The Ideology of SS Bureaucrats
The major question driving Michael Thad Allen's The Business of Genocide
is what motivated mid-level SS bureaucrats in their pursuits of
industry, slave labor, and murder. Allen rejects Hannah Arendt's theory
of the banality of evil, as well as the explanation that SS bureaucrats
were simply cogs in a machine that operated beyond their control.
Instead, he argues that mid-level SS managers in the WVHA
(Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt, or Business Administration Main Office)
were driven primarily by a "plexus of ideologies." In doing so, he
challenges the supposition of many studies, that Nazi bureaucrats were
repulsed by their actions. Rather, he argues they were committed to the
leadership principle of "productivism," modernization, racial supremacy,
and the goal of creating an SS "New Order" throughout Europe. SS ideals
shaped the bureaucracy and provided it with enough ideological
consistency. Allen believes that rather than factional disputes, far
more cooperation within the SS leadership was possible than other
historians have portrayed.
Allen's study focuses
on activities of the WVHA, which was formed out of a desire by Himmler
to introduce modern, managerial practices to the financial
administration and economic enterprises of the SS. Himmler's interests
in the economy reflected his goal to bring the SS worldview into private
industry and to create a new economic order founded on productivism and
German racial supremacy. The earliest companies acquired included a
publishing company, Nordland Verlag; a photographic studio, FF Bauer;
the Allach Porcelain Manufacture, which made "kitschy statuettes"; and
the Anton Loibl GmbH, which claimed to conduct "high-tech research and
development but produced bicycle lights". The choice of these early
enterprises (as well as those acquired during the war years) hardly
suggests that the SS was seeking to create an empire, but that Himmler
was trying to provide a cultural service to promote a German national
community. For example, the SS established the German Earth and Stone
Works (Deutsche Erde- und Steinwerke, DESt), to contribute to Hitler's
favorite architectural projects.
As the financial
activities of the SS expanded in 1937-1938, Himmler made Oswald Pohl
responsible for modernizing the economic administration. Pohl's efforts
would lead to the formal establishment of the WVHA in 1942. Pohl was
dedicated to Himmler's New Order, and he tried to recruit men who shared
these views. Therefore, the ideological commitment of the SS managers
was of foremost importance to their appointments. If they were also
talented, modern managers, they were highly effective. But this was
apparently rare, and with one exception all of the SS commercial
enterprises were poorly managed.
Against the backdrop of
how the WVHA emerged and functioned, Allen examines the careers of
several men in the commercial and engineering sectors of the SS economic
administration. He convincingly illustrates that the SS mid-level
managers were driven by a "plexus of ideologies." They were neither cogs
in a machine, nor trapped in a bureaucratic "iron cage," nor banal
technocrats. Allen finds that the commercial pursuits of the SS were far
less successful than the construction engineers. He explains the
differences in outcome may be due to the engineers' ability to combine
technical knowledge with ideological commitment. This becomes obvious
when we compare Allen's study of DESt, TexLed (Textil- und
Lederverwertung GmbH, Textile and Leather Utilitzation Ltd), and Hans
Kammler's SS construction corps.
Allen demonstrates that
the SS was interested in modernization and technology, but according to
his analysis they did not pursue technology rationally (this makes them
no less modern in Allen's definition). The SS managers of the
commercial operations showed an affinity for "sweet machines," the
newest technology. This is what motivated Arthur Ahrens, the first
manager of DESt, to adopt the dry brick making process offered by
Spengler Maschinenbau, a process that depended upon adequate clay
supplies and skilled laborers that were unsuited for DESt. The company
was so poorly managed that an investigation led to Ahrens' replacement
by Erduin Schondorff, the first "outsider" whom Pohl recruited.
Appointing an outsider with technical expertise proves to Allen that
Pohl and Himmler were committed to modernizing the economic
administration of the SS enterprises. Schondorff was attracted to the SS
because it encouraged technological innovations; he was less interested
in other aspects of SS ideology. Schondorff introduced modern,
managerial practices such as statistical surveillance of labor and
imposed an impersonal hierarchy at the operations. However, DESt
continued to blunder forward because Schondorff was never able to
integrate effectively the use of modern machines with the exploitation
of unskilled concentration camp laborers. The failure of DESt stands in
sharp contrast to the success of TexLed.
