The Dealmaker Romy Gai and the Opacity Problem FIFA: Swiss Non-Profit, Global Crime — Post 6

The Dealmaker

Romy Gai and the Opacity Machine

FIFA: Swiss Non-Profit, Global Crime — Post 6 | February 6, 2026

FIFA: SWISS NON-PROFIT, GLOBAL CRIME
Post 1: The $11 Billion Question — Where FIFA's money goes
Post 2: The Stats Perform Mystery — Undisclosed payments, Vista Equity
Post 3: The Saudi Web — PIF, DAZN, circular money
Post 4: The New Corruption — Post-2015 reforms failed
Post 5: The Player Extraction — 3% compensation, no CBA
Post 6: The Dealmaker ← YOU ARE HERE — Romy Gai and AWE
Post 7: The Global Pattern — NFL to FIFA

Romy Gai became FIFA's Chief Business Officer in April 2022. Within four years, he negotiated or was involved in: The Stats Perform betting data deal (payment undisclosed). The DAZN Club World Cup broadcasting rights ($1 billion). The Aramco sponsorship (Saudi state oil, $100 million per year). The Saudi Fund for Development loan agreement (up to $1 billion). And he was FIFA's CBO when FIFA awarded the 2034 World Cup to Saudi Arabia. Before joining FIFA, Gai spent seven years as Chairman of AWE International Group, a sports consulting firm that operated offices in London, Italy, Monaco, Portugal, and Saudi Arabia. AWE's client list is not public. The firm describes itself as serving "major brands" in fan engagement and event marketing — but won't name clients. Gai also served as CEO of the UAE Pro League (United Arab Emirates' top soccer league) from approximately 2011 to 2015. He spent 14 years as Chief Commercial Officer at Juventus FC before that. Every role involved commercial dealmaking. Every role involved regions or companies with Gulf ties. And now every major FIFA deal Gai negotiates seems to benefit Saudi-adjacent entities or private equity firms with Saudi connections. We can't prove Gai is corrupt. We can't prove he had undisclosed relationships with Stats Perform, Vista Equity, DAZN, or Saudi entities before joining FIFA. But we can prove FIFA hired someone whose consulting firm operated in Saudi Arabia, then signed multiple deals that benefit Saudi interests — all with undisclosed financial terms. The opacity is the corruption. And Romy Gai is the face of FIFA's post-reform dealmaking model.

Who Is Romy Gai?

Romy Gai is FIFA's Chief Business Officer, a position he's held since April 2022. As CBO, he oversees FIFA's commercial division: partnerships, sponsorships, media rights, licensing, and business development.

In short: Gai negotiates the deals that generate FIFA's revenue.

His background before FIFA:

1. AWE International Group (2015-2022): Chairman of a sports consulting and events firm. AWE operated offices in multiple countries including London, Italy, Monaco, Portugal, and Saudi Arabia. The firm specialized in fan engagement, strategic consulting for brands, marketing, and event organization.

2. UAE Pro League (approximately 2011-2015): Chief Executive Officer of the United Arab Emirates' top professional soccer league. Responsible for commercial development, broadcasting deals, and league operations.

3. Juventus FC (14 years before UAE): Chief Commercial Officer of one of Europe's most valuable football clubs. Negotiated sponsorships, licensing deals, and commercial partnerships.

The pattern: commercial dealmaking in sports, with heavy emphasis on Gulf region connections (UAE Pro League, AWE's Saudi office).

When FIFA hired Gai in April 2022, the hire was framed as bringing in experienced commercial expertise. Gai had a track record at elite levels (Juventus) and international experience (UAE, AWE's global offices).

But within four years, Gai would negotiate deals that raise questions about conflicts of interest, prior relationships, and FIFA's post-reform governance.

📅 ROMY GAI'S CAREER TIMELINE

EARLY CAREER (~1990s-2000s):
• Juventus FC: Chief Commercial Officer (14 years)
• Responsibilities: Sponsorships, licensing, commercial partnerships
• Context: One of Europe's biggest clubs, massive commercial operation

2011-2015: UAE PRO LEAGUE
• Position: Chief Executive Officer
• Location: United Arab Emirates (Gulf region)
• Responsibilities: Commercial development, broadcasting, league operations
• Context: Gulf sports ecosystem, regional business relationships

2015-2022: AWE INTERNATIONAL GROUP
• Position: Chairman (ownership/control stake)
• Company: Sports consulting and events firm
• Offices: London, Italy, Monaco, Portugal, Saudi Arabia
• Services: Fan engagement, brand consulting, marketing, events
• Client list: NOT PUBLIC

APRIL 2022: JOINS FIFA
• Position: Chief Business Officer
• Responsibilities: All commercial deals (partnerships, media, licensing)
• Reports to: Gianni Infantino (FIFA President)

2022-2026: DEALS NEGOTIATED AT FIFA
• Stats Perform betting data (Jan 2026, payment undisclosed)
• Likely involved: DAZN Club WC rights (~$1B)
• Likely involved: Aramco sponsorship (Saudi, $100M/year)
• Likely involved: Saudi Fund loans (up to $1B)
• During tenure: 2034 WC awarded to Saudi (Dec 2024)

The pattern: Gulf region experience → opaque consulting firm → FIFA dealmaker
→ negotiates Saudi-adjacent deals with undisclosed terms.

AWE International: The Opaque Consulting Firm

AWE International Group is the key to understanding Gai's potential conflicts.

Gai was Chairman of AWE from 2015 to 2022 — seven years. This wasn't an executive job where he worked for someone else. As Chairman, he had ownership or significant control. AWE was, effectively, his firm.

What did AWE do? According to its website and company materials:

• Fan engagement strategies for sports brands
• Strategic consulting for companies and institutions
• Marketing and event organization
• Digital campaigns for sports properties

The firm positioned itself as a "bridge between the past and the future" in sports business, emphasizing innovation, education, and fan-centric approaches.

In 2018, AWE Sport International (the Monaco-based subsidiary) was selected for HYPE-Sports Innovation's TOP 50 Program, highlighting its role in sports tech and innovation.

In 2021, Gai and Beniamino Savio (AWE Sport CEO) launched Sport Horizon Holding (SHH), a vehicle for club acquisitions — further tying Gai to AWE's strategic direction.

But here's what AWE won't disclose: who its clients were.

AWE describes serving "major brands" without naming them. Its portfolio implies work with companies, athletes, and federations — but provides no specifics.

