Secret cargo from Syria to Crimea: the saga of Nadalina. Part 1

Secret cargo from Syria to Crimea: the saga of Nadalina. Part 2

Posted by George Freund on November 18, 2016

By vasgri | on 11/05/2016


InformNapalm international volunteer intelligence community got on the trail of a secret cargo which was shipped from Syria to Crimea under very mysterious circumstances. It was unloaded at destination by Russian military personnel with utmost care and heightened security. This publication is a result of OSINT and HUMINT activity of our volunteer community.

On October 20, 2016 about 1:00 p.m. the cargo ship Nadalina sailing under the flag of Sierra Leone called at the port of Feodosia (occupied Crimea). The vessel arrived from Tartus (Syria), after a call to the Romanian Port of Navodari.

The unloading of the vessel started only about two days later; it was carried out on the night of October 21 to 22, 2016, from 10:00 p.m. to 02:00 a.m. It was performed by military servicemen using a port crane under heightened security. All the bystanders were cleared out, and the pier was cordoned off by extended police squads and gray men. The illumination was directed away from the pier, so the unloading process was poorly visible. The vessel floodlight periodically switched off when portions of the cargo were lifted up, instead of being on permanently, as it usually is the case during unloading.

The locals on social networks also noticed the uncommon manner of the unloading.



The unloaded cargo was in crates oblong 0.5 x 1 x 3 m, of khaki color that looked like non-flammable composite containers for storage and transportation of special-purpose products.



The screenshot of the video depicting the arrival of Nadalina in Feodosia clearly shows the bulb raised above the waterline, which indicates that the vessel was underloaded.




The unloading of one crate took 25-30 minutes. In total, 8-10 crates were unloaded. The crates were unloaded slowly, with great care; apparently, the “longshoremen” were very apprehensive of the cargo being damaged.

After the night unloading, the vessel remained at the port until October 25, and then it sailed towards Kerch. However, in the morning of October 26 still en-route, it backtracked to Feodosia, and started out for the return trip, presumably in the direction of the Bosporus.



The vessel

The operator and owner of Nadalina (IMO:8215754) is an offshore company, Bia Shipping Co Ltd. (the Marshall Islands, 2010), headquartered in Constanța (Romania). This company is a part of a family business of Syrian entrepreneurs coming from the outskirts of Tartus. Bia Shipping Co. is an official partner of Johar Shipping srl. registered in Constanța (Romania) and controlled by the a Syrian family http://johar.ro/. Its owner is Hassan Johar, born in 1981. The members of Johar’s family live in Syria, Romania and the UK.

Despite the fact that Johar is not the official owner of Bia Shipping Co Ltd, he actually controls the company and is entitled to sign for it. Three key positions at the company are occupied by Adnan Hassan (Managing Director), Johar Hassan (Head of Operational Department) and Ferhad Hassan (Ship Chandler).

Cargo

Apparently, the recent repair work on Nadalina in Navodari is also connected with the transportation of this cargo. This is another indirect indicator of the importance of this cargo, as any technical risks during the delivery had to be mitigated to the maximum extent.

The utmost care of the unloading operation points to an extremely hazardous character of the cargo, whereas its timing indicates a special effort taken to hide the fact of delivery.

The analysis of the peculiarities of the cargo delivery and unloading suggests the following possible considerations:

The cargo was delivered from Tartus. It is unlikely that a civil vessel would be chartered for the covert carriage of conventional ammunition from Syria to the territory occupied by Russia. Such ammunition would have been handed over to the Syrian government forces or kept in the territory of the Russian base in Syria. This implies that Russians had to remove from the Syrian territory some type of ammunition or its components that are not supposed to be located in this territory, cannot be safely stored due to inability to provide safe storage, cannot be used, but require special technologies and facilities for disposal, have political significance and implicate the Russian Federation or the Damascus regime, in the event these weapons are found in Syria. The small size of the cargo delivered (8-10 crates) is also an essential detail pointing to the importance of the contents.

The cargo was delivered to Feodosia, not to Sevastopol, where it would be more logical to deliver military cargoes. Choosing the port of unloading was probably determined by further routing or destination of the cargo. Near the port of Feodosia there is “Feodosia-13” facility that is best suited as a potential storage site for extremely hazardous cargoes.

The cargo was delivered by means of a third-party company, not by the Russian Navy ships regularly calling at Tartus. The choice of a private company can be explained by an attempt to hide the link of the cargo to the Russian Federation, as well as to reduce the risk to the crew of a naval ship.

The cargo was delivered by sea, not by air (which would have been much faster and less visible). The choice of the sea route shows that it was too dangerous to carry by air. Furthermore, if the aim was to deliver the cargo to Feodosia rather than anywhere else, the plane would have attracted more attention and required additional efforts to arrange an overland transportation between the storage facilities and the airports.

