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The 2026 Promise: Will Everything Really Change?
California high-speed rail officials say 2026 will be a breakthrough year. They've said that before. Here's what's actually happening—and why you should be skeptical.
Abstract
In December 2025, California High-Speed Rail Authority CEO Brian Kelly told the Fresno Bee that 2026 would be "the year everything changes" for the beleaguered project. After 17 years, $15.7 billion spent, and zero operational track for passengers, Kelly promised that 2026 would see completion of the Central Valley guideway, opening the door to track installation and—eventually—actual trains. This isn't the first time officials have promised a breakthrough year. This paper examines what's actually supposed to happen in 2026, why it matters (or doesn't), the brutal math behind the project's failures, and whether there's any reason to believe this time is different. Spoiler: probably not. But the story of why California keeps promising transformation while delivering disappointment reveals everything wrong with American infrastructure—and everything we need to understand if we ever hope to build anything ambitious again.
1. December 2025: The Promise Returns
Brian Kelly, CEO of the California High-Speed Rail Authority, sat down with the Fresno Bee in mid-December 2025. His message was optimistic, almost defiant: 2026 would be transformative. After years of criticism, delays, and budget explosions, the project was finally about to turn a corner.
According to Kelly, by the end of 2026, the Authority would complete 70 miles of elevated guideway through California's Central Valley—the concrete structures that will eventually support high-speed trains. With that infrastructure in place, contractors could begin installing track. After track comes electrical systems, then signaling, then testing. And then, perhaps by 2030-2033, passengers might actually ride trains between Merced and Bakersfield.
Not Los Angeles to San Francisco, as originally promised. Not even Sacramento to San Diego, as once envisioned. Just Merced to Bakersfield—two cities most Californians couldn't locate on a map, connected by high-speed rail traversing agricultural land in the Central Valley.
But Kelly's framing was telling: "2026 could be the year everything changes." Not "will be." Could be. After 17 years and nearly $16 billion spent, even the CEO won't commit to certainty.
What Actually Happens in 2026?
Let's be precise about what Kelly is actually promising:
The 2026 Deliverables (According to Kelly)
- Complete the guideway: 70 miles of elevated concrete structures finished
- Begin track installation: Laying the actual rails on the completed guideway
- Attract private investment: Kelly believes completion will convince private investors to fund extensions
- Demonstrate viability: Prove the project can actually deliver infrastructure, not just consume money
Notice what's NOT promised for 2026: trains running, passengers riding, revenue being generated, extensions being built, Los Angeles or San Francisco being connected. The promise is merely that the concrete part will be done, allowing the next phase to begin.
In construction terms, this is like celebrating that you've poured the foundation of your house. Crucial? Yes. But you're years away from moving in, and you haven't even started on the walls, roof, plumbing, or electrical.
The Private Investment Gambit
Kelly's real bet isn't on 2026 completing the guideway—that's fairly certain at this point. His bet is that completion will catalyze private investment to extend the system beyond the initial Central Valley segment.
The logic: investors have been skeptical because nothing was built. Once something tangible exists—70 miles of guideway plus track—investors will see it's real and commit billions to extend north toward Sacramento and south toward Bakersfield, eventually reaching Los Angeles.
This is, to put it mildly, optimistic. Private investors aren't stupid. They can do math. And the math of California high-speed rail is catastrophic.
2. The Brutal Math: Promise vs Reality
To understand why 2026's promise rings hollow, you need to understand the numbers—numbers that tell a story of systematic failure at every level.
The 2008 Promise
When California voters approved Proposition 1A in November 2008, they were sold a specific vision:
- Cost: $33 billion for the full system
- Route: San Francisco to Los Angeles (with extensions to Sacramento and San Diego)
- Travel time: 2 hours 40 minutes SF to LA
- Completion: Operational by 2020
- Ridership: 41 million passengers annually by 2030
- Revenue: Profitable from operations, no ongoing subsidies needed
Voters authorized $9 billion in bonds. The rest would come from federal grants, private investment, and other sources. It was ambitious but seemed achievable—other countries had built high-speed rail for similar costs.