This opacity matters because:

If AWE consulted for Stats Perform, Vista Equity, DAZN, or Saudi entities before Gai joined FIFA in 2022, that creates conflicts.

Gai would have negotiated FIFA deals (2022-2026) with companies his firm previously worked for. Prior business relationships influence deal terms. Even if legal, it's a structural conflict.

We searched for evidence of AWE-Stats Perform, AWE-Vista, or AWE-DAZN relationships. We found none. But AWE doesn't disclose clients. So absence of evidence doesn't mean absence of relationship — it means AWE successfully hid its client list.

AWE INTERNATIONAL: OPACITY BY DESIGN

WHAT AWE CLAIMS TO DO:
• Fan engagement for sports brands
• Strategic consulting for companies/institutions
• Marketing and event organization
• Digital campaigns
• "Bridge between past and future" in sports business

AWE'S STRUCTURE:
• Founded 2015 (management buyout by investment fund)
• Romy Gai: Chairman 2015-2022
• Offices: London (HQ), Italy, Monaco, Portugal, Saudi Arabia
• Subsidiaries: AWE Sport, AWE Sport Education
• 2021: Gai launched Sport Horizon Holding (club acquisition vehicle)

WHAT AWE WON'T DISCLOSE:
• Client list: NOT PUBLIC
• Portfolio says "major brands" — doesn't name them
• No comprehensive public list of consulting relationships
• Financial filings (if any) don't require client disclosure

WHY THIS MATTERS:
• If AWE consulted for Stats Perform → Gai negotiated FIFA deal with former client
• If AWE consulted for Vista Equity → conflict of interest
• If AWE consulted for DAZN → prior relationship influences FIFA-DAZN deals
• If AWE consulted for Saudi entities → explains Gai's role in Saudi deals

WHAT WE SEARCHED FOR:
• AWE-Stats Perform relationships: None found
• AWE-Vista Equity relationships: None found
• AWE-DAZN relationships: None found
• But AWE won't disclose clients, so we can't rule out relationships

THE OPACITY IS THE POINT:
Consulting firms that want to attract clients showcase their work. AWE hides it.
Why? To enable executives to move between consulting and governing bodies without
disclosed conflicts. Gai ran opaque firm → joins FIFA → negotiates opaque deals.

The Saudi Office: Gulf Region Connections

In 2018, AWE International had an office in Saudi Arabia. This was reported when AWE launched FANBOX, a joint venture with Advice Group, with offices including Saudi Arabia.

Gai also served as CEO of the UAE Pro League from approximately 2011 to 2015. The UAE (United Arab Emirates) and Saudi Arabia are closely aligned Gulf states with extensive business and political ties.

So Gai has direct Gulf region experience:

• CEO of UAE's top soccer league (2011-2015)
• Chairman of consulting firm with Saudi office (2015-2022)

Then he joins FIFA (April 2022). And FIFA proceeds to sign multiple deals that benefit Saudi interests:

• Aramco sponsorship: Saudi state oil company, $100M/year (announced 2024)
• 2034 World Cup: Awarded to Saudi Arabia, sole bidder (December 2024)
• Saudi Fund loans: Up to $1B for FIFA-endorsed stadiums (November 2025)
• DAZN deals: FIFA sells Club WC rights to DAZN; PIF owns $1B stake in DAZN (2024)

We can't prove Gai orchestrated these deals based on prior Saudi relationships. But we can prove:

• Gai has Gulf business background (UAE Pro League, AWE Saudi office)
• FIFA hired him as CBO (April 2022)
• FIFA then signed multiple Saudi-adjacent deals (2022-2026)
• All deals have undisclosed or opaque financial terms

This is structural conflict hidden through opacity. The person negotiating FIFA's Saudi deals has prior Saudi business connections. We can't trace the connections because AWE won't disclose clients and FIFA won't disclose deal terms.

⚠️ THE SAUDI CONNECTIONS: STRUCTURAL CONFLICT

GAIT'S GULF REGION BACKGROUND:
• UAE Pro League CEO (2011-2015): United Arab Emirates
• AWE International: Had Saudi Arabia office (reported 2018)
• Gulf expertise: Commercial dealmaking in UAE/Saudi ecosystem

FIFA'S SAUDI DEALS (DURING GAIT'S TENURE):
• Aramco sponsorship: Saudi state oil, ~$100M/year (2024)
• 2034 World Cup: Saudi Arabia, sole bidder (Dec 2024)
• Saudi Fund loans: Up to $1B for stadiums (Nov 2025)
• DAZN connection: PIF owns $1B stake in DAZN (FIFA's media partner)
• Stats Perform: Previously owned by DAZN (now Vista, but DAZN history)

THE TIMELINE:
• 2011-2015: Gai works in UAE (Gulf region)
• 2015-2022: Gai's firm has Saudi office
• April 2022: Gai joins FIFA as CBO
• 2022-2026: FIFA signs multiple Saudi-adjacent deals

WHAT WE CAN'T PROVE:
• Gai negotiated FIFA deals to benefit Saudi contacts
• AWE consulted for Saudi entities that later benefited from FIFA deals
• Gai will leave FIFA for Saudi/PIF-backed firm

WHAT WE CAN PROVE:
• Gai has Gulf business background
• FIFA hired him, then signed Saudi deals
• All deals have undisclosed/opaque terms
• The opacity makes corruption impossible to prove — but also impossible to disprove

This is structural conflict. Not a smoking gun, but a pattern that raises questions
FIFA won't answer.

The Deals Gai Negotiated

As FIFA's Chief Business Officer, Gai is responsible for all major commercial deals. Here's what we know he negotiated or was involved in:

1. Stats Perform betting data deal (January 2026):

• Gai is quoted in all press releases as FIFA's representative
• Exclusive betting data rights through 2029
• Payment to FIFA: undisclosed
• Stats Perform owned by Vista Equity Partners
• Stats Perform previously owned by DAZN (2019 sale)

2. DAZN Club World Cup broadcasting rights (2023-2024):

• Deal value: approximately $1 billion
• Gai likely involved (CBO oversees media rights)
• PIF invested $1B in DAZN shortly after FIFA deal

3. Aramco sponsorship (2024):

• Saudi state oil company becomes FIFA global partner
• Deal value: ~$100M/year through 2027
• Gai likely involved (CBO oversees sponsorships)

4. Saudi Fund for Development MoU (November 2025):

• Up to $1B in concessional loans for FIFA-endorsed stadiums
• Gai likely involved (commercial partnerships)

Every deal has a Saudi connection or a private equity connection. Every deal has undisclosed or opaque financial terms. And every deal was negotiated by someone whose consulting firm had Saudi operations.

