The Three Gorges Dam Engineering Triumph and the Human Cost Part 2: The Scale of Construction and the Catastrophe of Displacement

The Three Gorges Dam

Engineering Triumph and the Human Cost

Part 2: The Scale of Construction and the Catastrophe of Displacement

A collaborative research series by Randy T Gipe and Claude (Anthropic)
December 2025

The Three Gorges Dam is, by any technical measure, one of the most impressive structures ever built by human beings.

It stands 185 meters tall—roughly the height of a 60-story building—and stretches 2,335 meters across the Yangtze River, making it nearly five times the size of the Hoover Dam.¹ Behind it lies a reservoir 660 kilometers long, holding 39.3 billion cubic meters of water—a volume equivalent to filling 15.7 million Olympic swimming pools.²

The dam houses 26 massive turbine generators, each rated at 700 megawatts, yielding a total installed capacity of 22,500 megawatts (22.5 gigawatts). This displaced Brazil's Itaipu Dam as the world's largest power station. Once fully operational, the Three Gorges Dam generates approximately 84 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually—enough to power the entire United Kingdom for nearly three months.³

The project required 27.2 million cubic meters of concrete and 463,000 tons of steel. For comparison, the Great Pyramid of Giza contains roughly 2.5 million cubic meters of stone—meaning the Three Gorges Dam used more than ten times the material volume of humanity's most iconic ancient structure.⁴

The engineering is, without question, a triumph.

But engineering does not exist in isolation. Every cubic meter of concrete, every megawatt of capacity, every kilometer of reservoir came at a cost—measured not just in yuan but in human lives, social stability, and the integrity of governance itself.

The same state apparatus that built the world's largest power station systematically failed the people it displaced to make room for it.

This is the paradox at the heart of the Three Gorges Dam: it succeeded as infrastructure and failed as policy. This post examines both dimensions—the scale of what was built, and the immense human wreckage left in its wake.

I. The Engineering: Physical Scale and Technical Achievement

A Concrete Gravity Structure at Unprecedented Scale

The Three Gorges Dam is located near the town of Sandouping in Hubei province, approximately 40 kilometers upstream from the Gezhouba Dam and 1,800 kilometers from the Yangtze's mouth at Shanghai. Its design is a straight-crested concrete gravity dam—meaning it resists the force of the reservoir through its sheer mass rather than through arching or buttressing.⁵

The dam's crest elevation is 185 meters above sea level. The normal pool level—the water elevation during standard operations—is set at 175 meters, creating what Chinese officials called a "high gorge, smooth lake" (高峡平湖, gāoxiá pínghú), echoing Mao Zedong's 1956 poem.⁶

Key Physical Specifications:
• Length: 2,335 meters (7,660 feet)
• Height: 185 meters (607 feet)
• Reservoir Length: 660 kilometers (410 miles)
• Total Storage Capacity: 39.3 billion cubic meters
• Flood Control Capacity: 22.15 billion cubic meters
• Power Generation Capacity: 22,500 MW (22.5 GW)
• Annual Power Output: ~84 billion kWh⁷

The reservoir extends from the dam site all the way to Chongqing, transforming what was once a turbulent, rapid-filled stretch of the Yangtze into a navigable waterway capable of accommodating oceangoing freighters. To manage ship traffic, the project includes a sophisticated dual navigation system: a five-stage ship lock capable of handling large cargo vessels (though passage requires at least 2.5 hours) and a vertical ship lift for smaller vessels, which reduces transit time significantly.⁸

Construction Timeline: From River Closure to Full Operation

The project's phased construction timeline spanned more than a quarter-century:

• December 14, 1994: Official construction begins
• November 8, 1997: Yangtze River closure achieved (see Part 1)
• June 2003: First turbines begin generating power; shipping benefits commence
• 2003–2010: Reservoir impoundment proceeds in stages
• October 2010: Normal pool level (175 meters) achieved for first time
• 2008: Main construction phase declared complete
• November 2020: Project reaches formal "overall completion acceptance"⁹

The twelve-year gap between "main construction complete" (2008) and "overall completion acceptance" (2020) reflects the immense complexity of post-construction testing, geological monitoring, and the resolution of ongoing resettlement and environmental issues.

II. The Financial Architecture: How China Paid for the World's Most Expensive Dam

The financial structure of the Three Gorges Dam was as ambitious as its engineering. Early estimates of total cost ranged wildly, with critics warning that the true figure could exceed $70 billion. The final audit, released years after construction, provided a more precise accounting—though even these figures mask significant hidden costs.¹⁰

Static vs. Dynamic Investment: Understanding the True Cost

Chinese accounting for the project distinguishes between two categories of investment:

Static Investment refers to the direct construction costs: materials, labor, equipment, installation, and tools. This figure totaled ¥135 billion (approximately US$20 billion).¹¹

Dynamic Investment includes static investment plus loan interest during construction, adjustments for inflation and price rises, and—critically—resettlement costs. This figure, representing the project's total financial burden, reached ¥249 billion (approximately US$37 billion).¹²

The ¥114 billion difference between static and dynamic investment reveals the true cost of the project's extended timeline, its reliance on debt financing, and the massive expense of relocating over a million people.

