody.”
Hastings
grew up in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he attended private schools,
then got an undergraduate degree in math at Bowdoin College, in Maine.
After two years in Swaziland as a high-school math teacher for the Peace
Corps, he earned a master’s degree in computer science from Stanford
and landed in Silicon Valley. “I really loved software,” Hastings says.
“I never loved anything so much.” But, he adds, “The big thing Stanford
did for me was turn me on to the entrepreneurial model.”
In
1991, Hastings launched a company called Pure Software, built around
Purify, a popular computer program he’d created that identified bugs in
software programs. Andreessen, who used the debugging program for his
Mosaic and Netscape browsers, describes Purify as “one of the reasons
Mosaic worked and didn’t crash.” Pure Software took off, but Hastings
was unprepared to manage a company that, by 1996, had grown to six
hundred employees. “The product was excellent,” he said. “My management
style was not excellent.”
In 1997, Pure Software
was sold to Rational Software (which was later bought by I.B.M.) for
seven hundred million dollars, and Hastings soon left. After “a period
where I felt like a failure,” he concluded that he was spending too much
time thinking about engineering and too little thinking about how to
recruit and retain a team of capable people. He now lives in Santa Cruz
with Quillin and their two teen-age children. They have four shelter
dogs, and, in the back yard, four goats and ten chickens. He is involved
in various philanthropic ventures that promote charter schools and
education reform. “Unfortunately, and weirdly, I have almost no
hobbies,” he said. “I don’t sail, I don’t fish. I’m a pitiful failure as
a Renaissance man.”
Hastings founded Netflix,
in 1997, with Marc Randolph, who worked for him at Pure Software. To
manage the technical aspects of the Web site, he recruited Neil Hunt,
another mathematician and former colleague. Hunt helped to create a
“personalization” engine that would decipher what each subscriber liked
to watch, based on what the subscriber had watched before, and suggest
what he or she might want to see next. Similar advisory algorithms were
entering the home through TiVo, the digital video recorder introduced in
1999, and Amazon’s Web site. In 1999, Hastings hired Ted Sarandos, who
had been the vice-president of product and marketing for West Coast
Video, a Blockbuster-like company with nearly five hundred stores.
Sarandos had a deep knowledge of movies and television shows and began
to broaden the range of material that Netflix made available. In 2002,
the company turned profitable and went public.
Hastings
pressed his team to begin streaming movies and television shows over
the Internet. The film industry, worried about digital piracy, initially
resisted licensing its content to stream; and Netflix lacked access to
recent movies, because the studios had exclusive long-term deals to sell
them to HBO and other cable subscription channels such as Starz.
Finally, in 2008, Netflix made a deal with Starz to stream the movies it
had acquired. “We agreed to pay thirty million dollars annually,”
Sarandos said. “It was about three times my budget!” Starz
and other content providers realized that Netflix offered not only a
new source of revenue but also a way to build audiences for current
broadcast and cable shows, by allowing Netflix subscribers to watch
prior seasons. The ratings for the fifth season of AMC’s “Breaking Bad”
were more than double those of the season before, and several times
higher than those of Season One. “It seems to me close to inarguable
that, when past seasons were available, people were introduced to them
through on-demand services like Netflix,” Josh Sapan, the president and
C.E.O. of AMC Networks, told me. “They became engaged.” Between 2007,
when streaming began, and the end of 2009, Netflix subscriptions jumped
from 7.5 million to twelve million. Media executives dismissed the
notion that Netflix was a threat. In 2010, Jeff Bewkes, the C.E.O. of
Time Warner, told the Times, “It’s a little bit like, is the Albanian army going to take over the world?,” adding, “I don’t think so.”
Hastings
told me that he treated Bewkes’s comment “as a badge of honor. For the
next year, I wore Albanian Army dog tags around my neck. It was my
rosary beads of motivation.” Netflix continued to expand, making itself
available on game consoles, mobile phones, tablets, and other streaming
devices, such as Apple TV and Roku—and, for the first time outside the
U.S., in Canada. It reached licensing agreements to air complete
previous seasons of programs from ABC, NBC, Fox, CBS, and the leading
cable networks.
