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Stalin's Secret Plans & Mid-Century Visions
How Soviet central planning contemplated the tunnel, the dark reality of gulag labor in Far East development, the 1942 U.S. Army Corps study, WWII's brief transformation from barrier to bridge, and Stalin's rejected 1945 proposal to Truman
Abstract
The Stalin era represents one of the darkest and most complex chapters in the Bering Strait tunnel's long history. During the 1930s-1950s, the dream of connecting continents collided with Soviet central planning, forced labor, wartime necessity, and the dawn of the Cold War. In the 1930s, Stalin's industrialization drive extended tentacles into the Soviet Far East, where studies of a Bering crossing were conducted—not to foster international cooperation but to exploit the region's gold deposits and connect concentration camp zones. In 1942, as Nazi Germany invaded deep into Soviet territory, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers studied building a railroad from Canada to Alaska's western coast specifically to supply the USSR, though the project was deemed too difficult and ultimately replaced by the ALSIB air route. Between 1942-1945, nearly 8,000 American aircraft crossed near the Bering Strait to supply the Soviet war effort—the only period in history when the region functioned as a bridge rather than barrier. Then, at Potsdam in August 1945, Stalin proposed to Truman that they link their rail networks through a Bering tunnel, framing it as continuation of wartime cooperation. Truman declined as the Cold War's ice curtain descended. This paper examines how ideology, forced labor, war, and geopolitical rivalry shaped three decades when the tunnel existed in Soviet planning documents but could never be discussed openly—an era when the project's association with Stalin's Terror makes it, even today, morally complicated to fully embrace the dream's Soviet-era incarnation.
1. The 1930s: Stalin's Far East and the Darkness Beneath
In 1929, Joseph Stalin launched the First Five-Year Plan—an unprecedented attempt to industrialize the Soviet Union through centralized state control. Agriculture was forcibly collectivized. Industry was commanded to meet impossibly ambitious targets. Millions died in engineered famines and purges. And in the Soviet Far East, Stalin's industrial ambitions took their darkest form: the gulag labor system that would extract resources through human suffering on an industrial scale.
The Far East: Resource Frontier and Prison
The Soviet Far East held immense resource wealth: gold in the Kolyma region, timber throughout Siberia, coal, metals, and potential petroleum. But it was thousands of kilometers from European Russia, sparsely populated, and lacked infrastructure. Stalin's solution was characteristically brutal: send forced labor.
The Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies—the Gulag—established massive camp complexes in the Far East during the 1930s. Kolyma, in particular, became synonymous with death. Prisoners were worked to exhaustion in gold mines where temperatures reached -60°C (-76°F). Survival rates were appalling. The Russian historian Robert Conquest estimated that of the millions sent to Kolyma, perhaps 30% survived to be released.
The Gulag Connection to Bering Infrastructure
According to engineer Hal Cooper and other historians, during the 1930s, studies of a Bering Strait connection were undertaken in part because Stalin sought to link concentration camp zones where gold-mining and other forced labor activities were occurring. The tunnel wasn't envisioned as international cooperation but as internal logistics for exploiting gulag labor more efficiently.
This dark reality means that Soviet-era Bering proposals can never be celebrated without acknowledging the human cost that would have built them. Any infrastructure constructed in Stalin's Far East during this period was, directly or indirectly, connected to the gulag system.
The BAM and Forced Labor
The Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railway—a northern parallel to the Trans-Siberian Railway—began construction in the 1930s largely through gulag labor. Stalin saw it as strategic: a railway further from the vulnerable Chinese border, opening resource-rich regions for exploitation. Construction proceeded under horrific conditions: permafrost, seismic zones, extreme cold, and brutal treatment.
Work on the BAM was suspended during World War II but resumed afterward. The railway wouldn't be completed until the 1980s, but its initial construction established the template: Soviet Far East development relied on forced labor to overcome costs that market economies couldn't justify.
Had the Bering tunnel been attempted in the 1930s-1950s, it almost certainly would have employed gulag labor. The moral stain of this association haunts even contemporary proposals—can we celebrate a dream that, in its Soviet incarnation, would have been built on slave labor?