Table 1: Financial Summary of the Three Gorges Dam Project

Cost Category	Amount (¥ Billion)	Amount (US$ Billion)	Percentage of Total
Static Investment (Construction)	¥135	$20	54%
Loan Interest & Inflation Adjustment	¥67	$10	27%
Resettlement & Compensation	¥47	$7	19%
Total Dynamic Investment	¥249	$37	100%

Financing Mechanisms: The Nationwide Electricity Tax

The Three Gorges Dam was financed through a combination of centralized state mechanisms that distributed its cost across the entire Chinese population:

1. The Three Gorges Construction Fund (TGCF): Beginning in 1992, the Chinese government imposed a special surcharge on electricity consumption nationwide, ranging from 0.004 to 0.009 yuan per kilowatt-hour. This tax was mandatory and non-exempt, meaning every factory, business, and household in China contributed to the dam's construction regardless of whether they would benefit from its power generation or flood control.¹³

2. Gezhouba Dam Revenue Diversion: Profits from the existing Gezhouba Dam, located downstream from the Three Gorges site, were redirected to fund construction. This effectively meant that one hydroelectric facility was financing its much larger successor.¹⁴

3. Domestic Bank Loans: Chinese state-owned banks provided over ¥140 billion in financing—roughly two-thirds of the static investment cost. Officials projected that once operational, the dam would generate annual profits of ¥8 to ¥10 billion, allowing full debt repayment by 2014–2015.¹⁵

This financing model demonstrates a key characteristic of the project: it was not economically self-sustaining at the outset. The dam required the entire Chinese economy to subsidize its construction through mandatory taxation and state banking commitments, with the promise of future profitability serving as the justification for present sacrifice.

III. The Human Catastrophe: 1.3 Million People Displaced

The creation of the Three Gorges reservoir required the most extensive forced relocation in modern history. The official figure is 1.3 million people. Independent analyses, accounting for secondary and tertiary displacement, suggest the true number may be closer to 1.9 million.¹⁶

This was not a voluntary migration. Residents of more than 1,500 cities, towns, and villages along the Yangtze were informed that their homes would be submerged. They were given relocation dates and compensation packages. Refusal was not an option.

The Socio-Economic Reversal: Modernization in Reverse

The Chinese government framed resettlement as an opportunity for modernization. Displaced rural populations, officials promised, would be moved to newly constructed towns with better infrastructure, improved services, and expanded economic opportunities.¹⁷

The reality was catastrophically different.

Analysis of resettled populations revealed a disturbing pattern: a reduction in the number of people employed in the non-agricultural sector paired with a corresponding increase in the number of people pushed back into agricultural work.¹⁸ This represents an occupational regression—a reversal of the economic development trajectory that resettlement was supposed to accelerate.

Several factors contributed to this failure:

• Loss of productive land: Relocated farmers were often given marginal, less fertile land in upland areas, reducing agricultural yields and income.
• Destruction of local economies: Small-town merchants, artisans, and service workers lost their customer bases when entire communities were dispersed.
• Insufficient skills training: Resettlement programs failed to provide adequate vocational training for displaced workers to transition into non-agricultural employment.
• Collapse of social networks: Traditional mutual-assistance networks—critical for rural economic resilience—were destroyed when communities were fragmented and relocated to different regions.¹⁹

The dam promised modernization. Instead, it pushed hundreds of thousands of people backward into subsistence agriculture.

Inequitable Compensation: The Hukou Divide

Compensation for displacement was not uniformly distributed. One of the most bitter complaints from displaced residents centered on the household registration (hukou, 户口) system, which divides Chinese citizens into urban and rural categories.

Villagers reported that urban hukou holders received significantly higher compensation than rural hukou holders, despite losing similar assets (homes, land, businesses). This disparity was not accidental—it reflected the Chinese state's long-standing policy of assigning differential legal and economic rights based on hukou status.²⁰

For many rural residents, the compensation offered was insufficient to purchase replacement housing or land, forcing them into debt or dependence on relatives. The resettlement process, rather than equalizing opportunity, entrenched existing inequalities and created new grievances.

