Monday, August 28, 2017


The last two days I've been offering my usual high octane speculation about the various incidents that have plagued the Arliegh Burke class of US navy missile frigates, the Donald Cook incident, the Fitzgerald incident, and the most recent, the John McCain incident. Thus far, I've advanced three basic hypotheses:
1) Crew and officer incompetence, which appears to be the favored "implied meme or hypothesis" of the US Navy, particularly in the wake of the McCain incident;
2) A form of targetable remote jamming or electronic systems interference or electromagnetic pulse, "selective jamming," as I dubbed it yesterday. This appears to be the implication of all three incidents, when considered whole, as the ships affected were apparently able to do certain things (such as continue under their own power) while during a certain period of time, they apparently were not able to take evasive action (and this applies both to the warships and to the ramming commercial ships in the Fitzgerald and McCain incidents). This appears to be a hypothesis suggested by careful parsing of statements by Russians themselves, assuming such statements to be true for the sake of argument (we'll get back to that possibility in a moment);
3) A form of remote electronic interference with the crews of those ships, in a form of "selective jamming" that amounts to mind manipulation.
Of course, one may advance a fourth hypothesis here:
4) Some form or combination of all the above.
But there is a fifth possibility, namely, that the incidents were not the result of "remote selective jamming" at all, but rather, a cyber-attack, as the following articles indicate:
(See also: )
It's the last article I want to concentrate on, and in particular, these statements:
The commander of the US navy has ordered an unprecedented worldwide “operational pause” as analysts warn Chinese hackers have breached US military security, causing two recent US naval collisions. 
A report prepared for the Pentagon and officials from government and the defense industry in 2013 warned that the nation’s most sensitive advanced weapons systems had been compromised by Chinese hackers, and four years later the Pentagon’s worst fears are being realized.
More than two dozen major weapons systems whose designs were breached in 2013 were programs critical to U.S. missile defenses and navy ships, according to a Washington Post report that detailed previously undisclosed sections of a confidential report prepared for Pentagon leaders by the Defense Science Board.
This electronic intrusions were a huge issue a few years ago, with military experts warning that the practice of having all of our computer chips built in China was a disaster waiting to happen. Because we are too cheap to pay Americans to do the work, we have allowed China access to the backbone of our systems. (Emphasis added)
"Gee... you mean all the globaloney spewed by Mr. Globaloney that if we scatter industry all over the world we'll have an era of galloping and somersaulting peace, love, and brotherhood isn't true?"
Yes, Mr. Rottenchild, Mr. Rockefailure, it's not true. Shipping your critical defense industries overseas is probably not a good idea. In fact, it's pretty darned stupid. One need only imagine Kaiser Wilhelm contracting with the French firm of Schneider-Creusot to build the barrels and munitions for the German army's "Big Berthas" before World War One: soon you'll have exploding barrels, wounded or killed gun crews, and projectiles that are duds. It's the same reason the Royal Navy didn't buy its battleships from Blohm und Voss in Hamburg, or the Red Army didn't buy its T-34 tanks from Krupp in Essen.
But humor aside, there's another aspect to this cyber-attack hypothesis, for if it is the explanation behind all these incidents, including the Donald Cook incident, then one might be looking at something else than my "selective targetable jamming" idea or its corollary "mind control" hypothesis, but a simple matter of the old PROMIS software-NSA "clipper chip" scandal of the 1980s: with the export of chips to China, the entire military might be compromised by chips that are, in effect, Chinese versions of the NSA's clipper chip, and they might be reading the same mail, so to speak, that the NSA is reading. This would mean that Russian indications of a "selective jamming technology" which would include a "human interference" component are a kind of Potemkin village, a claim that might be true, or might be false, one simply does not know.
Might this fifth hypothesis be combined with the other four? Certainly. For example, imagine activating a "clipper chip" or a certain segment of a software code remotely, by a specific radio signal: "if receiving frequency "x" then execute lines of code "w,y,z..." and so on. Imagine being particularly fiendish and Byzantine, and coding software, or building a chip, to activate certain instructions when it receives a signal in a frequency frequently used by a potential enemy, or even activated on certain well-used terms in a foreign military, and you get the idea.
Of course, your guess with this story is as good as mine, but I cannot help but see why, faced with these glaring security nightmares, the US Navy is opting for the "implied incompetence hypothesis," because the alternatives are nothing less than a nightmare.
All of this leaves us with the question of who might be doing this. But for a full consideration of that question, we'll have to wait until tomorrow (yes, I know, it's a four part blog).                      

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