The 2025 Reality
Seventeen years later, here's what actually exists:
What $15.7 Billion Bought
- Operational track: Zero miles
- Guideway completed: ~50-60 miles (not yet 70)
- Passengers carried: Zero
- Revenue generated: Zero
- Cities connected: Zero
- When passengers might ride: 2030-2033 (maybe) between Merced and Bakersfield
- Current cost estimate for full LA-SF system: $128 billion
- Funding secured for full system: Nowhere close
Let that sink in: $15.7 billion spent, zero passengers carried. That's roughly $15.7 billion per passenger mile delivered. Infinity dollars per operational mile. The worst return on investment in American infrastructure history.
The Cost Explosion Explained
How does a $33 billion project become $128 billion? Several factors combined catastrophically:
- Land acquisition: Acquiring rights-of-way through private property proved far more expensive than estimated. California's strong property rights mean every landowner can fight, delay, and extract maximum compensation.
- Environmental litigation: Multiple lawsuits delayed construction for years, adding billions in carrying costs and inflation.
- Engineering challenges: California is seismically active. Building earthquake-resistant elevated guideway costs exponentially more than projections assumed.
- Scope changes: Safety requirements, station designs, and route modifications all added costs.
- Political interference: Route changes to satisfy local politicians (like the "Palmdale detour") added distance and cost.
- Labor costs: California's prevailing wage laws and union requirements mean construction costs far exceed national averages.
- Project management: The Authority has been criticized for poor management, contractor disputes, and lack of expertise.
But the fundamental problem is simpler: the 2008 estimates were fantasy. Whether intentionally low-balled to win voter approval or genuinely naive about California's challenges, the $33 billion figure bore no relationship to reality.
3. Why We're Building in the Wrong Place
Perhaps the most damning aspect of California's high-speed rail isn't the cost overruns or delays—it's where they chose to build first.
The Central Valley Decision
The project is building through California's Central Valley—Merced to Bakersfield—before connecting to Los Angeles or San Francisco. This decision, made around 2012-2015 after it became clear the full system was unaffordable, created what critics call a "train to nowhere."
Why build here first? The official reasons:
- Flat terrain: Easier and cheaper than tunneling through mountains or building through dense urban areas
- Fewer property owners: Acquiring agricultural land is simpler than urban property
- Less litigation: Fewer powerful interests to fight the project
- "Shovel-ready": Could begin construction quickly to meet federal grant deadlines
The real reason? They needed to spend federal money before deadlines expired, and building in the Central Valley was the only thing they could start quickly.
The "Train to Nowhere" Problem
But building Merced to Bakersfield first creates massive problems:
Why Central Valley First Is Catastrophic
- No market: Almost nobody wants to travel between Merced and Bakersfield at high speed. Combined metro population: ~1.2 million. Compare to LA-SF: ~20 million.
- No connections: The segment connects to nothing. No major airports, no existing rail networks, no population centers.
- No revenue: When operational, it will lose money. Who subsidizes it while waiting for extensions?
- Stranded asset risk: If extensions never get built (likely), California will own expensive infrastructure serving nobody.
- Political vulnerability: A money-losing "train to nowhere" is easy to attack and hard to defend.
Transportation experts call this "building the least useful section first." It's like building a bridge from nowhere to nowhere and hoping someone later builds roads to connect it to cities.
The rational approach would have been building an urban segment first—say, San Francisco to San Jose, or Los Angeles to Anaheim. These would immediately serve millions, generate revenue, and demonstrate utility. But they're also far more expensive and politically complex.
So California chose to build where it was easy, not where it was useful. The result: 17 years later, we have guideway in the wrong place, serving no one, generating no revenue, and convincing no one that the project makes sense.
4. The Pattern of Broken Promises
Kelly's 2026 promise isn't the first time officials have declared a breakthrough year was imminent. Looking at the pattern reveals systematic over-promising:
A Timeline of "Breakthrough" Promises
- 2008: "Operational by 2020!"
- 2012: "Construction starting, momentum building!"
- 2015: "Central Valley segment making progress!"
- 2018: "Major construction milestones achieved!"
- 2021: "Guideway taking shape, track installation soon!"
- 2023: "Substantial completion approaching!"
- 2025: "2026 will be the year everything changes!"
Each time, the promise is the same: we're finally turning the corner, progress is accelerating, skeptics will be proven wrong. And each time, reality disappoints.
Why does this pattern persist? Several reasons:
- Institutional incentive: The Authority's existence depends on the project continuing. Optimism justifies continued funding.
- Political cover: Elected officials who backed the project need to show progress to voters.
- Genuine belief: Some officials truly believe each setback is temporary and success is imminent.
- Contractor pressure: Construction firms with billions at stake lobby for continued funding.