This isn't proof of corruption. But it's a pattern that demands transparency. And FIFA provides none.

The Revolving Door Watch

Gai is still at FIFA as of February 2026. He hasn't left for a private sector role. So there's no smoking gun revolving door yet.

But the NFL taught us the pattern:

Kevin LaForce (NFL example):

• Ran NFL's 32 Equity while negotiating deals with portfolio companies
• Negotiated Genius Sports deal (April 2021)
• Left NFL two months later (June 2021) for RedBird Capital
• RedBird then partnered with NFL on EverPass Media (May 2023)

The pattern: negotiate deal, leave shortly after, join beneficiary or related firm.

If Gai follows this pattern:

• Negotiated Stats Perform deal (January 2026)
• Stays at FIFA for 12-24 months to avoid obvious conflict
• Leaves for Vista Equity, Stats Perform, DAZN, or a PIF-backed firm (2027-2028)

That would be the smoking gun. But even without a departure, the opacity is damning. Gai ran an opaque consulting firm with Saudi ties, joined FIFA, negotiated opaque deals that benefit Saudi-adjacent entities, and FIFA won't disclose the financial terms.

The revolving door doesn't require proof of quid pro quo. It just requires watching.

If Gai leaves FIFA for a Stats Perform-related company, we'll know. Until then, the pattern speaks for itself.

REVOLVING DOOR WATCH: WILL GAI LEAVE FOR BENEFICIARIES?

THE NFL PRECEDENT (KEVIN LAFORCE):
• Ran 32 Equity (NFL venture fund)
• Negotiated deals with portfolio companies (conflicts)
• April 2021: Negotiated Genius Sports deal
• June 2021: Left NFL (2 months later) for RedBird Capital
• May 2023: RedBird partnered with NFL on EverPass Media
• Pattern: Negotiate deal → leave shortly after → join beneficiary/related firm

IF GAI FOLLOWS THIS PATTERN:
• January 2026: Negotiated Stats Perform deal
• 2026-2027: Stays at FIFA (avoids obvious conflict)
• 2027-2028: Leaves for Vista Equity, Stats Perform, DAZN, or PIF-backed firm
• That would be smoking gun revolving door

CURRENT STATUS (FEBRUARY 2026):
• Gai still at FIFA (hasn't left)
• Stats Perform deal announced 1 month ago (Jan 12, 2026)
• Too soon to know if he'll leave

COMPANIES TO WATCH:
• Vista Equity Partners (owns Stats Perform)
• Stats Perform itself
• DAZN Group (PIF-backed, previously owned Stats Perform)
• Any PIF-backed sports/media company
• Saudi sports entities (LIV Golf, Newcastle United, Saudi Pro League)
• Sports consulting firms with Gulf clients

WHY THIS MATTERS EVEN WITHOUT DEPARTURE:
• Gai ran opaque firm (AWE, client list hidden)
• AWE had Saudi office
• Gai joined FIFA, negotiated Saudi-adjacent deals
• All deals have undisclosed terms
• Opacity makes corruption impossible to prove OR disprove

The revolving door doesn't require quid pro quo. It just requires watching. If
Gai leaves for a beneficiary, we'll know the deals were self-serving.

What We Know vs What's Hidden

Here's what's public about Romy Gai:

Public:

• FIFA Chief Business Officer since April 2022
• Negotiated Stats Perform deal (quoted in press releases)
• Chairman of AWE International 2015-2022
• AWE had Saudi office (reported 2018)
• CEO of UAE Pro League 2011-2015
• CCO at Juventus for 14 years

Hidden:

• AWE's client list (not public, can't verify Stats Perform/Vista/DAZN/Saudi relationships)
• Payment FIFA receives from Stats Perform (undisclosed)
• Gai's role in other FIFA deals (DAZN, Aramco, Saudi Fund) — likely involved but not publicly confirmed
• Whether Gai will leave FIFA for private sector (too soon to know)
• Any side agreements or future employment discussions

The hidden information is where corruption lives. And FIFA provides no transparency.

The Face of Post-Reform FIFA

Romy Gai isn't Sepp Blatter. He's not taking cash bribes in hotel rooms. He's not wiring money to Swiss bank accounts.

He's the face of FIFA's post-reform corruption model: negotiate deals through corporate partnerships, hide financial terms, come from opaque backgrounds that make conflicts impossible to trace.

This is smarter corruption. Harder to prosecute. Structured through legitimate business transactions. But the outcomes are the same: FIFA gives value to entities that pay FIFA, players get 3%, and the people negotiating the deals have backgrounds that raise questions they won't answer.

Post 7 will connect this to the NFL series: the same extraction model, different scale, global reach. From 32 Equity to AWE International. From Genius Sports to Stats Perform. From NFL owners to FIFA executives. The pattern is universal.

HOW WE BUILT THIS POST — FULL TRANSPARENCY

WHAT'S CONFIRMED (Primary Sources):
• Gai's position: FIFA CBO since April 2022 (FIFA announcement)
• Stats Perform deal: Gai quoted in press releases (Jan 12, 2026)
• AWE background: Chairman 2015-2022 (company records, LinkedIn)
• AWE Saudi office: Reported 2018 (FANBOX JV press release)
• UAE Pro League: CEO ~2011-2015 (documented in profiles)
• Juventus: CCO for 14 years (confirmed in bio)
• AWE client list: NOT PUBLIC (we searched, found no disclosure)

WHAT WE SEARCHED FOR BUT DIDN'T FIND:
• AWE-Stats Perform relationships (no evidence, but AWE won't disclose clients)
• AWE-Vista Equity relationships (same)
• AWE-DAZN relationships (same)
• Gai's specific role in DAZN/Aramco/Saudi Fund deals (likely involved as CBO, not explicitly confirmed)

WHAT'S INFERRED (Clearly Labeled):
• "Structural conflict": Our characterization of Saudi background + Saudi deals
• "Opacity is corruption": Our assessment based on hidden client lists + undisclosed payments
• "Face of post-reform FIFA": Our editorial conclusion about Gai's role

WHY THIS MATTERS:
Gai ran opaque consulting firm with Saudi operations, joined FIFA, negotiated
opaque deals benefiting Saudi-adjacent entities. Can't prove corruption (too
well hidden). Can't disprove it either. The opacity IS the story.