Vladimir Lenin's Call
Before Stalin, Vladimir Lenin had called for intensified railroad construction toward the Bering Strait as part of Soviet economic development. Lenin's vision was revolutionary transformation through infrastructure—connecting the scattered Soviet periphery to the industrial core, integrating the economy, demonstrating communist efficiency.
But Lenin died in 1924 before realizing these ambitions. Stalin inherited both the vision and the willingness to use any means to achieve it. What Lenin framed as modernization, Stalin executed through Terror.
2. 1941-1942: Pearl Harbor and the Railroad That Wasn't Built
On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, bringing the United States into World War II. Within weeks, Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union—Operation Barbarossa, launched June 22, 1941—had pushed deep into Soviet territory. The USSR desperately needed American aid. But how to deliver it?
Stalin's December 1941 Request
According to historical accounts, shortly after Pearl Harbor, Stalin called Franklin Roosevelt and requested American war materials to resist the German invasion. He asked Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's closest advisor, to travel to Moscow to discuss logistics. How could the United States supply Russia?
Three options existed:
- Maritime routes: Ships through the Arctic Ocean to Murmansk (subject to German U-boat attacks) or the long route through the Persian Gulf to Iran
- Air routes: Fly aircraft across the Atlantic or Pacific
- Overland: Build a railroad from Canada through Alaska to the Bering Strait, ferry supplies across, connecting to Soviet rail
The railroad option captivated some planners. It would create permanent infrastructure rather than relying on vulnerable shipping. It could support the war effort and serve postwar development. And crucially, it avoided ocean crossings where German submarines exacted terrible tolls.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Study
In 1942, the Seattle District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers conducted a feasibility study for a proposed railroad from Prince George, British Columbia, to Fairbanks, Alaska, and then to Teller—a town on Alaska's northwestern coast, about 90 miles from the Bering Strait.
The 1942 Railroad Proposal
Distance: 1,417 miles from Prince George to Teller
Projected cost: $87 million for construction plus $24 million for rolling stock
Timeline: Estimated 2-3 years to complete
Purpose: Create a "backdoor re-supply route" for the Soviet Union
From Teller: Supplies would be ferried across the Bering Strait to Uelen, where they would connect to Soviet rail being extended eastward
The project had influential backers. Franklin Roosevelt's uncle, Frederic Delano, urged him to fund the Army Corps feasibility study. The concept attracted railroad interests who saw potential for postwar commercial development. Alaska boosters envisioned their territory becoming an international crossroads.
June 1942: The Decision
After the U.S. defeat of a Japanese carrier force at Midway Island in June 1942, the railroad project was deferred. Several factors drove this decision:
- Midway's strategic shift: The Japanese threat to Alaska diminished, reducing the railway's defensive justification
- Time concerns: Even at accelerated pace, the railway wouldn't be operational until 1944-1945 at earliest
- Alternative emerged: Flying aircraft directly from Alaska to Siberia proved faster and more feasible
- Cost vs. benefit: $110+ million for infrastructure that might not be needed if the war ended before completion
- Terrain challenges: The route crossed roadless wilderness, permafrost zones, and seismically active regions
Instead, the United States pursued the Alaska Highway (1,420 miles from Dawson Creek, British Columbia, to Fairbanks, completed in less than nine months) to provide ground access to Alaska. For supplying the USSR, the air route would prove sufficient.
3. 1942-1945: ALSIB—When the Strait Was a Bridge
What actually got built was far more elegant than a railroad: the Alaska-Siberia (ALSIB) air route, the only period in history when the Bering Strait functioned as a bridge rather than barrier.
The Route
Aircraft manufactured in the United States were flown from factories to Great Falls, Montana, then through a series of airfields across Canada and Alaska to Ladd Army Airfield in Fairbanks. There, Soviet pilots took over and flew the aircraft across the Bering Strait, through Siberia, and onward to the Eastern Front—a total distance of about 14,000 kilometers (8,700 miles) when including all segments.