Whatever Hastings’s ambitions, he
was eager not to appear to be competing with his sources of content. In
its first-quarter report for 2011, Netflix declared that it was
“fundamentally correct” to characterize the company as “rerun TV.” But
the broadcast networks would not sell Netflix the current seasons of
television shows; customers had to turn to Hulu. For Hulu, the networks
defensively bought the rights to popular cable programs like “The Daily
Show with Jon Stewart” and “The Colbert Report,” which are not available
on Netflix.
Hastings
sees his main competitors as Showtime and, especially, HBO. Both have
lucrative arrangements with cable providers, through which they offer a
library of shows and movies to watch on demand; and both now offer
apps—HBO Go and Showtime Anytime—that enable cable subscribers to watch
any of those channels’ programs on any device. HBO has more than two and
a half times as many subscribers worldwide as Netflix—a hundred and
fourteen million—and its list of original hits, from “The Sopranos” to
“Game of Thrones,” is extensive. In
the spring of 2011, Netflix announced that it was aggressively entering
the business of original programming. The company spent a hundred
million dollars to make the two-season, twenty-six-episode political
thriller “House of Cards,” directed by David Fincher and starring Kevin
Spacey. The director and the actor had approached several networks;
Netflix offered to approve the project without seeing a pilot or
test-marketing it with viewers. Last year, Spacey told an audience at
the Guardian Edinburgh International Television Festival, “Netflix was
the only network that said, ‘We believe in you. We’ve run our data and
it tells us that our audience would watch this series. We don’t need you
to do a pilot. How many do you wanna do?’ ”
Netflix
tracks not only its subscribers’ preferences and habits but also how
quickly they watch each episode and how many episodes they watch in one
night. It has organized its library into seventy-nine thousand
categories—Foreign Sci-Fi & Fantasy, Dark Thrillers Based on
Books—to better predict what you might want to watch next. “There’s a
whole lot of Ph.D.-level math and statistics involved,” Hunt says. The
Netflix database indicated that the original series on which “House of
Cards” was based, a British production with the same name, was popular
with Netflix users. So were political thrillers, Fincher’s films (“Fight
Club,” “The Social Network”), and Spacey, who has starred in a range of
movies, including “Se7en” (another Fincher film) and “The Usual
Suspects.”
But, in September of 2011, Hastings
made a major miscalculation. Netflix’s DVD rentals were falling, and the
company had announced that it was splitting its subscription in two:
one for DVDs by mail, a second for online streaming. Hastings then
announced that the DVD rentals would now be handled by a new entity,
Qwikster. Hastings had seen how companies such as AOL had been slow to
replace dial-up Internet access with broadband. “I was so obsessed with
not getting trapped by DVDs the way AOL got trapped, the way Kodak did,
the way Blockbuster did,” he told me. “We would say, Every business we
could think of died because they were too cautious.” Netflix’s combined
subscription rate rose by sixty per cent, to sixteen dollars a month,
and thousands of customers posted complaints on the company’s Web site.
Eight hundred thousand subscribers abandoned the service, and the stock
price plummeted. By October, Netflix had reversed the decision to split
itself into two companies. The
crisis soon faded. “House of Cards,” which appeared in February, 2013,
won three Emmys—the first time a non-traditional television show had won
the award. In October of 2013, Netflix’s stock price surpassed its
all-time peak, approaching four hundred dollars per share, although the
company’s third-quarter net income was only thirty-two million dollars.
(HBO’s earnings exceeded $1.7 billion on five billion dollars in
revenues.) By the end of 2013, Netflix’s stock had tripled in value
since the beginning of the year, and the board voted to boost Hastings’s
total compensation to six million dollars.
