Gameplay – On mythology of game theory
http://en.kalitribune.com/gameplay-on-mythology-of-game-theory/
Persuasive
power of myth is proportional to verity of it’s images to truth in
itself, while persuasive power of lie stems from it’s appellation to
weakness of thought – to inertia delighted with ease of passing flimsy
judgments; with all those things that make keyboard pushing
informational machines, still, but – if posthumanist have they way – not
yet for long, called ‘humans’, go LOL! and OMG! as on command. The
mythology of rational playground falls precisely into this second
category, because it takes itself seriously, as a necessary and
all-applicable system, therefore it subverts the transcendental, robbing
it of it’s very possibility, while replacing it with it’s own cuckoo’s
egg.
Jargon of game theory
From time to time, while suffering the mass media barrage, a question
occurs in one’s mind: exactly how many words are there in media
vocabulary? For, when it comes to treatment of serious subjects like
economy and politics, the words in use are being reduced to a
surprisingly few, even so that purported media analysis or commentary
comes to resemble a mantra or nursery rhyme. Furthermore, it is
notable that this “linguistic drain” occurs precisely at the moment
when “serious” matters come into focus, and in spite of all loftiness of
speakers – our designated hierophants of media oracles – we are
bombarded with rather frivolous terminology; namely, one is perplexed
why, for instance, the economical and political agents are called players? Why the philosophy professor speaks about strategy of Nietzsche’s arguments? What exactly does it mean to have cultural strategy? On what grounds the literally critic assumes that James Joyce employed narrative strategy?
Why are all those serious things spoken about as if they were some kind of game?
On the face of it, the answer is
surprisingly easy to deduce. The game or game-play jargon originates in
global epistemic dominance of thought models derived from mathematical
game theory. It’s various abstract and complex forms (so called ‘models’
or ‘modules’), as well as their global appliance on all aspects of
life, to a significant extent build the spiritual framework of our time,
although they are rarely discussed outside of academia. However, game
theory is not merely a mathematician’s plaything. If we bear in mind
that global world stage – with all those global players – is at the same
time the home of myriads of people who are well aware that they are
being played, but have no idea of true nature of those playing them –
then it is clear that fundamentals of game theory should be put to
critical scrutiny. The task is all the more urgent – and all the more
easier – if we bear in mind that peculiarity of game theory, in contrast
to other mathematical models, lies in the fact that it is founded on
all-encompassing and at the same time incredibly simple – one could say
simple as in ‘dim witted’ – explanation of man and world in general.
This means that game theory is a metaphysical teaching, i.e. it’s
ambition is to encompass everything, both nature of man and nature of
universe. And there is a one special rule to every game of metaphysics,
namely this: when abstract and esoteric professional language of science
is put aside, the game is potentially understandable to all parties,
those who are playing and those who are being played. It is an unspoken
rule, an ancient assumption of all world-view con-games: in order for
half-truth to hold sway over everybody, it must speak in common
language. So let us take a look, aided by some elementary concepts, what
exactly is game theory and what it means for someone who is not a
player, neither big nor small.
Game theory is an explanatory model of
decision making. It defines it’s subject as rational activity whose
purpose is an increase in well-being of the deliberating individual or
collective. Any behaviour seemingly pursuing different purpose is only a
roundabout way to achieve it more rationally, or it is simply
“irrational”. Tertium non datur. Obviously, we are dealing
with, broadly speaking, “liberal” definition of human being, although it
is in fact the legacy of Ancient Greek Sophists. Bearing in mind that
individual is always in the midst of other individuals and that in order
to achieve it’s goals it must collaborate or come into conflict with
them, the society has to be rationally modelled in order to minimize the
conflict. Old bogeyman of political philosophy, Thomas Hobbes, thought
that such a thing is possible only by absolute sovereignty of the State,
because he was convinced that all those self-centred atoms are more
prone to play some iteration of Total war than that of Sims. Proponents
of game theory try to evade this fairly consistent inference or use it
to prove something else: atomized individuals do not strive towards
all-out conflict but towards equilibrium. The term denotes the
state of conflict turned latent, in the sense of permanent threat or
warning, but ceased to be destructive; it is, in a word, a rational
conflict, a war that grew cold. Namely, rational behaviour is primarily
strategic, i.e. it endeavours to accomplish it’s end despite possible
resistance by anticipating the strategies of that resistance. The
healthy society is the one in which unavoidable conflicts are being
canalized in relative harmony, regulated by the rules of the game,
because the players realized that relative equality is more expedient
than playing ‘all or nothing’ game. Hence, the game theory has a notable
militaristic nature, affirmed by it’s history: it flourished inside the
military think tanks during the first years of the Cold war, only to be
later unleashed on civil societies throughout the West.