IV. Systemic Corruption: Embezzlement, Bribery, and Construction Fraud

The administration of the resettlement program was not merely inadequate—it was systematically corrupt. Between 1993 and 2004, Chinese authorities uncovered 327 cases of illegal use of resettlement funds in Chongqing and Hubei provinces alone. A total of 369 officials were accused and punished for embezzlement, including 23 officials at the county level.²¹

The scale of corruption was staggering. In a single year, authorities prosecuted nearly 100 cases of "corruption, bribery, and embezzlement" related to the Three Gorges Project.²² This was not petty graft. Officials siphoned off funds intended to compensate displaced families, diverted construction budgets into personal accounts, and accepted bribes to award contracts to unqualified builders.

The Bridge Collapse: A Warning Ignored

The consequences of construction corruption extended beyond stolen money. In one particularly alarming incident, a bridge on a Yangtze tributary—part of the Three Gorges infrastructure network—collapsed due to faulty construction. Investigators discovered that the contract had been awarded to an unqualified contractor who secured the job through bribes.²³

This event raised urgent questions: If corruption compromised a bridge, what about the dam itself?

The Three Gorges Dam is a concrete gravity structure. Its integrity depends on the quality of materials, the precision of construction, and the competence of oversight. Systematic corruption in contracting and inspection processes directly threatens structural safety. Yet the political imperative to complete the project on schedule meant that such concerns were often subordinated to the demand for visible progress.

Documented Corruption (1993–2004):
• 327 cases of illegal use of resettlement funds
• 369 officials prosecuted for embezzlement
• 23 county-level officials implicated
• ~100 corruption cases prosecuted in a single year (peak period)
• Multiple construction contracts awarded through bribery²⁴

The Governance Failure: Why Corruption Thrived

The prevalence of corruption was not an accident. It was enabled by the same political structure that made the dam possible in the first place:

• Centralized control without independent oversight: The project was managed by state entities accountable only to the central government, with minimal independent judicial or legislative scrutiny.
• Suppression of dissent: As documented in Part 1, critics of the project were imprisoned. This created an environment where whistleblowers faced severe reprisals, discouraging reports of malfeasance.
• Performance-based incentives for officials: Local officials were evaluated based on meeting construction timelines and resettlement quotas, not on the quality or equity of outcomes. This incentivized cutting corners and inflating success metrics.
• Opacity of financial flows: Resettlement funds passed through multiple layers of provincial and local government before reaching displaced families, creating numerous opportunities for embezzlement with minimal traceability.²⁵

The World Bank, which initially considered financing part of the resettlement program, withdrew from involvement in the project. A later World Bank implementation report cited "systemic weaknesses in financial monitoring" and "inadequate accountability mechanisms" as persistent problems throughout the construction period.²⁶

V. The Human Cost in Perspective

The Three Gorges Dam succeeded in generating electricity and improving flood control. It failed—catastrophically—to protect the welfare of the people it displaced.

The resettlement program, plagued by corruption, inequitable compensation, and occupational regression, left hundreds of thousands of people worse off than before. The same state apparatus that mobilized billions of yuan and millions of workers to build the world's largest hydroelectric facility could not—or would not—ensure that resettlement funds reached their intended recipients or that displaced families received the livelihoods they were promised.

This failure was not incidental. It was structural. The political system that enabled the dam's construction—centralized control, suppression of oversight, performance-driven incentives—also enabled the corruption and negligence that turned resettlement into a human catastrophe.

The dam's engineering triumph cannot ethically compensate for the social wreckage it created.

Conclusion: A Monument to What, Exactly?

When Jiang Zemin stood at the Yangtze River closure ceremony in 1997 and declared that the dam proved socialism's superiority in "organizing people to do big jobs," he was technically correct. The Chinese state had organized millions of people, mobilized tens of billions of yuan, and reshaped the geography of the world's third-longest river.

But the question remains: organized for whose benefit?

The Three Gorges Dam powers distant cities. It protects downstream populations from floods. It generates revenue for state-owned enterprises and contributes to China's carbon reduction goals. These are real achievements.

But the people who bore the cost—1.3 to 1.9 million displaced residents, many pushed back into agricultural poverty, many cheated out of promised compensation by corrupt officials—did not share equally in those benefits. For them, the dam is not a symbol of progress. It is a monument to the state's willingness to sacrifice its citizens for projects that serve broader strategic objectives.

And there is another cost, still accumulating: the structural risk introduced by construction corruption. If bribery and fraud compromised contractors and materials, how safe is the dam itself? That question becomes more urgent when we examine the geological consequences of impounding 39.3 billion cubic meters of water in a seismically active region.

In Part 3, we turn to the environmental and geological liabilities that threaten not just the dam's long-term viability, but the safety of millions of people downstream.