Television
today faces two major threats. The first is to the advertising model.
About fifty per cent of viewing households use a digital video recorder.
Between half to two-thirds of those households skip the ads, and new
features, such as those on the Hopper, a DVR with the Dish satellite
network, allow viewers to do so instantly on select shows. Every viewer
who skips an ad, or who leaves a broadcast or cable channel to watch
Netflix or another ad-free service, is evidence to advertisers that
television airtime isn’t worth what it once was—a conclusion that will
eventually mean less revenue for broadcast and cable networks. Sixty-six
billion dollars—four out of every ten media dollars—is spent annually
on TV commercials, according to Sir Martin Sorrell, the chairman and
C.E.O. of W.P.P., the world’s second-largest advertising and marketing
agency. Sorrell told me that W.P.P. has shifted eighteen billion
dollars, or thirty-five per cent of its advertising expenditures, to
digital media since 2000.
The second threat is
existential. Starting around 2008, viewers could stream video services
through the television only by attaching another device, such as a DVD
player, an Xbox, a Nintendo Wii, or an Apple TV. The streaming services
are getting cheaper and easier to use. Last July, Google released
Chromecast, a device that looks like a flash drive (you plug it into
your TV’s HDMI port) and allows you to stream from such sources as
Netflix, YouTube, Hulu Plus, Google Play, or whatever you happen to be
watching on Google’s Chrome Web browser. The device costs thirty-five
dollars. As consumers grow more aware of such options, they are bound to
ask why they bother subscribing to cable television.
The
latest menace is Aereo; for eight or twelve dollars a month, the
service connects each customer to a remote, dime-size antenna that
allows members in almost two dozen cities to watch over-the-air
broadcasts or record shows in a cloud-based DVR. Chet Kanojia, an
engineer and the company’s C.E.O., says that he created Aereo to help
spare people the cost and the waste of the typical cable bundle.
Technically, one can still watch broadcast television using just an
antenna, but people have grown accustomed to the more reliable picture,
and to the DVR functions, that cable provides; and broadcasters have
come to rely on the retransmission fees. Still, Kanojia wondered, why
should viewers have to pay an expensive cable bill if mostly what they
want to watch are the broadcast channels?
“Consumers
had the right to this programming because it was free to air,” Kanojia
said. As he describes it, Aereo merely allows customers to connect to
antennae that receive broadcast signals. (You can fast-forward past the
ads when watching recorded shows.) But TV executives don’t see it that
way. “It’s a technology that basically wants to steal our signal,”
Moonves said. “How do you take our signal”—and the programs that CBS has
paid for—“and sell it to customers?” So far, Aereo has successfully
convinced some courts that the technology is little different from the
antennae that television viewers once mounted on their rooftops. The
Supreme Court is expected to rule on Aereo’s legitimacy by July. In
2013, at his annual investor conference, John Malone, the chairman of
Liberty Media Corporation, which has investments in cable companies,
said that cable executives needed to respond more creatively to these
new technologies. He urged his colleagues to create an Internet-based
streaming service to rival Netflix. As an example, he cited Comcast’s
XFinity, which, like Hulu, offers streaming video. Last week, Verizon
announced plans to acquire Intel Media, the chip-maker’s digital-TV
division, in a further effort to make TV available anywhere and on any
screen.