Prisoner’s dilemma At
this level, some peculiarities are notable. The term ‘game’ is made
distinct but is not clearly defined, i.e. it is obviously artificially
narrowed. For instance: since when the game has to be competitive?
Moreover, it is usually understood as repose from labours and conflicts.
Game by it’s nature doesn’t require winners and losers. It can be – and
it usually is – completely self-sufficient activity. In that sense,
dances, visual and linguistic creative activities, in a word: fine or
liberal arts, are forms of playing the game. Those are all activities
that, deprived of any calculated purpose outside themselves, remain
autonomous and, therefore, free. However, game theory, without further
clarification, presumes that games are always forms of competition
implying conflict, binary division on winners and losers, element of
chance and relations of power, i.e. of domination and submission. So
game theory is concerned with power play. This is best illustrated in
most famous of game theory modules, so called “prisoner’s dilemma”.
The prisoner’s dilemma is an imagined
situation which game theoreticians apply to reality and it has many,
more or less complex, variations. It can be described, using the so
called static model, in the following way:
Two criminals are brought to police
station for questioning. They committed the crime, but if the police
fail to get the confession from one or either of them, they’ll walk.
They are put in separate rooms and isolated from one another. The
confession is demanded from each one. Situation in which they are put by
rules of the game provides them with limited number of possible
strategies: each one could or could not confess. If both confess, their
pay-off is equally small, but if only one confesses, his pay-off is
small but bigger than the pay-off of his accomplice. If neither
confesses, the pay-off is equally big for both of them, but so is the
risk of losing everything. Two key factors are in play: they are
completely isolated from one another, i.e. they only know the game rules
and pay-offs on which they model their respective strategies, and each
one only wants to maximize his own pay-off. The game theory endeavour to
use this module to explain the real life situations and foresee the
decisions to be made by opponents (for instance, by Soviets in Cold war
era) or to offer the best course of deliberation to it’s users. In the
dynamic model of prisoner’s dilemma, the main difference is in
accessibility of information, because players are allowed to confer
before they are isolated.
One thing is of note here. It is a seemingly insignificant, but in reality, key feature of prisoner’s dilemma module and game theory in general. Namely, more often than not, the agents of decision making in game theory modules are described as criminals. Sometimes they are jewel thieves, sometimes it’s a fugitive escaping the posse, and in one encyclopaedia example game theory module is illustrated by act of tossing the incapacitated opponent into precipice. It is interesting that the author uses the pronoun he for victim while the criminal in dilemma is denoted as she, in strict accordance to rules of political correctness. Bearing in mind that victimhood, imaginary or not, proves to gain a rather abundant pay-off, it seems that even the game theoretician is faced with prisoners dilemma.
The game myth This feature leads us to key weak
point of game theory, i.e. it’s flimsy definition of rationality.
Namely, “big players”, of whose moving and shaking the media hierophants
inform us unceasingly, are brought into situation not only to be
denounced as criminal organizations, by the angry public, but the notion
appears to be incorporated into very definition of their enterprises.
Every player seeks exclusively his own maximal gain, and that which is
considered to be “one’s own”, therefore rationally desirable, seemingly
private, comes dangerously close to being privative. Bearing in mind
that such exclusive economical players are prone to merge with their
playmates in politics – which is notably the elementary definition of
fascism – one comes to conclusion that in the foundations of seemingly
supra-private bodies, be it corporations or governments, not only
private but also privative interests are embedded, and that very process
of democracy can be seen as a means of accomplishing this. In that
sense, it is no wonder that what is now called “liberalism” is a form of
strange metaphysics. Namely, it appeals to ‘human nature’ and ‘natural
rights’, but is in fact always been infected with an urge for escapism,
clearly visible in so called “state of nature” and “social contract”
theories, mythical stories about the historical event that never
happened in the historical age that never was, which man escaped by the
decision he never made. Game theory metaphysics transforms this myth,
enriches it, but it certainly doesn’t dispel it. The myth is sold,
against all reason and wealth of human imagination, as veritable image
of truth, i.e. a valid world-view, the prism through which the
contemporary world-picture is transmitted before our eyes. However, this
picture, no matter how coherent and self sufficient, is in fact rather
fragile.One thing is of note here. It is a seemingly insignificant, but in reality, key feature of prisoner’s dilemma module and game theory in general. Namely, more often than not, the agents of decision making in game theory modules are described as criminals. Sometimes they are jewel thieves, sometimes it’s a fugitive escaping the posse, and in one encyclopaedia example game theory module is illustrated by act of tossing the incapacitated opponent into precipice. It is interesting that the author uses the pronoun he for victim while the criminal in dilemma is denoted as she, in strict accordance to rules of political correctness. Bearing in mind that victimhood, imaginary or not, proves to gain a rather abundant pay-off, it seems that even the game theoretician is faced with prisoners dilemma.