The Player Extraction The Worst Labor Deal in Sports FIFA: Swiss Non-Profit, Global Crime — Post 5

The Player Extraction

The Worst Labor Deal in Sports

FIFA: Swiss Non-Profit, Global Crime — Post 5 | February 6, 2026

FIFA: SWISS NON-PROFIT, GLOBAL CRIME
Post 1: The $11 Billion Question — Where FIFA's money goes
Post 2: The Stats Perform Mystery — Undisclosed payments, Vista Equity
Post 3: The Saudi Web — PIF, DAZN, circular money
Post 4: The New Corruption — Post-2015 reforms failed
Post 5: The Player Extraction ← YOU ARE HERE — 3% compensation, no CBA
Post 6: The Dealmaker — Romy Gai and AWE
Post 7: The Global Pattern — NFL to FIFA

Lionel Messi has won the World Cup. Cristiano Ronaldo hasn't. Neymar came close. Kylian Mbappé will try again. These are the world's most valuable athletes, paid hundreds of millions by their clubs. But when they play in the World Cup — the tournament that generates $11 billion in revenue for FIFA — they play for free. Not literally free. National federations pay small bonuses (often $30,000-50,000 per player for making the squad, sometimes more for winning matches). But FIFA doesn't pay them. The $11 billion FIFA generates from their performances? Players get zero. Their clubs get $355 million total in "release fees" for allowing players to represent their countries. That's 3.2% of FIFA's revenue. The other 96.8% stays with FIFA. Compare this to the NFL: American football players receive 48.8% of league revenue via a collective bargaining agreement. They have a union. They can strike. They negotiate. FIFA players have none of this. No CBA. No global union with bargaining power. No ability to withhold labor without betraying their countries. National federations control player selection. Federations depend on FIFA funding. Players are atomized across 211 countries with zero collective leverage. The result: FIFA extracts 15 times more from players than the NFL does. And players can't do anything about it. This is the worst labor deal in global sports.

The Numbers: 3% vs 48.8%

Let's start with the math we established in Post 1:

FIFA (2023-2026 cycle):

• Total revenue: $11 billion
• Player compensation (via club release fees): $355 million
• Player share: 3.2%

NFL (2024 season):

• Total revenue: ~$25 billion
• Player compensation (via salary cap): ~$12.2 billion
• Player share: 48.8% (CBA-mandated)

The difference:

FIFA extraction: 96.8% of revenue kept from players
NFL extraction: 51.2% of revenue kept from players

FIFA's extraction is 15.25 times worse than the NFL.

If FIFA operated like the NFL:

• $11 billion × 48.8% = $5.368 billion to players
• Actual player compensation: $355 million
• Difference: $5.013 billion

FIFA is keeping $5 billion per cycle that would go to players under an NFL-style revenue sharing model.

And the NFL isn't a paragon of labor fairness. NFL players fight for every percentage point. The 48.8% share came from decades of strikes, negotiations, and collective action.

FIFA players get 3% without any of that leverage. Because they have no leverage.

🔥 THE EXTRACTION COMPARISON: FIFA vs NFL

FIFA (2023-2026 CYCLE):
• Revenue: $11 billion
• Player compensation: $355 million (club release fees)
• Player share: 3.2%
• FIFA keeps: 96.8%

NFL (2024 SEASON):
• Revenue: $25 billion
• Player compensation: $12.2 billion (salary cap)
• Player share: 48.8% (CBA Article 12)
• Owners keep: 51.2%

THE COMPARISON:
• FIFA extraction: 96.8% kept from players
• NFL extraction: 51.2% kept from players
• FIFA’s extraction is 15.25x worse

IF FIFA OPERATED LIKE NFL:
• $11B × 48.8% = $5.368 billion to players
• Actual: $355 million
• Difference: $5.013 billion kept by FIFA every 4 years

PER WORLD CUP PLAYER (2026):
• 48 teams × ~23 players = ~1,104 players
• If FIFA paid like NFL: $5.368B / 1,104 = $4.86 million per player
• Actual (via club fees): $355M / 1,104 = $321,557 per player (indirect)
• Players are losing $4.54 million each compared to NFL revenue sharing

This is systematic extraction at global scale.

Why Players Can't Strike

In the NFL, players can strike. If labor negotiations break down, the NFL Players Association can call a work stoppage. Players refuse to play. Games don't happen. Revenue stops. Owners feel pain. This leverage forces owners to negotiate.

NFL players have used this leverage multiple times:

• 1982 strike: 57 days, forced owners to increase player compensation
• 1987 strike: 24 days, led to free agency reforms
• 2011 lockout: Owners locked out players, settlement reached after 132 days

The threat of strikes gives NFL players bargaining power. Owners know that if they don't negotiate in good faith, players can shut down the league.

FIFA players have no equivalent leverage. Here's why:

1. National teams, not leagues: NFL players work for 32 teams in a single league. They can collectively refuse to work. But FIFA players represent 211 national teams across different confederations. There's no single employer to strike against.

2. National pride prevents strikes: If NFL players strike, fans are disappointed but understand it's a labor dispute. If World Cup players tried to strike, they'd be accused of betraying their countries. The political and emotional pressure is enormous. Players who refused to play for their national teams would face public backlash, potential government pressure, and career consequences.

3. National federations control selection: Players don't choose to play for their national teams — federations choose them. If a player becomes a "problem" (e.g., demands revenue sharing), the federation can simply not select them. There are always other players willing to play for free.

4. No unified bargaining unit: NFL players are represented by the NFLPA. All NFL players are members. The union can speak for everyone. FIFA players have FIFPro (international players' union), but FIFPro is a federation of national unions, not a single bargaining unit. It has no authority to negotiate with FIFA on behalf of all players.

5. Clubs pay player salaries: NFL players' salaries come from the league (via team salary caps funded by shared revenue). So NFL players care deeply about league revenue. FIFA players' salaries come from clubs. Their club paychecks aren't affected by FIFA revenue. This reduces their incentive to fight FIFA for revenue sharing.

The result: FIFA players can't credibly threaten to strike. And without that threat, they have no leverage.