Jeff Bewkes, of Time Warner, which no
longer owns or has a stake in the cable company of the same name,
assails the “lunacy” of the many cable-system owners trying “to protect
their culture of gatekeeper.” Last year, ABC, Fox, and NBC, which had
been planning to sell Hulu, decided to hold on to it, to compete with
Netflix. “The digital space was too important,” Chase Carey, the
president and C.O.O. of 21st Century Fox, told me. To keep viewers from
skipping ads, the cable industry has embraced an antediluvian strategy:
offer more comprehensive video on demand, including the newest episodes
of many of broadcast TV’s biggest hits, at no extra cost, but with
fast-forwarding disabled. Customers
may be starting to revolt. Time Warner has lost cable subscribers in
each of the past eighteen quarters. Cable-system owners blame the
decline on the networks, which force them to carry expensive bundles of
channels that many viewers don’t want; according to analysts, ESPN alone
accounts for roughly six dollars in every cable bill, even for viewers
who never watch it. “The largest concentration of power is in the hands
of a few content companies,” Glenn Britt, who retired as the C.E.O. of
Time Warner Cable in December, told me. “If a distributor wants ESPN, he
or she has to pretty much buy everything Disney”—which controls
ESPN—“sells, because that’s how it’s sold.” Britt said that between
those costs and the retransmission fees paid to networks, which are
projected to rise from three billion to almost four billion dollars this
year, the portion of a subscriber’s bill spent on basic cable
television could exceed the current average of seventy-five dollars a
month.
What Netflix and the other new platforms
still can’t offer is the kind of appointment viewing—the Olympics, the
Super Bowl, the Oscars, “American Idol”—that has been the mainstay of
broadcast television and certain cable operators. The networks pay huge
sums for the exclusive rights to broadcast these events. The future of
traditional television, Hastings says, is in airing more live events,
which attract higher advertising rates. In December, NBC broadcast a
live musical, “The Sound of Music,” starring Carrie Underwood. Although
critics panned it, nearly nineteen million people watched it that night,
the biggest NBC Thursday-night, non-sports audience in almost a decade.
Among the few executives who express no concern about the shifting
television terrain are those involved in sports. “The only certainty is
sports,” David Stern, the commissioner of the N.B.A., told me. Hastings
agrees. “For a hundred million dollars,” he told me, “we could get the
Badminton League!”
Without
commercial interruptions, Hastings argues, the viewing experience has
become more immersive and sustained. When Netflix released “House of
Cards,” it made the entire first season of episodes available at once,
and viewers binged. Cindy Holland, Netflix’s vice-president of original
content, told me that the average Netflix viewer watches two and a half
episodes in one sitting. The creative experience is different, too, she
said; making “House of Cards” was akin to making “a thirteen-hour
movie.” There was no need to recap previous episodes or to insert
cliffhangers. Increasingly, show creators can work without executives’
notes, focus groups, concerns about ratings, and anxieties about whether
advertisers will resist having their products slotted after a nude
scene or one laced with obscenity.
“There’s a
reason why people now talk about this as the golden age of scripted
drama,” Michael Lynton, the C.E.O. of Sony Entertainment, told me. “You
can write a character that grows over the course of thirteen hours of
television. That’s more attractive than a two-hour movie.” The
opportunities have enticed strong writers, directors, and actors.
“What’s happened as a result of this is a flourishing of an entirely new
kind of television.”
Netflix
has also begun investing heavily in children’s programming; last June,
it signed a five-year deal with DreamWorks Animation, which will produce
three hundred hours of original animated kids’ shows. “We have become
Netflix’s single largest supplier of original kids’ content,” Jeffrey
Katzenberg, the C.E.O. of DreamWorks Animation, said. The effort is part
of a long-term strategy to train viewers to watch Netflix. “It’s
habit-forming,” Sarandos, Netflix’s chief content officer, said.
But
there are other ways to consume video than those which Netflix has in
mind. Brian Robbins, the founder of AwesomenessTV, a provider of YouTube
channels, first gained recognition in the mid-nineteen-eighties as a
young actor on “Head of the Class,” an ABC sitcom. He went on to direct
more than ten movies, including “Varsity Blues,” before becoming a
writer and a producer for long-running children’s programs on
Nickelodeon. Four years ago, his agent told him about Fred, a teen-ager
from Nebraska who had his own YouTube channel. Fred recorded short rants
in a screechy voice on such topics as staying in a fancy hotel room and
dreaming of being a famous actor. His real name was Lucas Cruikshank,
and his hotel riff drew twenty-three million views, more than the
biggest hit show on television. Fred’s videos were a few minutes long,
perfectly tailored to the medium. Robbins came home that night and asked
his tween children, “You know who Fred is?” They did.