The analysis of the size and shape of the unloaded containers gives reason to suggest that they contained ammunition with at least 200 mm caliber. Despite the absence of direct evidence, the analysis of indirect features lets us assume that the contents of the shipment are ammunition/components of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – most likely, chemical weapons.

The picture to the New York Times article published in 2015 shows a similar-sized crate used for the storage of Iraqi missiles (Borak-70) with a chemical warhead.





Conclusions: there is no reliable and direct evidence, that we have witnessed a delivery from Syria of WMD components/ammunition rather than anything else. However, our analysis of the information indicates the following:

regular violations of the sanctions regime with regard to the occupied Crimea by the ships of Hassan Johar’s affiliated companies;

an involvement of Hassan Johar’s companies in arms smuggling and delivery of illegal migrants from Syria and Turkey to Europe;

relations of Hassan Johar’s companies with the Syrian intelligence agencies (or authorities) and the Russian intelligence agencies;

there is indirect evidence of carriage of WMD from Syria to the occupied Crimea

This investigation was prepared by Dmytro K, Anatolii Baronin и Kateryna Yaresko for InformNapalmvolunteer intelligence community. An active link to the authors and our project is obligatory for any reprint or further use of the material.

Translated by Victoria Batarchuk

https://informnapalm.org/en/secret-cargo-from-syria-to-crimea-the-saga-of-nadalina-part-1/  

Secret cargo from Syria to Crimea: the saga of Nadalina. Part 2

Posted by George Freund on November 18, 2016

By vasgri | on 11/06/2016

InformNapalm international volunteer intelligence community got on the trail of a secret cargo which was shipped from Syria to Crimea under very mysterious circumstances. It was unloaded at destination by Russian military personnel with utmost care and heightened security. This publication is a result of OSINT and HUMINT activity of our volunteer community.

The first part of our report will reveal the nature of cargo and walk you through other unexpected investigation findings:

Secret cargo from Syria to Crimea: the saga of Nadalina. Part 1

The second part of our report is devoted to the owner of the ship that transported the secret cargo from Syria.

The operator and owner of Nadalina (IMO:8215754) is an offshore company, Bia Shipping Co Ltd. (the Marshall Islands, 2010), headquartered in Constanța (Romania). This company is a part of a family business of Syrian entrepreneurs coming from the outskirts of Tartus. Bia Shipping Co. is an official partner of Johar Shipping srl. registered in Constanța (Romania) and controlled by the aSyrian family. Its owner is Hassan Johar, born in 1981. The members of Johar’s family live in Syria, Romania and the UK.

Despite the fact that Johar is not the official owner of Bia Shipping Co Ltd, he actually controls the company and is entitled to sign for it. Three key positions at the company are occupied by Adnan Hassan (Managing Director), Johar Hassan (Head of Operational Department) and Ferhad Hassan (Ship Chandler).

Nadalina

The social network analysis shows that Nadalina is supervised by Samir Fahel. Its pictures take up a significant portion of his posts on Facebook. Nadalina has been apparently named after his granddaughter, Nadalina Fahel (the company ships are mostly named after the daughters of a family member).

On October 18 Samir published the pictures of Nadalina in the dock of Navodari port (Romania), where the vessel was repaired. Besides, the pictures of the vessel were often posted on the account of Samir’s son, Amin. Nadalina is maintained by RUAD Marine Service, where the members of Fahel family work under the guidance of Rami Mustafa.



The relationship between Fahel family and Johar is clear from the diagram. Amin (Samir’s son), has a brother, Mahmoud Hassan, which confirms the kinship between the families.




There are different ways to spell the name used for the companies of the Johar family: Johar/Jaohar/Jawhar.

Khaled Johar is a cousin of Hassan Johar. He lives in London and owns the company Jaohar UK.http://www.jaohar.com/ Its branch offices also operate in Constanța and Beirut. A partner of Johar Hassan is Abdallah Aluf, Chairman of the Board of Misr Unimarine, an Egyptian company, and Allouf Safety Syria (Tartus), as well as President of Dameko Shipping Company S.A. (PO Box 726, c/o Unimarine Management Co, al-Mina street, Tartus, Syria). Taking advantage of his private contacts at the Ministry of Transport of Syria, Aluf obtained security certificates which were used for illegal transportation of Syrian migrants to Turkey and Europe.

Hassan Johar also owns Shnar Shipping Srl, another company registered in Constanța. The company is co-owned by Adnan Hassan, Ferhad Hassan and Abdul Rahman Hassan. The legal addresses of Shnar Shipping Srl and Johar Shipping in Constanța are the same.