⚠️ WHY FIFA PLAYERS CAN'T STRIKE

NFL STRIKE LEVERAGE:
• Players work for 32 teams in single league
• NFLPA can call work stoppage
• No games = no revenue = owners feel pain
• History: 1982 strike (57 days), 1987 strike (24 days), 2011 lockout (132 days)
• Threat of strikes forces good-faith negotiation

WHY FIFA PLAYERS CAN’T USE SAME LEVERAGE:

1. NATIONAL TEAMS, NOT LEAGUES:
• 211 national teams across different confederations
• No single employer to strike against
• Can’t collectively refuse to work

2. NATIONAL PRIDE PREVENTS STRIKES:
• NFL strike = labor dispute (understandable)
• World Cup strike = betraying your country (politically explosive)
• Players who refused would face: Public backlash, government pressure, career damage
• Patriotism weaponized against labor rights

3. FEDERATIONS CONTROL SELECTION:
• Players don’t choose to play — federations choose them
• “Problem” players (demanding revenue) can be dropped
• Always other players willing to play for free

4. NO UNIFIED BARGAINING UNIT:
• FIFPro exists but is federation of national unions
• No single entity with authority to negotiate for all players
• Can’t coordinate global labor action

5. CLUBS PAY SALARIES:
• NFL: League revenue → salary cap → player paychecks
• FIFA: Club revenue → player paychecks (independent of FIFA)
• FIFA revenue doesn’t affect player salaries directly
• Reduces incentive to fight FIFA

THE RESULT:
Players can’t credibly threaten to strike. Without that threat, they have zero
leverage. FIFA can pay 3% and face no consequences.

FIFPro: The Union Without Power

FIFPro (Fédération Internationale des Associations de Footballeurs Professionnels) is the international organization representing professional football players. It's often described as the "global players' union."

But FIFPro has no real power to negotiate with FIFA.

Here's why:

1. FIFPro is a federation of national unions, not a single union. It represents 65 national player associations from different countries. Each national association has its own priorities, legal frameworks, and relationships with its national federation. FIFPro can't speak for all players with one voice because its member associations don't always agree.

2. FIFPro has no collective bargaining agreement with FIFA. Unlike the NFLPA (which has a legally binding CBA with the NFL), FIFPro has no formal agreement that requires FIFA to negotiate. FIFA can simply refuse to bargain.

3. FIFPro has no enforcement mechanism. Even when FIFPro makes demands (e.g., "players should receive revenue share from World Cup"), FIFA can ignore them. FIFPro can't force FIFA to comply because it has no legal authority and players can't strike.

4. FIFPro's funding is limited. The NFLPA has substantial resources (funded by player dues from high-earning NFL athletes). FIFPro's budget is smaller because it represents players across vastly different income levels (some earn millions, many earn modest salaries). This limits FIFPro's ability to fight long legal battles or fund global organizing campaigns.

5. National federations outflank FIFPro. FIFA's member associations are national federations (like the US Soccer Federation, English FA, etc.). These federations vote on FIFA policies. FIFPro can lobby, but it has no votes. Federations prioritize their own interests (FIFA funding) over player interests.

So FIFPro exists. It issues statements. It advocates for player rights. But it can't force FIFA to share revenue. And without enforcement power, advocacy doesn't change the extraction.

FIFPRO: THE UNION WITHOUT POWER

WHAT IS FIFPRO:
• International organization representing professional football players
• Federation of 65 national player associations
• Often called “global players’ union”

WHY IT HAS NO REAL POWER:

1. FEDERATION STRUCTURE, NOT SINGLE UNION:
• 65 national associations with different priorities
• Can’t speak with one voice (members don’t always agree)
• Compare to NFLPA: Single union, all NFL players are members

2. NO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT:
• NFLPA has legally binding CBA with NFL (requires good-faith negotiation)
• FIFPro has NO formal agreement with FIFA
• FIFA can simply refuse to bargain

3. NO ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM:
• FIFPro makes demands → FIFA ignores them
• FIFPro has no legal authority to force compliance
• Players can’t strike (national pride, federation control)
• Result: Advocacy without power

4. LIMITED FUNDING:
• NFLPA funded by high-earning NFL players (substantial resources)
• FIFPro represents players across vast income ranges (many earn modest salaries)
• Limited budget = can’t fight long legal battles or fund global campaigns

5. NATIONAL FEDERATIONS OUTFLANK FIFPRO:
• FIFA’s voting members = national federations (USSF, English FA, etc.)
• FIFPro can lobby but has no votes
• Federations prioritize FIFA funding over player interests

THE RESULT:
FIFPro exists. Issues statements. Advocates for players. But can’t force FIFA
to share revenue. Advocacy without enforcement = players still get 3%.

National Federations: The Intermediaries Who Won't Help

You might think national federations would pressure FIFA on behalf of players. After all, federations select players, organize national teams, and have direct relationships with FIFA.

But federations don't pressure FIFA for player revenue sharing. Here's why:

1. Federations depend on FIFA funding. FIFA distributes hundreds of millions to national federations via programs like FIFA Forward (development grants). Federations that antagonize FIFA risk losing funding. So federations stay quiet about player compensation.

2. Federations benefit from the current system. Under FIFA's model, federations receive World Cup prize money (e.g., $42 million for winning 2022 World Cup). Federations decide how much of that to distribute to players. Some federations keep significant portions for "administration." If FIFA paid players directly, federations would lose control over that money.

3. Federations are often poorly governed. Many national federations have their own corruption scandals, opaque finances, and undemocratic structures. These federations aren't going to advocate for player rights when they're busy protecting their own interests.

4. Federations vote on FIFA policies. FIFA Congress (where major decisions are made) is composed of national federation representatives. These are the people who elect the FIFA President and approve budgets. They're not going to vote for revenue sharing that reduces their own FIFA grants.

So players are trapped: FIFPro has no power. National federations won't help. And FIFA faces zero pressure to change.

The Club Release Fee Model: 3% and Indirect

FIFA's only direct payment related to players is the Club Benefits Programme: compensation to clubs for releasing players to national teams.

For the 2026 World Cup, FIFA will pay $355 million total to clubs worldwide. The formula:

• $10,000 per player per day
• Covers preparation period (before tournament) and tournament duration
• Includes compensation for players released during qualifiers (new for 2026)

Example: A club that releases 5 players for the World Cup might receive $500,000-1 million depending on how long those players' teams stay in the tournament.

But this isn't player compensation. It's club compensation. The money goes to clubs, not players. Clubs decide whether to pass any of it to players (most don't).

So when we say "players get 3%," that's even generous. The $355 million goes to clubs. Players themselves get zero from FIFA.