Persuasive power of myth is proportional
to verity of it’s images to truth in itself, while persuasive power of
lie stems from it’s appellation to weakness of thought – to inertia
delighted with ease of passing flimsy judgments; with all those things
that make keyboard pushing informational machines, still, but – if
posthumanist have they way – not yet for long, called ‘humans’, go LOL!
and OMG! as on command. The mythology of rational playground falls
precisely into this second category, because it takes itself seriously,
as a necessary and all-applicable system, therefore it subverts the
transcendental, robbing it of it’s very possibility while replacing it
with it’s own cuckoo’s egg. However, in moments of crisis – and
etymologically it equals the moments of judgment – of all aspects of
life, such as the one unfolding right now, it’s lameness is ever more
obvious, and it’s ability to keep alive the illusion ever more
inadequate to the task. Notion of man as ‘selfish informational
apparatus’ is in fact a careless distortion of classical understanding
of elementary human solidarity, founded on love of one’s own being
transferred to another’s, best explained in Aristoteles’ book VIII of Nicomahean Ethics, where it is defined as ‘friendship’ (filia)
in the broadest sense. And if one thing is certain these days, it is
the fact that progressive concentration of power in the hands of
players, at the expense of those who are being played, is more likely to
push the losing side into irrational decision of giving up selfishness;
of saying: “I will not play anymore.”
Ghosts in the machine Such
eventuality, namely: the choice of irrational decision, sheds more
light on crucial system error in the definition of man and the game this
pseudo-metaphysics imposes on us. The term ‘irrational’ is never really
defined in the framework of game theory. Truth be told, the rationality
fared only little better, but at least it can serve as a foothold for
via negativa deduction of what is not irrationality. For game
theoretician, irrational behaviour is not behaviour at all, it is a
pseudo-behaviour deprived of deliberation. Bearing in mind that game
theory yields considerable pay-off in microbiology, where genes are
conceived as rational players in the game of survival of the fittest, we
even can’t say that irrational players are making monkeys of
themselves. So how to, by using this sophisticated net, catch the
elusive mutant which doesn’t play games, strategize, steal and adjust to
political moment?
Let’s define who or what he is, see
whether it helps a bit. This “ghost in the machine” could be someone
whose moral sentiment forces him to irrationally decline profitable
professions or profitable occasions such as to employ his talents in
mass propaganda or advertising; furthermore, in order to achieve his
end, for instance write the novel penetrating the depths of human
condition, he irrationally decides to always be close to death, because
only then he can really reach the heart of his subject, while at the
same time he knows that pay-off will probably come after he is long
gone. Is there any conceivable rational agent who can assume that he
rationally planned all this? Or are all those “whistleblowers” really
rational players; people who rationally decided to confront corruption,
and now enjoy the pay-off in the form of being unemployed and crucified
between responsibility towards their conscience and their families?
After all, do you think these lines you are just reading are written with pay-off in mind?
Isn’t it all so irrational? Therefore, isn’t it just what we are looking for?
After all, do you think these lines you are just reading are written with pay-off in mind?
Isn’t it all so irrational? Therefore, isn’t it just what we are looking for?
The game theory glimpses the irrational
as it’s own confinement; the barbwire circumscribing the playground or
unforeseen eventuality breaking the rules of gameplay, it’s strict
order. Bearing in mind that we are talking about world order – and globe
circumscribing barbwire – the shrinking of the irrational is absolute
inasmuch the rule of mythical rational is absolute. Endemic, logically
indescribable specimens are reduced to occasional noise in communication
channels between players. Only, the problem is: those endemic specimens
are in fact the majority of our respectably populated planet, so the
noise does tend to become pretty loud. It even begins to obstruct the
tranquillity of academic think tanks, and we know that devising complex
and abstract logical, not to mention mathematical, model demands focus, a
certain withdrawing from the world in the isolation of cabinet – that
parody of monk’s cell. Could it be that irritating hum is evolving into
unpredictable, unbearable noise whose source is too powerful for campus
security to subdue? Is it only rational to predict that global fish is
much too big for thin net made of loosely knit conceptual framework,
unfit even to catch a butterfly? What if it breaks? Because the enemy is
irrational, therefore: unthinkable. It is the great Unknown, something
equal to alien invasion. Can the sorcery of half-truth, half-philosophy,
half-culture and half-living keep it’s eyes wide shut for much longer?
Isn’t it horrifying, that beast of thousand faces, called Average Joe?
What can if he gets out of control?
For god sakes, he could laugh the players out of the playground!
And, consequently, out of existence.
Branko Malić