Robbins
decided to make a movie with Fred. “I had a relationship with Paramount
but knew they wouldn’t do it,” Robbins told me. So, in August of 2009,
he put up a million dollars; four months later, he had a ninety-minute
movie, about a boy trying to get a girl to fall in love with him. He
sold “Fred: The Movie” to Nickelodeon, and it proved so popular that two
more Fred movies and a twenty-four-episode series, “Fred: The Show,”
followed. Robbins decided to form a company, AwesomenessTV, to create
content for YouTube channels—there are more than half a billion on
YouTube.com. In the world of YouTube, not only is every device a
television but every viewer is a potential network and content provider.
Robbins
works in a brick-walled office in a two-story industrial building in
West Los Angeles. He has thirty young employees, and he roams around in
jeans, a T-shirt, and shiny black sneakers. Just before Thanksgiving in
2012, AwesomenessTV ran a promotion asking subscribers, “Do you want to
be the next YouTube star?” Two hundred thousand teen-agers responded,
and nearly half of them started their own YouTube channels, attracting
sixty million unique monthly visitors. Today, eighty-five thousand kids
have channels on AwesomenessTV, and thirty-one million teens and tweens
have visited the site. “When you speak to kids, the No. 1 thing they
want is to be famous,” Robbins said. “They don’t even know for what.”
Advertisers
want to reach this young demographic. Last May, DreamWorks Animation
bought Robbins’s company, for thirty-three million dollars. Katzenberg
told me that, “by the end of next year, under AwesomenessTV, we could
have as many daily active users as the Disney Channel, Cartoon Network,
and Nickelodeon together.”
Established
executives in traditional TV are reassured by Nielsen ratings suggesting
that, of the forty-two hours of television that Americans watch each
week, only three hours are on portable devices or computers. But Pat
McDonough, a senior vice-president of analysis at Nielsen, concedes that
the company does not have the capability to compile smartphone usage
among very young people. “For mobile devices, we are not measuring below
age thirteen today,” she said. And yet, she noted, “We think there’s a
lot of consumption on their parents’ devices.” Although viewers under
twenty-four watch less traditional television than ever, McDonough was
confident that they would grow into the habit. “The older you get, the
more you watch,” she said.
Robbins disagrees:
“That’s like saying when color TV came in that people were going to go
back to watching black-and-white television when they got older, because
that’s what their parents and grandparents did!” He added, “The next
generation, our audience and even younger, they don’t even know what
live TV is. They live in an on-demand world.”
Hastings
predicts that by 2016 half of all television will be delivered by the
Internet, and he expects Netflix to be an ever bigger part of it. Over
dinner, he asserted that the company can double or even triple its
domestic audience: “I think sixty to ninety million subscribers is
Netflix’s potential U.S. market.” Netflix is also expanding aggressively
overseas, where almost a quarter of its forty-four million subscribers
live.
To hold its own against HBO and video on
demand, Netflix will have to invest further in original content. It
spends only about two hundred and fifty million dollars on originals,
some eight per cent of its three-billion-dollar programming budget. HBO
spends four times as much. And unlike HBO, which owns the sixty-eight
series it has produced, Netflix owns only the first-window streaming
rights of its programs, including “House of Cards.” Sarandos boasts that
eighty per cent of Netflix’s current spending is on “exclusive”
content, but this simply means that Netflix licenses these programs
exclusively for a limited period, after which they may be sold
elsewhere. Netflix is still largely dependent on the film and television
studios, which can raise their licensing fees as they wish.