- Sunk cost fallacy: "We've spent $16 billion, we can't stop now!"
5. The Trump Factor: Federal Funding Evaporates
Kelly's 2026 optimism faces an immediate challenge: in December 2024, the incoming Trump administration announced plans to rescind $4 billion in federal grants to California High-Speed Rail.
This isn't surprising—Trump has been a vocal critic, calling the project "a disaster" and "a complete waste of money." His administration views it as a symbol of California Democratic mismanagement and federal dollars wasted on a project that will never work.
The $4 billion represents a significant chunk of the project's remaining committed funding. Without it, completing even the Central Valley segment becomes questionable. Extensions beyond that become nearly impossible without a radical funding breakthrough.
Kelly's response? Double down on the private investment pitch. If federal money disappears, private capital must fill the gap. But this creates a circular problem: private investors won't commit until they see the project is viable, but the project can't prove viability without completing enough track to carry passengers, which requires money investors won't provide until viability is proven.
This catch-22 is fatal for most mega-projects. California's bet is that completing the Central Valley guideway breaks the cycle—that 70 miles of concrete will somehow convince investors to commit billions despite the project's catastrophic history.
History suggests otherwise.
6. Will 2026 Actually Change Anything?
So back to the original question: will 2026 be the year everything changes?
The optimistic case:
- Guideway completion demonstrates the project can deliver infrastructure
- Track installation begins, showing continued momentum
- Private investors, seeing tangible progress, commit capital for extensions
- Political support solidifies around a project that's finally building something
- By 2030-2033, trains run between Merced and Bakersfield, proving the concept
- Success breeds success: extensions follow, system eventually reaches LA and SF
The realistic case:
- Guideway gets finished (probably, though maybe delayed to 2027)
- Track installation begins but proceeds slowly due to funding constraints
- Private investors remain skeptical; commitments are minimal or non-existent
- Federal funding under Trump is rescinded, creating $4B hole
- Project continues limping forward, burning through remaining committed funds
- By 2030, maybe trains run between Merced-Bakersfield, losing money and serving few
- Extensions remain unfunded pipe dreams
- Project becomes permanent political football—too expensive to kill, too compromised to succeed
The pessimistic case:
- Federal money disappears entirely
- State funding dries up as economic challenges mount
- Track installation stalls due to lack of funds
- Project enters "suspended animation"—guideway sits unused, gradually deteriorating
- By 2030, California owns $20+ billion in concrete structures that never carry trains
- Project is eventually canceled, becoming the most expensive infrastructure failure in U.S. history
Which scenario is most likely? Probably something between realistic and pessimistic. The project has demonstrated remarkable political durability—it survives because too many people have too much invested (financially and reputationally) to let it die. But it also hasn't demonstrated any ability to deliver on promises or attract the additional funding needed for completion.
So the likely outcome: 2026 sees guideway completion, track installation begins, the project continues consuming money at a slower pace, and in 2030 we're writing articles asking "Will 2031 be the year everything changes?"
Conclusion: The Promise We Keep Making
California High-Speed Rail has been promising transformation for 17 years. Each year brings new promises of imminent breakthroughs. Each year delivers modest construction progress and massive cost overruns. The 2026 promise fits this pattern perfectly.
Will 2026 be different? Probably not fundamentally. The guideway will likely be completed—that's concrete enough (literally) to probably happen. But the larger promises—private investment, rapid extension, eventual success—rest on the same shaky assumptions that have failed for nearly two decades.
The real question isn't whether 2026 changes everything. It's whether California can ever admit that the project, as conceived, has failed and needs radical reimagining—or cancellation. That conversation requires honesty about costs, utility, alternatives, and opportunity costs. It requires acknowledging that sunk costs are sunk, that promises made in 2008 bear no relationship to 2025 reality, and that sometimes the right decision is to cut losses rather than throw good money after bad.
But that conversation isn't happening. Instead, we get another promise of a breakthrough year. Another assurance that this time is different. Another request for patience and continued funding.
Maybe 2026 will surprise us. Maybe private investors will materialize. Maybe the project will finally deliver something approaching its promises.
Or maybe—more likely—we'll be writing the same article in 2027, 2028, and 2029, each time asking whether next year will be the year everything changes.
In our next paper, we'll examine what actually got built between 2020-2024—the pandemic years when construction continued but the world changed around California's most ambitious infrastructure project.