Abdul Rahman Hassan, 53, was arrested in 2014 in Constanța for smuggling of 40,440 cigarettes from Turkey to Romania while he was the captain of the vessel Rania H (in October 2015 he was convicted to three years and eight months in prison). According to the Prosecutor of Constanța, Abdul Rahman Hassan was also convicted for human trafficking after he facilitated the illegal entry of two Syrian Kurds into Romania.

On social networks the Hassan-Fahel family members appear indifferent to politics and it looks like they have no long-term ties with Russia. While being tacit Assad supporters, the family representatives do not express their political views in public.

At the same time, taking into account the level of counterintelligence regime in Tartus, calling at this port and receiving delivery/shipment orders from the territory of the Crimean Peninsula would with great probability require contacts/relations with the Syrian intelligence agencies, or a coat-tail in the high political or military circles in Damascus and in the Russian intelligence agencies. Such contacts/relations are likely to have a business basis.

Apparently, choosing Nadalina for the transportation of this cargo is connected with the specialization of these shipowners on risky operations, as well as with their strong presence at Tartus and relations with the Syrian authorities. Today, Johar operates the vessels associated with illegal traffic. Thus, his company’s ships regularly violated the EU sanctions regime, calling at the ports of the occupied Crimea:



On October 1-8, 2014 ADNAN H, a Romanian cargo ship was loaded with scrap metal in the port of Feodosia. Previously, this cargo ship had also violated the sanctions and called at the Crimean ports. Three other Bia Shipping vessels violated the sanctions and called at the ports of Crimea in the period from July to September 2014: cargo ship Nargys H, IMO 9030333, cargo ship Anda, IMO 8027638, and cargo ship Sherin, IMO 8003943. All the four vessels are owned and operated by Bia Shipping.

The analysis of the marine traffic for the period of October 20-26, 2016 has revealed the regular character of the traffic by Johar-related fleet in the direction of the occupied Crimea to bypass the EU sanctions regime.



Thus, the routes of Bia Shipping Co Ltd vessels bear evidence of their regular use for cargo transportation to and from the occupied Crimea.

Johar had been directly or indirectly connected to illegal shipping. He had twice sold vessels to operators who then used them for arms smuggling. In 2012 ship Letfallah II was sold to Mohammad Khafaji, the owner of Khafaji Shipping Co. registered in Honduras. Khafaji is the only representative of the business group who actively publishes messages related to deaths of Syrian migrants and shows his utmost sympathy in this regard.

Letfallah II operated by ISM Group Ltd., was intercepted by Lebanese navy with three containers of weapons transported from Libya to Syria on board.

There are grounds to assume that Johar Shipping and Syrian ISM Group Ltd (Abdullah Yahia Building, BP 83, ath-Thawra street, Tartus, Syria) are related companies. Two vessels of the latter, Mega Star and Hiba K (renamed to Rasha D), were involved in arms smuggling allegations in 2013. ISM Group Ltd. also offered registration of ships under the flag of Sierra Leone (the flag of ship Nadalina) in Tartus. The flag of Sierra Leone, along with the flag of Togo, are frequently used by the Johar group vessels.

Conclusions: there is no reliable and direct evidence, that we have witnessed a delivery from Syria of WMD components/ammunition rather than anything else. However, our analysis of the information indicates the following:

regular violations of the sanctions regime with regard to the occupied Crimea by the ships of Hassan Johar’s affiliated companies;

an involvement of Hassan Johar’s companies in arms smuggling and delivery of illegal migrants from Syria and Turkey to Europe;

relations of Hassan Johar’s companies with the Syrian intelligence agencies (or authorities) and the Russian intelligence agencies;

there is indirect evidence of carriage of WMD from Syria to the occupied Crimea.

This investigation was prepared by Dmytro K, Anatolii Baronin и Kateryna Yaresko for InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community. An active link to the authors and our project is obligatory for any reprint or further use of the material.

Translated by Victoria Batarchuk

Edited by Artem Velichko

https://informnapalm.org/en/secret-cargo-syria-crimea-saga-nadalina-part-2/

Not even the history books would offer direct evidence of a covert WMD delivery to a theatre of conflict. Only a declassified file long after the event would. Without a source or a sample, we have to rely on our best analysis. That would be a untraceable WMD was shipped into the Crimea for insertion into The Ukraine/Donbass area with the only conceivable use being a false flag attack to justify a full scale retaliation. The Russians already have all the WMD at their disposal that they could ever require. Something off the books implies an operation is brewing. There are reports the Russians have inserted 30,000 ground troops and that mustard gas was being made by ISIS in Syria. However, this was preelection news. It would appear that if Hillary was elected President. a full scale war would have ensued on several fronts. That may be the reason the shadow government pulled the plug on her. A good sign would be the weapons are removed to Russia for destruction.