February 4, 2013“It’s a simple stress test—I do your bloodwork, send it to the lab, and never Most
Wall Street analysts extoll the virtues of Netflix, pointing to its
impressive subscriber growth, but Michael Pachter, an analyst at Wedbush
Securities, is a skeptic. He says that Netflix is spending more than
what is reflected in its earnings. In 2012, the company reported a net
income of seventeen million dollars on revenues of $3.6 billion, yet its
free cash flow was a negative fifty-eight million dollars. At the end
of 2013, its cash flow was a negative sixteen million dollars, while its
net income was a hundred and twelve million. (Its cash balance,
however, was $1.2 billion.) The gap is hidden because the cost of
programming gets amortized over the life of the license, Pachter says:
“It’s a big ticking time bomb.” He believes that Netflix has to either
slow spending or raise its monthly subscription price. But Netflix’s
strategy—grab the market first, worry about profits later—is common
among Internet startups, and has worked well for Amazon and Facebook.
Hastings dismissed Pachter’s assessment: “Michael Pachter has been
bearish about Netflix since 2005, when he put a three-dollar price
target on us and wrote that we were ‘a worthless piece of crap.’ He
continues to be wrong.” In
the long run, Hastings has a bigger worry: whether Netflix will be as
readily accessible to its customers as it is now. Netflix, YouTube,
Amazon Instant Video, and the other streaming-video providers all
require a broadband connection. That’s an integral, and lucrative, part
of the dread cable bill and will become only more so. “The future is
broadband,” Hastings concedes. “That business has nearly
one-hundred-per-cent margins.”
Glenn Britt, of
Time Warner, said that he could envisage cable-systems operators giving
up on the cable-television portion of their business altogether: “It may
be perfectly viable in the future for a cable company to say, ‘I’m
losing enough money selling television; I’m just going to sell
broadband.’ ” Andreessen said, “The cable bundle is melting ice cream.
Cable should aggressively shift over to a broadband service now and get
out of programming and raise prices and free up broadband so it can
offer higher speeds on all devices.” That would be a major blow to
broadcast and cable networks, Britt said, but “right now the content
companies are in denial that that could ever happen.” Verizon and A.T.
& T. have broadband networks, but DirecTV, Dish Network, and other
satellite television providers, which together serve about fifty million
subscribers, do not. Presumably,
cable operators will look for ways to charge more for broadband
service, perhaps by placing a meter on subscribers’ Internet usage, just
as power companies do with electricity. Last week, a federal court
struck down F.C.C. rules, adopted in 2010, that required broadband
providers to treat all Internet traffic equally. The decision appears to
grant Verizon, Comcast, Time Warner Cable, and others much greater
leverage in deciding how they can bundle and sell Internet access to
their customers. The cable operators could work out deals with specific
content providers—e-mail might cost less than gaming, and providers
might offer, say, YouTube and Amazon Instant Video at a lower price, but
Hulu or Netflix at a higher one. Last week, in a letter to
shareholders, Netflix noted that providers “now can legally impede the
video streams that members request from Netflix. . . . The motivation
could be to get Netflix to pay fees to stop this degradation.”
The
court’s decision will likely be appealed. “But, if cable companies try
to charge more to Netflix and Google, digital companies may buy their
own pipes,” Andreessen said. In 2012, Google launched Fiber, which
offers Internet and television service that’s a hundred times faster
than average broadband speeds, using fibre-optic cables; but so far
Fiber has wired only Kansas City and Provo, Utah; Austin is next.
With
Internet television, customers have grown accustomed to the idea that
they might really have it all, whenever they want. What’s unclear is
whether that freedom will cost more than the current bargain. Last week,
in a conference call with analysts, Hastings said that if broadband
providers tried to block Netflix this would “fuel the fire for more
regulation.” But he also said that Netflix is considering a
tiered-pricing plan; this might raise rates for new subscribers. And he
emphasized his company’s leverage: the broadband providers “want to
expand,” and providing “a good Netflix experience” is vital to that
effort. “Our economic interests are pretty co-aligned.” ♦
Ken Auletta began contributing to The New Yorker in 1977 and has written the Annals of Communications column since 1993.