TexLed's success can be
explained by several factors, including the simple fact that textile
manufacturing is a labor intensive job which proved perfectly suited to
the use of concentration camp laborers. Yet sound management also
contributed to TexLed's ability to meet supply demands and run at a
profit. TexLed was managed by Fritz Lechler and Felix Krug, who fully
identified with the SS plexus of ideologies, and they possessed modern,
technological management skills. Like Ahrens, they purchased the most
modern sewing machines that could increase output, but did not require
skilled laborers. Therefore, their operations fully exploited
concentration camp labor through modern managerial techniques,
controlled labor costs, and profit-oriented operations. At both German
commercial operations, forced laborers were exploited and treated
cruelly (a topic that is discussed only briefly), but TexLed
demonstrated to Allen that "ideological extremism" and business sense
could be integrated coherently. TexLed and DESt are just two of the case
studies of SS commercial operations examined by Allen. In all of his
examples, it appears that TexLed's success was mere happen chance
despite Pohl's efforts. He was rarely able to recruit competent modern
managers, who were fully dedicated to SS ideology.
Hans Kammler, who led
the SS construction corps, appears to be the exception. He embodied the
ideal, modern SS bureaucrat, was dedicated to the SS cause, and held a
degree in engineering. The SS construction corps earned great notoriety
for building underground manufacturing sites, as well as the
concentration camps. Indeed, Allen maintains:
Only Hans Kammler and
his SS Building Inspectors were capable of providing essential service
to the war economy by forging a mutual sense of purpose with competent
industrial managers and by providing the knowledge and skills to bend
the complex world of production to the Third Reich's needs/
In 1941-1942, Kammler
introduced a hierarchy in the Construction Corps that encouraged
creativity, accountability, and interchangeability. He recruited young
engineers, largely from the air force, who possessed the "old Staffel
spirit". Kammler was an interventionist manager, who showed great skill
at exploiting and moving forced laborers from one construction site to
another. This is particularly evident in the construction of underground
factories. Kammler's construction corps achieved their goal efficiently
and promptly because they were willing to exploit their laborers to the
point of working them to death. Ideology gave Kammler's engineers
common identity which improved their output while treating the slave
laborers under their command brutally.
In Allen's discussion
of the concentration camps, we realize that not all the SS branches were
committed to modernization. One branch of the WVHA was never fully
modernized: the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps (IKL) which provided
the labor for SS projects and private enterprises. The concentration
camp system began in the Third Reich with the primary goal of policing
inmates. Only when labor shortages began to develop in Germany by
1936-1937, was the use of concentration camp inmates as laborers
conceived. While the commercial operations of the WVHA needed productive
workers, the IKL, administered by the Death's Head Units, placed a
"primacy on policing" and encouraged brutal treatment of inmates. The
WVHA consistently struggled with the IKL over which of these goals was
more important, but they never morally questioned the abuse of slave
laborers. Pohl's first attempt to impose modern management on the IKL
came with the creation of a new Office I/5 whose "sole duty was to
smooth out the IKL's labor allocations to the German Commercial
Operations" . Wilhelm Burböck was appointed leader and given the title
of Deputy for the Labor Action (Beauftragter für den Arbeitseinsatz).
Burboeck and his men never acquired the cooperation of the IKL. In fact,
Office I/5 was essentially taken over by the IKL. In early 1942, as the
demand for labor increased, Pohl made another institutional attempt to
gain the IKL's cooperation in productivist ideology and appointed
Gerhard Maurer to lead Office Group D2-Labor Action. The most lasting
change that Burböck and Maurer made was to introduce and then improve
upon the statistical surveillance of the concentration camp populations.
Burböck created a category for inmates "unfit to labor;" Maurer
provided a more detailed description of this category including
numerical codes and standardized forms, and compelled the IKL to
cooperate. Unfortunately, as Allen points out, these statistics
facilitated the IKL's identification of concentration camp inmates, who
were then killed because they were deemed "unfit to work" (Operation 14 f
13).
Allen's study not only
challenges scholars to rethink the motivations of SS bureaucrats, but
also boldly challenges conventional interpretations about the problem of
modernity and the issue of polycracy in the Third Reich. On the subject
of modernity, Allen warns us not "to conflate 'modernity' with
'rationality' and 'pure' technocratic instrumentalism, or insist that
modernization necessarily leads to a democratic polity, or the
full-flowering of the Enlightenment". He is quite right, yet, his own
definition of what is "modern" appears inconsistent. For example, when
Allen assesses the administrative practices of Burböck, he describes his
efforts as a "sham" and a conscious pretense at modern management" .
Allen implies that because Burböck's aspirations did not lead to
expected outcomes, his innovations were somehow less modern. Yet, it was
Burböck's statistical surveillance which Maurer improved upon that
leads Allen to describe the latter as a "capable, inspiring, and
interventionist [i.e. modern] manager" (p. 183). One suspects that the
difference between the two men has less to do with modernization
theories than the fact that Maurer was more competent, a workaholic, and
had the advantage of studying Burböck's "system," which had no
precedence. Would Maurer have been so successful if he did not have
Burböck's failed efforts as an example? If modern simply means "a new
culture of technology and science," then were not Burböck and Maurer
equally modern, applying the science of business management to their
tasks, but that the former was just less competent than the latter? In
short, the criteria of what makes an SS bureaucrat modern is
problematic, apparently relative, and open to debate.