What players get:

• Appearance fees from national federations: Some federations pay players for making the squad (e.g., $30,000-50,000)
• Performance bonuses from federations: Win bonuses, tournament progression bonuses (varies by federation)
• Prize money distributions: Some federations share World Cup prize money with players (e.g., US women's team negotiated equal prize money sharing)

But all of this comes from national federations, not FIFA. And it's tiny compared to the $11 billion FIFA generates.

THE CLUB RELEASE FEE MODEL: WHY PLAYERS GET ZERO

FIFA’S CLUB BENEFITS PROGRAMME:
• Total for 2026 World Cup: $355 million
• Formula: $10,000 per player per day
• Covers prep period + tournament duration + qualifiers (new for 2026)
• Payment goes to CLUBS, not players

EXAMPLE:
• Club releases 5 players for World Cup
• Players’ teams stay in tournament 30 days average
• Payment: 5 players × $10,000/day × 30 days = $1.5 million to club
• Players receive: $0 from FIFA (club decides whether to pass any on)

WHAT PLAYERS ACTUALLY RECEIVE:
• From national federations (not FIFA):
- Appearance fees: $30,000-50,000 (varies by federation)
- Performance bonuses: Win bonuses, progression bonuses
- Prize money shares: Some federations distribute World Cup prize money
• From FIFA directly: $0

THE PROBLEM:
• FIFA generates $11B from player performances
• Pays clubs $355M (3.2% of revenue)
• Pays players $0
• National federations distribute small bonuses (funded by federation, not FIFA)
• Total player compensation: Tiny fraction of value they create

COMPARE TO NFL:
• NFL revenue → salary cap → player paychecks (direct)
• FIFA revenue → FIFA reserves → clubs get release fees → players get $0 (indirect)

Players generate 100% of FIFA’s $11B revenue. FIFA pays them nothing.

Why This Will Never Change

FIFA's player extraction won't change because the structure prevents it:

1. Players can't strike (national pride, federation control, no unified union)

2. FIFPro can't force negotiations (no CBA, no enforcement power)

3. National federations won't help (depend on FIFA funding, benefit from current model)

4. FIFA faces no external pressure (Swiss non-profit law permits extraction, no shareholders to hold accountable)

5. Players are atomized (211 countries, different legal systems, no collective leverage)

The only scenario where FIFA would share revenue with players is if:

• Players could credibly threaten to not play (requires overcoming national pride barriers)
• National federations collectively demanded it (requires federations to prioritize players over FIFA funding)
• Legal action forced it (requires finding jurisdiction where FIFA's extraction violates law)
• Sponsors demanded it (requires sponsors to care about player compensation more than branding)

None of these are likely. So FIFA will continue extracting 97% of revenue while paying players nothing.

Post 6 will profile the man negotiating FIFA's deals: Romy Gai, whose consulting firm had Saudi operations and whose current role makes him the face of FIFA's post-reform corruption model.

HOW WE BUILT THIS POST — FULL TRANSPARENCY

WHAT’S CONFIRMED (Primary Sources):
• FIFA revenue: $11B (2023-2026 cycle) — FIFA budget documents
• Club Benefits Programme: $355M (2026), $10k/player/day — FIFA press releases
• NFL revenue share: 48.8% to players (CBA Article 12) — confirmed in NFL CBA
• FIFPro structure: Federation of 65 national associations — FIFPro documentation
• FIFA Forward grants: FIFA distributes development funding to federations — FIFA reports
• NFL strike history: 1982 (57 days), 1987 (24 days), 2011 lockout (132 days) — documented

WHAT’S CALCULATED (Showing Math):
• Player share of FIFA revenue: $355M / $11B = 3.2%
• If FIFA paid like NFL: $11B × 48.8% = $5.368B (vs $355M actual)
• FIFA extraction vs NFL: 96.8% / 51.2% = FIFA 15.25x worse

WHAT’S INFERRED (Clearly Labeled):
• “Worst labor deal in sports”: Our characterization based on 3% vs 48.8% comparison
• “Structure prevents change”: Our analysis of why players have zero leverage
• “Will never change”: Our assessment based on structural barriers

WHY THIS MATTERS:
FIFA generates $11B from player performances. Players get $0 directly (clubs get
$355M release fees = 3.2%). No CBA. No strike leverage. No union with power.
This is 15x worse extraction than the NFL — and players can’t fight back.

The New Corruption How FIFA's Reforms Failed FIFA: Swiss Non-Profit, Global Crime — Post 4

The New Corruption

How FIFA's Reforms Failed

FIFA: Swiss Non-Profit, Global Crime — Post 4 | February 6, 2026

FIFA: SWISS NON-PROFIT, GLOBAL CRIME
Post 1: The $11 Billion Question — Where FIFA's money goes
Post 2: The Stats Perform Mystery — Undisclosed payments, Vista Equity
Post 3: The Saudi Web — PIF, DAZN, circular money
Post 4: The New Corruption ← YOU ARE HERE — Post-2015 reforms failed
Post 5: The Player Extraction — 3% compensation, no CBA
Post 6: The Dealmaker — Romy Gai and AWE
Post 7: The Global Pattern — NFL to FIFA

In May 2015, Swiss police raided a luxury Zurich hotel and arrested seven FIFA officials on US federal corruption charges. The Department of Justice indicted 14 people total for racketeering, wire fraud, and money laundering involving $150 million in bribes. Sepp Blatter — FIFA President for 17 years — resigned days later. The scandal exposed decades of corruption: vote-buying for World Cup hosting rights, kickbacks on marketing deals, cash bribes delivered in hotel rooms. FIFA promised reforms. Gianni Infantino was elected President in February 2016 on a platform of transparency, ethics, and clean governance. Term limits were imposed. Independent ethics committees were strengthened. Transparency requirements were added to financial disclosures. The reforms looked real. But in May 2017 — just 15 months after taking office — Infantino orchestrated the removal of both FIFA ethics committee chairs: Cornel Borbély (investigatory chamber) and Hans-Joachim Eckert (adjudicatory chamber). They were ousted mid-investigation. Reports suggest they were pursuing more than 100 open cases, including inquiries into Infantino's own conduct. The FIFA Council — controlled by Infantino allies — voted to remove them and install replacements. The "independent" watchdogs were fired for doing their jobs. The reforms didn't end corruption. They just made it harder to prosecute. Today, FIFA operates the same extraction model — but instead of cash bribes, it's circular money flows through Saudi sponsorships, undisclosed data deals, and private equity partnerships. Not cleaner. Smarter.