The Aircraft
The types delivered included:
- Bell P-39 Airacobra and P-63 Kingcobra: Single-seat fighters favored by Soviet pilots
- Douglas A-20 Boston/Havoc: Light bombers
- Douglas C-47 Skytrain: Transport aircraft
- North American B-25 Mitchell: Medium bombers
- Curtiss P-40 Warhawk: Fighters
The first delivery—twelve Douglas A-20 Havoc bombers—arrived at Ladd Field on September 3, 1942. Led by Lieutenant Colonel P. Nedosekin, they crossed from Nome, Alaska, to Markovo, Russia, on September 29, 1942—while the Battle of Stalingrad raged thousands of miles to the west.
The Human Dimension
What made ALSIB remarkable wasn't just the logistics—it was the human cooperation it required. American and Soviet personnel worked side by side at Ladd Field. Soviet inspectors meticulously examined each aircraft; Americans corrected any deficiencies the Soviets identified. Soviet pilots trained on American aircraft, learning operations and maintenance.
Outside official duties, genuine friendships formed. Soviet pilots shopped in Fairbanks, paying in old U.S. gold certificates they'd somehow acquired. They bought luxury items—radios, watches, fabrics—to take home, items unavailable in the wartime Soviet Union. American personnel were curious about their Soviet counterparts. Many friendships lasted lifetimes.
Political officers accompanied Soviet pilots to ensure loyalty, and wartime censorship meant the ALSIB route wasn't publicly discussed until summer 1944. But within the confines of necessity, two ideologically opposed nations found they could cooperate effectively.
The Airfields
Sixteen airports were built or rebuilt along the Soviet portion of the route through uninhabited tundra, impenetrable taiga, permafrost, and extreme cold. Uelkal, the first Soviet airport just across from Alaska, was constructed in weeks during August-September 1942. Workers unloaded 12 ships of building materials, fuel, and food, erecting structures around the small Eskimo settlement.
Further along the route, airports sprang up at Markovo, Seymchan (navigating the "Pole of Cold" at Oymyakon where temperatures reached -71°C), Yakutsk, Kirensk (built almost entirely by manual labor), and finally Krasnoyarsk. Many of these facilities were constructed through forced labor, connecting even this relatively humane program to the gulag system's dark reality.
The Legacy
By September 1945, more Lend-Lease aircraft had been delivered via ALSIB than by all other routes combined. The program demonstrated that Americans and Soviets could work together effectively when necessity demanded. Veterans on both sides remembered ALSIB as proof that cooperation was possible.
But as the Pacific War wound down, the wartime marriage of convenience ended. Soviet pilots departed Fairbanks shortly after Japan's September 1945 capitulation. The airfields would remain, many serving civilian aviation afterward, but the cooperation that built them evaporated as Cold War descended.
4. August 1945: Potsdam and Stalin's Proposal
The scene returns to where we began Paper #5: Cecilienhof Palace, Potsdam, summer 1945. World War II in Europe had ended. The Allied leaders met to decide the postwar order. And amid discussions of Germany's partition and Japan's surrender, Stalin made his proposal to Truman.
The Proposal
According to historical accounts, Stalin proposed connecting American and Soviet rail networks through a tunnel or bridge across the Bering Strait. He framed it as continuation of wartime cooperation—the logical next step after ALSIB had proven that joint infrastructure projects could succeed.
Stalin's timing was deliberate. The ALSIB route had just demonstrated feasibility. Thousands of American and Soviet personnel had worked together successfully. The strait had functioned as a bridge for three years. Why not make it permanent?
Moreover, Stalin likely saw economic and strategic benefits:
- Far East development: A connection to North America would justify massive Soviet investment in Far East infrastructure
- Resource exploitation: Easier access to markets for Siberian resources
- Strategic positioning: Physical connection to America implied political normalization
- Prestige: A mega-project on par with anything the West could achieve
Truman's Rejection
Harry Truman, who had become president just four months earlier following Roosevelt's death in April 1945, declined the proposal. The official reason was unspoken but obvious: the Grand Alliance was fracturing.