For those who study the
Third Reich, Allen raises another important issue: is polycratic rule
unique to National Socialism? This is an interesting question, although
not entirely relevant and difficult to prove. The more pertinent
question seems to be whether or not the concept of polycracy has lost
its usefulness. Allen's discussion of this concept would have been more
convincing had he offered a more in-depth explanation of the term.
Instead, he reduces polycracy to mean nothing more than a simple
"divvying up [of] tasks" common to all bureaucracies. This is, however,
far from the original meaning outlined by Peter Hüttenberger, Martin
Broszat, and others. Polycratic interpretations are based on the belief
that the Nazis relied heavily on personal rule, an idea embodied in the
leadership principle. Subsequently, studying power struggles (that is
the patronage networks), rivalries and feuds is of paramount importance.
Polycratic interpretations do not deny that cooperation was possible,
indeed, it was imperative. Where Allen differs from the more standard
works is a matter of emphasis. Allen acknowledges that polycratic
infighting occurred, but he prefers to emphasize the points of
cooperation, not conflict. Allen writes, "When [polycracy] degenerates
into a focus on mere 'power struggles,' we are instead led to believe
that Nazis pursued naked, internecine strife as if for its own sake".
Worse yet, Germany's genocidal policies are then explained in terms of a
"'self-acting' bureaucratic machine," as Hans Mommsen would have it.
Allen's concerns about the amoral or immoral direction in which
polycratic interpretations can lead are valid, and a reminder that
historians should not avoid making moral judgments. Ironically, even
Allen points out that infighting facilitated "a new method of murder."
How? When Burböck and Maurer could not obtain the cooperation of the IKL
to limit its brutality in order to improve productivity, they adapted
and modernized their bookkeeping procedures by creating, and then more
clearly defining, the category "unfit to labor." Unintentionally,
Burböck and Maurer facilitated the IKL's identification of concentration
camp inmates who were killed when they could no longer toil. Allen
correctly asserts that Burböck and Maurer were morally responsible even
if unintentionally so. They approved of the racial policies that
legitimized the brutality; they simply wanted a guaranteed supply of
slave laborers. Therefore, even though Allen's criticism of polycratic
interpretations is not wholly convincing, his emphasis on cooperation
reminds us that ideology was important.
It is usually unfair to
point out topics omitted from historical monographs, but these seem
relevant to Allen's study. He is weak in exploring the nexus between the
SS and the private business sector. He tells us that one of Himmler's
goals was to become a role model for private enterprises corrupted by
the disintegrating influences of capital. Yet, not once is Himmler's
Circle of Friends (Freundeskreis Himmler) discussed, even though Oswald
Pohl was a member. While scholars tend to dismiss this elite voluntary
association as unimportant, given Allen's thesis that ideology,
especially the goal of cultural reconstruction, drove the SS-WVHA, he
should have provided his expert opinion on this subject and examined the
relationship between the SS bureaucrats and private businessmen more
fully. Moreover, Allen suggests on several occasions that private
enterprises took the initiative to acquire concentration camp labor from
the SS. However, the only concrete examples he cites were Porsche,
Farben, and Steyr-Daimler-Puch, while his footnote citations are fairly
limited on the subject of private enterprises in the Third Reich. Again,
given Himmler's cultural agenda, Allen might have explored in more
depth how private industry utilized concentration camp labor. If private
industry sought out the SS-WVHA, does this prove that Himmler or the SS
bureaucrats were succeeding in creating their New Order? Finally, with
respect to the SS bureaucrats, Allen makes reference to a
prosopographical study and an analysis of "collective biographies" of
the WVHA; these obviously informed his narrative. Yet, it would have
been useful to incorporate these findings more systematically even if
only in an appendix. These omissions do not undermine the effectiveness
of Allen's thesis, but might have strengthened it.
Allen's monograph is a
significant contribution to the study of the SS. He has utilized
numerous archival sources including contemporary evidence and trial
records. He puts a more human face on SS bureaucrats in the WVHA, and he
proves that they were driven by ideology; they were not mindless,
amoral technocrats. Allen fully accomplishes his major goal while
reminding scholars that modernization can be irrational and adopted by
any type of political system. He also raises questions about the use of
polycratic interpretations of the Third Reich that scholars will find
interesting.
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Earth and the human race have continually gone through dramatic,
paradigm shifting transformations throughout history. For example, we
once thought the earth to be flat, but now we know it to be round. This
is one example of many where the curtain has been pulled back and as a
result the way we see and perceive the world has completely changed.
