JAPAN’S INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM UNIT TO BE LAUNCHED AHEAD OF ...
I have also suggested, in past articles and blogs, that Mr. Abe's rearmament policy, while it might be publicly sold and spun as compliance to Washington's wishes, and to contribute to its "Pacific pivot," was also covertly about Japan's probable, though never voiced, hesitancy over its relationship to Washington, its current reliance on American power for its own national defense, and America's growing "craziness" on the international stage. In short, it's a case of "with friends like this, who needs enemies," and "can we really trust them for our defense?" I suspect Mr. Abe's government and the quiet circles of Japanese power have answered that last question with a no, in which case, Japan needs to be able to defend itself against all potential threats. And let's face it, a larger Japanese military will give it greater leverage and maneuverability on the geopolitical stage, transforming the Pacific from a one or at best two-power show between China and America, into a three-power show.
But I also suggested in yesterday's blog that Mr. Abe's rearmament might also have to do with something else, and that is, Japan's ability to interdict any potential terrorist threat, and to respond accordingly.
And this brings us back to that tidbit article I shared two days ago: what terrorist problem in Japan? What terrorist acts as have been perpetrated in that island nation have been more of the home-grown variety having little to do with Islamic terrorism. So why even connect Japan with the latter?
The connection is in this article, shared by Mr. S.:
https://www.rt.com/news/324779-japan-anti-terrorism-unit/
Note carefully what the article states, and this coming from a nation which, again, has virtually no track record of Islamic terrorist attacks on its own soil:
The deadly terror attacks in Paris have prompted the Japanese authorities to speed up the launch of their first ever anti-terrorism intelligence unit.The International Counterterrorism Intelligence Collection Unit will begin its operations on Tuesday, earlier than the originally planned launch date of April 2016, Yoshihide Suga, chief cabinet secretary, said.
Suga explained the move was due to the “severe safety situation” around the globe, with unnamed Foreign Ministry sources telling Reuters that the Paris attacks were the reason for the change of date.
The unit will consist of employees from the Foreign and Defense Ministries, the National Police Agency as well as the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, the chief cabinet secretary said.
Its representatives are to be sent to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, northwestern Africa and other areas with high terrorist activity, he added.
"Sharing information gathered by relevant government ministries and agencies as well as the unit, we would like to establish an 'all Japan' system to promote antiterrorism measures," Suga said, as cited by Kyodo news agency.
Suga added that the launch of the unit will be accompanied by set of other anti-terror measures, including the strengthening of information gathering and analysis regarding terrorism, beefing up security at ports, airports and other key facilities, and enhanced antiterrorism training.
"We will take the best possible measures to prevent terrorism in advance in cooperation with the international community," he explained.
In other words, Japan is not
going to wait for terrorism to strike its own soil, it is taking
preemptive action, notably, in words almost reminiscent of China's
recent international security statement "in advance in cooperation with
the international community," and it has made clear that "its
representatives are to be sent to...the Middle East," where two Japanese
nationals were recently beheaded by, you guessed it, ISIS, which is
supported by Turkey, aided by disastrous policy in Washington, and
funded and further aided by... "you-know-who."
So my high octane speculation here is that one might read Japanese statements in a manner similar to reading recent German
statements, not only as a quiet, discrete, but very firm moving of
"you-know-who" from the "friend" to the "fiend" column, and
additionally, I would aver that one must read it as a subtle
rupture between Tokyo and Washington, in spite of Mr. Abe's government,
like Mrs. Merkel's government, continuing to toe the Washington party
line in other political statements, for it will be as apparent to
Japanese analysts, as it is to Russian and European analysts, that
Washington's Middle East Policy since the Gulf War has been a tapestry
of errors, errors made at the behest of Wahabbist regimes anxious to
overthrow the secular states in the region to create the power vacuum
that they can fill. To drive this point home, if there is any doubt
about it, one must recall that in spite of ongoing disagreements between
Tokyo and Moscow about the Kurile islands, Japan and Russia are also
cementing agreements for Japanese assistance in developing Siberia and
its infrastructure, and Russia scored a key victory in its efforts to
bypass western systems of financial clearing by being granted access to
Japan Credit Bureau's system of clearing in the Pacific rim.
The real test of this
interpretation of Japanese intentions will, of course, emerge over time,
for it is one thing to have a domestic policy that recognizes the
nature of a particular type of international threat. But how Japan will
act upon that externally is now the key, and this may be revealed by
pondering two "high octane hypotheticals". In one scenario, one might
imagine Mr. Assad inviting this Japanese terrorist unit into that
country to participate in on-the-ground operations against Isis in
conjunction with the French and Russian air efforts. If Japan
accedes(and it would have reason to do so, given the murder of the two
Japanese nationals in that country), it would constitute a de facto
break with Washington and its increasingly bizarre list of toadies.
Japan might, of course, invoke the "Hollande Option," and coordinate
with Russia while reserving the right to influence later decisions about
the continuation of Mr. Assad's government. In another scenario, Japan
might be asked by Washington to "provide on-the-ground assistance" to
its own proxies in the region, say, Sultan Erdogan I. What this suggests
is, once again, that one has to look carefully at what Japan will
actually do with the capability, and not at what it says
it is doing. In other words, once again time will tell if any of these
high octane speculations are true or not. But when it comes right down
to it, I can more easily see a Japanese response to the murder of its
citizens by ISIS, than I can see blindly following Ankara's and Riyadh's
playbook.
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