The Old Corruption: $150 Million in Bribes

To understand how FIFA's reforms failed, we need to understand what they were reforming.

The 2015 scandal centered on systematic corruption spanning decades:

World Cup vote-buying: Officials received bribes in exchange for votes on hosting rights. Qatar 2022 and Russia 2018 hosting decisions were allegedly influenced by payments to FIFA Executive Committee members.

Marketing kickbacks: Companies paid bribes to FIFA officials to secure broadcasting and sponsorship deals. The scheme involved sports marketing firms (like Traffic Group, based in Brazil) paying millions to secure FIFA tournament rights, then inflating prices to recoup bribes.

Personal enrichment: Senior FIFA officials lived lavishly — private jets, luxury hotels, Swiss bank accounts — funded by bribes disguised as "consulting fees" or "commissions."

The DOJ indictment documented $150 million in bribes paid to FIFA officials between 1991 and 2015. The actual amount was likely far higher — $150 million was what prosecutors could prove.

Key figures indicted or implicated:

• Sepp Blatter: FIFA President 1998-2015, banned for financial misconduct
• Jack Warner: Former CONCACAF president, indicted for racketeering
• Chuck Blazer: Former CONCACAF general secretary, turned FBI informant
• Jeffrey Webb: CONCACAF president, pleaded guilty to racketeering
• Nicolás Leoz: CONMEBOL president, died while under house arrest

The corruption was blatant: cash in envelopes, wire transfers to personal accounts, bribes paid in hotel suites during FIFA meetings.

FIFA's reputation was destroyed. Sponsors threatened to leave. National federations demanded change. FIFA promised reform.

🔥 THE 2015 SCANDAL: WHAT FIFA WAS REFORMING

MAY 2015: THE ZURICH RAID
• Swiss police arrest 7 FIFA officials at Baur au Lac hotel
• US DOJ indicts 14 people total
• Charges: Racketeering, wire fraud, money laundering
• $150 million in documented bribes (1991-2015)

THE CORRUPTION MODEL:
1. World Cup vote-buying:
• Officials bribed for hosting votes (Qatar 2022, Russia 2018)
• Payments ranged from hundreds of thousands to millions per vote

1. Marketing kickbacks:
• Sports marketing firms (Traffic Group, others) paid bribes for FIFA rights
• Bribes disguised as “consulting fees” or “commissions”
• Firms inflated prices to recoup bribe costs

1. Personal enrichment:
• FIFA officials lived lavishly (private jets, luxury hotels, Swiss accounts)
• Sepp Blatter’s undisclosed compensation rumored >$5M/year
• Senior officials paid via offshore accounts

KEY FIGURES INDICTED/IMPLICATED:
• Sepp Blatter: FIFA President 1998-2015, banned 8 years (later reduced to 6)
• Jack Warner: CONCACAF president, indicted (fled to Trinidad)
• Chuck Blazer: CONCACAF general secretary, turned FBI informant (died 2017)
• Jeffrey Webb: CONCACAF president, pleaded guilty
• Nicolás Leoz: CONMEBOL president, died under house arrest

THE FALLOUT:
• Blatter resigned June 2015
• FIFA reputation destroyed globally
• Sponsors (Visa, Coca-Cola) demanded reforms
• National federations pressured FIFA for governance changes

This was the corruption FIFA promised to fix.

The Reforms: What FIFA Promised

In February 2016, Gianni Infantino was elected FIFA President on a reform platform. He promised:

1. Independent ethics oversight: Strengthened ethics committee with investigatory and adjudicatory chambers, independent from FIFA leadership

2. Term limits: FIFA President limited to 3 four-year terms (12 years maximum)

3. Transparency: Enhanced financial disclosures, publication of executive salaries, clearer accounting

4. Governance reforms: FIFA Council replacing Executive Committee, clearer separation of powers

5. Compliance and audit: Independent audit committee, compliance officers, regular reviews

These reforms looked substantial. And initially, they were implemented:

• Ethics committee chairs appointed: Cornel Borbély (investigatory) and Hans-Joachim Eckert (adjudicatory)
• FIFA Council formed with clearer governance structure
• Financial reports published with more detail (though still limited)
• Compliance programs established

For about 15 months, it appeared FIFA was serious about reform. Ethics investigations continued. Transparency improved slightly. The organization seemed to be cleaning house.

Then Infantino dismantled it.

📅 THE REFORM TIMELINE: PROMISE AND BETRAYAL

MAY 2015: SCANDAL BREAKS
• 7 officials arrested, 14 indicted
• Sepp Blatter resigns (June 2015)
• FIFA promises reform

FEBRUARY 2016: INFANTINO ELECTED
• Runs on reform platform
• Promises: Ethics, transparency, governance changes
• Elected with support of reformist national federations

2016: REFORMS IMPLEMENTED
• Ethics committee strengthened
- Cornel Borbély: Investigatory chamber chair
- Hans-Joachim Eckert: Adjudicatory chamber chair
• Term limits imposed (3 terms, 12 years max)
• FIFA Council replaces Executive Committee
• Financial disclosures enhanced (partially)
• Compliance programs established

2016-EARLY 2017: INVESTIGATIONS PROCEED
• Ethics committees pursue 100+ open cases
• Some investigations reportedly involve Infantino’s conduct
• Watchdogs functioning independently

MAY 2017: INFANTINO STRIKES BACK
• FIFA Council votes to remove both ethics chairs
- Borbély and Eckert ousted mid-investigations
• Replacements installed: María Claudia Rojas, Vassilios Skouris
• Critics: “Independent watchdogs fired for doing their jobs”

2017-2026: REFORMS UNRAVEL
• FIFA Council gains power to remove ethics officials
• Investigations slow dramatically
• Infantino consolidates control
• New corruption model emerges: partnerships, not bribes

The reforms lasted 15 months. Then Infantino dismantled them.

May 2017: The Ethics Purge

In May 2017, the FIFA Council voted to remove Cornel Borbély and Hans-Joachim Eckert — both ethics committee chairs — and replace them with new appointees.

The official reason: "Restructuring for greater efficiency."

The real reason: Borbély and Eckert were investigating FIFA officials, including Infantino.