At Potsdam itself, tensions were evident. Churchill warned of an "Iron Curtain" descending across Europe. Soviet forces occupied Eastern Europe with no clear timeline for free elections. Truman had just learned of the successful atomic bomb test and informed Stalin (though Stalin, through espionage, already knew). The strategic landscape was shifting rapidly from cooperation to confrontation.
Why Truman Said No
- Eroding trust: Soviet actions in Eastern Europe suggested Stalin wasn't interested in genuine cooperation
- Strategic vulnerability: A physical connection to the USSR created security risks
- Atomic monopoly: The U.S. believed it held decisive advantage, reducing need for Soviet cooperation
- Domestic politics: Americans were war-weary and unlikely to support massive new infrastructure spending
- Economic logic: Trade volumes didn't justify the investment
Truman's rejection marked a turning point. For the next forty-four years, the Bering Strait would be frozen not just by ice but by ideological division far colder and more enduring. The brief wartime thaw—when the strait functioned as bridge—ended. The Ice Curtain descended.
5. 1945-1953: The Final Stalin Years
Stalin's final years saw the Cold War solidify. In 1948, the Berlin Blockade tested Western resolve. In 1949, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb, ending American nuclear monopoly. The Chinese Communist Party won China's civil war, creating a vast socialist bloc. And in 1950, the Korean War brought superpowers into indirect military confrontation.
In this environment, Bering cooperation was impossible. The strait became heavily militarized. Chukotka was closed to outsiders. Indigenous peoples were prevented from crossing. Any discussion of physical connection became absurd—nations preparing for potential nuclear war don't build tunnels to each other.
Stalin's Death and Brief Thaw
Stalin died on March 5, 1953. His successors—eventually led by Nikita Khrushchev—initiated "de-Stalinization," releasing gulag prisoners, easing censorship, and pursuing "peaceful coexistence" with the West. The Korean War armistice was signed in July 1953. By the mid-1950s, a thaw seemed possible.
But the legacy of Stalin's era remained. The gulag system, while scaled back, continued. Far East infrastructure built through forced labor stood as monuments to suffering. And the Bering Strait, which Stalin had proposed connecting in 1945, remained divided—a testament to how quickly wartime cooperation had curdled into Cold War confrontation.
6. Conclusion: The Moral Weight of History
The Stalin-era Bering proposals carry moral weight that later iterations largely avoid. When we discuss the 2007 Russian proposal or 2025 Dmitriev pitch, we debate economics, engineering, and geopolitics. But 1930s-1950s Soviet proposals force us to confront darker questions: Can we celebrate a dream that would have been built on slave labor? How do we honor ALSIB's genuine cooperation while acknowledging the gulag system operating simultaneously?
The answer isn't to ignore this era but to learn from it:
- Infrastructure isn't neutral: How something is built matters as much as what is built
- Cooperation requires shared values: ALSIB succeeded because both sides genuinely wanted to defeat fascism; postwar proposals failed because values diverged
- Context shapes possibility: War necessity enabled what peace couldn't justify
- Dreams can have dark incarnations: The tunnel concept served Stalin's industrialization and control as much as any cooperative vision
Perhaps most importantly, the Stalin era demonstrates that some historical moments are so morally compromised that even well-intentioned projects become tainted. Any 1930s-1950s Bering tunnel would have exploited gulag labor. No amount of engineering ambition can redeem that.
Yet ALSIB offers counterpoint: proof that even deeply opposed nations can cooperate when necessity demands and when cooperation serves mutual interest. The 7,923 aircraft that crossed near the Bering Strait between 1942-1945 represent the only period when the dream functioned as intended—as a bridge rather than barrier.
That it lasted just three years before ideology reasserted itself reveals the fragility of cooperation built on necessity rather than shared values. Stalin's 1945 proposal to Truman was never going to succeed—not because the engineering was impossible, but because the trust required had already evaporated.
In our next paper, we'll examine the interwar period (1920s-1930s)—when the Russian Revolution, worldwide economic chaos, and the collapse of international cooperation extinguished the Gilded Age dream and set the stage for Stalin's darker visions.
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