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2020-2024: Building Through a Pandemic
When the world shut down, California high-speed rail kept building—proving it could deliver construction progress while simultaneously demonstrating why construction progress isn't enough
1. March 2020: The World Stops, Construction Doesn't
When COVID-19 shut down California in March 2020, most expected California High-Speed Rail construction to halt. The project was already struggling with delays and cost overruns. A pandemic seemed like it would deliver the fatal blow.
Instead, something unexpected happened: construction accelerated.
The Pandemic Paradox
In November 2020—eight months into the pandemic—the project hit an all-time high of 1,208 daily workers across 35 job sites in the Central Valley. This was nearly double the workforce at the pandemic's start.
How? Construction was deemed "essential work" in California. While millions worked from home or lost jobs entirely, high-speed rail workers reported to job sites daily. Safety protocols changed—smaller group meetings, social distancing, PPE—but work continued.
Toni Tinoco, Central Valley Deputy Regional Director, noted that the biggest challenge wasn't COVID—it was weather, as with any construction project. The pandemic was managed; the project's fundamental problems were not.
2. What Actually Got Built (2020-2024)
Between 2020 and 2024, California High-Speed Rail made visible progress in the Central Valley. Not passenger service. Not operational track. But concrete structures began rising from agricultural fields—proof that something was actually happening.
The Construction Scorecard (2020-2024)
- Guideway structures: 50+ completed out of 119 miles planned
- Right-of-way delivery: 96% of parcels acquired by 2022
- Utility relocations: 71% complete by end of 2022, 83% by 2023
- Design packages: All 163 completed for Central Valley structures
- Jobs created: 15,000+ construction jobs total
- Money spent: $13.8 billion by August 2025 (up from ~$5B in 2020)
- Passenger miles delivered: Still zero
The Hanford Viaduct—the project's longest structure in the Central Valley—began construction in 2020. Located about an hour south of Fresno, it's expected to be completed by 2026. When finished, it will be part of the testing track where trains will undergo 2-3 years of dynamic testing before any operations begin.
This is real progress. Concrete structures exist where none did before. Thousands of workers earned good wages. The Central Valley's landscape was visibly altered. But it's also progress toward a goal that keeps receding: operational service.
3. The Federal Drama: Trump vs Biden
The pandemic years coincided with a political drama that threatened the project's survival: the transition from Trump to Biden and back to Trump.
May 2019: Trump Cancels $929 Million
Even before COVID, the Trump administration had terminated $929 million in federal funding, citing lack of progress and California's abandonment of the SF-LA goal. California sued to stop the action.
June 2021: Biden Reinstates Funding
The Biden administration's first transportation actions included reinstating the $929 million and signaling openness to high-speed rail. Acting FRA Administrator Amit Bose spoke of "innovation in infrastructure" and connecting communities.
Then in December 2023, the Biden administration awarded $3.1 billion in new federal funding—the largest federal commitment since the original 2009 ARRA grant. This was a lifeline, suggesting the project had federal partnership for completion.
December 2024: Trump Returns, Funding Threatened Again
Trump's 2024 election victory immediately jeopardized federal funding. In December 2024, his incoming administration announced plans to rescind the $4 billion in grants. The cycle repeated: federal money promised, then threatened, creating uncertainty that makes long-term planning nearly impossible.
CEO Ian Choudri acknowledged the challenge but insisted the Authority would continue seeking funds: "77% of the money came from California taxpayers. We do want to continue to look for opportunities to work with the federal government."
Translation: California will build this with or without federal help—though "without" means it will take far longer and cost even more.
4. The Cost Crisis Deepens
The Escalating Price Tag (2020-2024)
- 2020 estimate: Central Valley segment $12.4 billion
- 2021 revised: Central Valley segment $13.8 billion
- 2022 estimate: Full SF-LA system $105-128 billion (up from $100B)
- Actual spent by 2025: $13.8 billion total (mostly Central Valley)
- Remaining need for just Central Valley: $16-20 billion
- Remaining need for full system: $100+ billion unfunded
Construction inflation explains some increases—COVID-era supply chain disruptions sent steel, rebar, and concrete prices soaring 47-53%. But other high-speed rail projects globally experienced similar inflation without California's catastrophic cost growth.
The 2022 Inspector General audit found the project "unlikely to finish on time and facing a budget shortfall"—the most diplomatically devastating assessment possible. Not "might face challenges." Not "requires additional funding." But bluntly: won't finish on time, doesn't have enough money.
5. What 2020-2024 Revealed
The pandemic years demonstrated three crucial things about California High-Speed Rail:
1. It Can Build Things
The project proved it can actually deliver construction. Structures rose. Workers were employed. Progress was visible. Critics who claimed "nothing will ever be built" were proven wrong. Something is being built.
But this raises a harder question: is building the wrong thing in the wrong place actually progress?
2. Money Is the Real Problem
Engineering challenges, permafrost issues, seismic requirements—these are all manageable with enough funding. The fundamental constraint isn't technical capability. It's money.
California has spent $13.8 billion over 17 years. That sounds enormous until you realize it needs $100+ billion more for the full system, or $16-20 billion more just to finish the Central Valley segment. At current funding levels ($1-2 billion annually), completion is decades away.
3. Political Will Is Insufficient
Governor Newsom supports the project. State legislators keep allocating cap-and-trade funds. The Authority persists. But support without resources is meaningless. California had nearly $100 billion in budget surplus in 2022—yet didn't allocate meaningful additional funding to high-speed rail.
Why? Because spending tens of billions on a "train to nowhere" in the Central Valley is politically toxic when schools need funding, homelessness persists, and infrastructure throughout the state crumbles.
Conclusion: Progress Without Purpose
The pandemic years proved California High-Speed Rail can build infrastructure despite extraordinary challenges. Construction continued when much of society shut down. Workers adapted. Progress was visible. By that measure, 2020-2024 was a success.
But success at construction isn't success at the project's actual goal: providing high-speed rail service between California's major cities. What got built serves no one yet and may never serve anyone if extensions aren't funded. Spending $13.8 billion to build guideway in agricultural land while cities remain unconnected isn't success—it's expensive proof that political will and construction capability without proper funding and planning produces expensive monuments to ambition rather than functional infrastructure.
The pandemic years demonstrated that California can build. What they couldn't demonstrate is whether California should build—or whether what's being built will ever matter.
In our next paper, we'll examine 2015-2019: The Great Scaling Back—when California officially abandoned the LA-SF vision and pivoted to the Central Valley-only plan that has defined the project's troubled trajectory ever since.
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