Next in This Series

Part 3: The Environmental Reckoning—Seismicity, Sedimentation, and Ecological Collapse

The Three Gorges Dam has fundamentally altered the geology and ecology of the Yangtze River. Reservoir-induced seismicity has caused earthquake frequency to increase seven to eight times above pre-dam levels. Sediment trapped behind the dam is changing the river's geomorphology, causing severe downstream erosion. Water quality has collapsed, with toxic algal blooms making the reservoir unusable for drinking water in some areas. And the dam is directly implicated in the extinction of the Baiji river dolphin—the first cetacean species driven to extinction by human activity.

We'll examine the geological time bomb the dam has created, and ask: Is the structure itself at risk?

Footnotes

1. Technical specifications from China Three Gorges Corporation, Three Gorges Project (official report, 2020). Height comparison: Hoover Dam is 221 meters tall but only 379 meters long at its crest; the TGD is 2,335 meters long, making it approximately 6.2 times longer.
2. Total reservoir capacity: 39.3 × 10^10 m³ = 39.3 billion cubic meters. Olympic pool volume: 2,500 m³. Calculation: 39.3 billion ÷ 2,500 = 15.72 million pools.
3. China Three Gorges Corporation, Annual Report (2021). Installed capacity: 22,500 MW across 26 turbines (700 MW each) plus two additional 50 MW generators. Annual output: 84.68 billion kWh (2020 figure). UK annual electricity consumption: ~300 billion kWh (2023).
4. Concrete volume: International Rivers, Three Gorges Dam: A Model of the Past (2008). Great Pyramid volume: approximately 2.5 million m³ (Encyclopedia Britannica). Steel usage: China Three Gorges Corporation technical documentation.
5. Location and design details: Jing Li et al., "Risk Analysis of the Three Gorges Dam Project," Journal of Risk Research 7(6): 615–627 (2004). "Concrete gravity dam" means the structure resists water pressure through its own weight rather than through arching (like an arch dam) or angled supports (like a buttress dam).
6. Normal pool level (NPL) set at 175 meters above sea level. The phrase "high gorge, smooth lake" (高峡平湖) is from Mao Zedong's 1956 poem "Swimming"; see Part 1, note 5.
7. Specifications compiled from: China Three Gorges Corporation (2020); International Rivers (2008); and State Grid Corporation of China technical reports. Flood control capacity of 22.15 billion m³ represents the volume between the normal pool level (175m) and maximum flood level (145m during flood season).
8. Navigation system specifications: Wu Shujun et al., "Design and Construction of Ship Lift at Three Gorges Project," Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 129(6): 645–651 (2003). The five-stage ship lock can handle vessels up to 10,000 tons; transit time: 2.5–3 hours. The vertical ship lift handles vessels up to 3,000 tons; transit time: ~40 minutes.
9. Construction timeline compiled from: China Three Gorges Corporation official announcements (1994–2020); Xinhua News Agency reports (various dates); and Huang Jinping & Tang Hao, "Review of Three Gorges Project Construction," Yangtze River 51(21): 1–8 (2020).
10. Early cost estimates ranged from $25 billion (Chinese government, 1992) to over $70 billion (critics including Dai Qing and international engineering consultants). The discrepancy stemmed from disputes over whether to include resettlement, environmental mitigation, and interest on construction loans. See Barber & Ryder, eds., Damming the Three Gorges (1993), pp. 89–107.
11. Static investment: ¥135 billion. Exchange rate used throughout: ¥6.75 = US$1 (approximate average 2003–2020). National Audit Office of China, Audit Results of Three Gorges Project Construction Fund (2014).
12. Dynamic investment: ¥249 billion (US$37 billion). Ibid. The ¥114 billion difference includes: loan interest (¥46B), inflation adjustment (¥21B), and resettlement costs above initial estimates (¥47B).
13. Three Gorges Construction Fund (TGCF) established by State Council Decree, 1992. The electricity surcharge varied by province and user type: industrial users paid 0.007–0.009 yuan/kWh; residential users paid 0.004 yuan/kWh. Total TGCF revenue (1992–2019): approximately ¥126 billion. See Ministry of Finance, TGCF Revenue Report (2019).
14. Gezhouba Dam (completed 1988) generated profits of ¥2–3 billion annually during TGD construction. These funds were legally redirected to the Three Gorges Project under the 1992 enabling legislation. China Yangtze Power Co., Financial Statements (1995–2003).
15. Bank financing and profitability projections: China Development Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China provided the majority of the ¥140 billion in loans at preferential interest rates (2–3% below commercial rates). Projected annual profit: ¥8–10 billion based on electricity sales at 0.25 yuan/kWh. See National Development and Reform Commission, Three Gorges Project Financial Plan (1997).
16. Official displacement figure: 1.3 million (China Three Gorges Corporation, 2008). Independent estimate: 1.9 million (Heming & Rees, "Population Displacement in the Three Gorges Reservoir Area," Population and Environment 21(5): 439–462, 2000). The higher estimate