At the time of their removal, reports indicated the ethics committees were pursuing more than 100 open investigations. These included:

• Allegations involving Infantino's private jet travel
• Questions about Infantino's relationship with his former employer (UEFA)
• Ongoing probes into regional confederation officials
• Investigations into World Cup hosting decisions

Borbély and Eckert were doing exactly what independent watchdogs should do: investigating everyone, including the President.

So Infantino's FIFA Council fired them.

The vote was framed as routine restructuring. But transparency advocates, journalists, and some national federations immediately recognized it as a purge. Michael J. Garcia — the former FIFA ethics investigator who resigned in 2014 after his Qatar World Cup report was mishandled — called the removals a "setback for reform."

The message was clear: FIFA's ethics system is independent only as long as it doesn't investigate the people in power.

THE 2017 ETHICS PURGE: FIRING THE WATCHDOGS

WHO WAS REMOVED:
• Cornel Borbély: Chair, Investigatory Chamber (ethics investigator)
• Hans-Joachim Eckert: Chair, Adjudicatory Chamber (ethics judge)
• Both appointed post-2015 reforms, functioning independently

WHEN: May 2017 (15 months after Infantino took office)

OFFICIAL REASON:
• “Restructuring for greater efficiency”
• “New leadership to continue reform process”

REAL REASON:
• Borbély/Eckert pursuing 100+ open investigations
• Some investigations involved Infantino’s conduct
- Private jet travel arrangements
- Relationship with UEFA (potential conflicts)
- Undisclosed dealings
• Watchdogs doing their jobs = threat to Infantino

HOW IT HAPPENED:
• FIFA Council (controlled by Infantino allies) voted to remove them
• Replacements installed: María Claudia Rojas, Vassilios Skouris
• No transparency on what happened to 100+ ongoing investigations

REACTION:
• Michael J. Garcia (former FIFA ethics investigator): Called it “setback for reform”
• Transparency International: Criticized FIFA for undermining independence
• Some national federations: Expressed concern privately (few spoke publicly)

THE MESSAGE:
FIFA’s ethics system is independent only when it doesn’t investigate people in
power. When watchdogs do their jobs, they get fired.

The New Model: Partnerships Over Bribes

Post-2017, FIFA corruption evolved. The old model — cash bribes, wire transfers, envelopes full of money — became too risky after the 2015 prosecutions.

The new model is legalized corruption through corporate partnerships:

Instead of bribes for World Cup votes:

• Saudi Arabia invests in FIFA's media partners (PIF → DAZN $1B)
• Saudi sponsors FIFA directly (Aramco $100M/year)
• Saudi offers FIFA loans (SFD up to $1B)
• FIFA awards 2034 World Cup to Saudi (sole bidder, no competition)

Instead of marketing kickbacks:

• FIFA gives exclusive betting data to Stats Perform (Vista Equity)
• Payment to FIFA: undisclosed
• Stats Perform profits from monopoly
• FIFA's dealmaker (Romy Gai) came from consulting firm with Saudi operations

Instead of personal enrichment via Swiss accounts:

• FIFA executives negotiate deals
• May later join private equity firms, consulting firms, or companies that benefited from FIFA deals
• Revolving door creates incentives to favor certain partners

This model is harder to prosecute because it's structured through legitimate corporate transactions. There's no smoking gun email saying "pay me $1 million for my vote." Instead, it's:

• A sovereign wealth fund investing in a streaming platform
• A state oil company sponsoring a sports organization
• A private equity firm getting exclusive data rights

Everything looks legal on paper. But the outcomes are the same:

• FIFA gives value (hosting rights, data monopolies, legitimacy) to entities that pay FIFA
• The money flows in circles
• Players and fans don't benefit
• FIFA executives profit (either directly via salaries or indirectly via future opportunities)

Not cleaner. Smarter.

⚠️ OLD CORRUPTION vs NEW CORRUPTION

OLD MODEL (PRE-2015):
• Cash bribes for World Cup votes
• Wire transfers to Swiss accounts
• Envelopes full of money in hotel rooms
• Marketing kickbacks disguised as “consulting fees”
• Easy to prosecute (if you catch them)

NEW MODEL (POST-2017):
• Sovereign wealth fund invests in FIFA’s media partner (PIF → DAZN $1B)
• State oil company sponsors FIFA (Aramco $100M/year)
• Development fund offers FIFA loans (SFD $1B)
• FIFA awards hosting to investor’s country (Saudi 2034)
• Hard to prosecute (all transactions look legitimate)

EXAMPLE: WORLD CUP HOSTING
• Old: Qatar allegedly paid bribes for 2022 votes
• New: Saudi invests in FIFA partners, sponsors FIFA, offers loans → gets 2034 as sole bidder

EXAMPLE: COMMERCIAL DEALS
• Old: Marketing firms paid kickbacks for tournament rights
• New: Private equity firm (Vista) gets exclusive betting data, payment undisclosed

EXAMPLE: PERSONAL ENRICHMENT
• Old: Officials received wire transfers to Swiss accounts
• New: Executives negotiate deals, potentially join beneficiary firms later (revolving door)

WHY NEW MODEL IS WORSE:
• Harder to prosecute (corporate partnerships look legal)
• Creates structural conflicts (not individual bribes)
• Opacity makes accountability nearly impossible
• Reforms designed to catch old corruption can’t touch new model

The corruption didn’t end. It evolved.

Infantino's Ethics Probes: Cleared by Compromised System

Gianni Infantino has faced multiple ethics investigations during his tenure as FIFA President. All were either dismissed or resulted in no punishment.

Examples:

1. Private jet travel (2016-2017): Infantino used private jets provided by FIFA sponsors and regional confederation officials. Questions raised about whether this created conflicts (sponsors getting favorable treatment in exchange for perks). Ethics committee investigated. Result: No action taken.

2. Meetings with Swiss Attorney General (2020): Infantino held undisclosed meetings with Switzerland's Attorney General Michael Lauber while Lauber was investigating FIFA corruption. Both denied wrongdoing. Lauber later resigned over the scandal. Infantino faced no consequences.

3. Residential arrangements (2021): Questions raised about Infantino's living situation and whether FIFA was improperly covering personal expenses. Ethics probe opened. Result: No wrongdoing found.

A pattern emerges: Infantino gets investigated, ethics committee (now controlled via FIFA Council's removal power) clears him, he continues operating.

This isn't because Infantino is innocent. It's because the ethics system is compromised. When you can fire the watchdogs mid-investigation (as happened in 2017), the watchdogs learn not to bark.

INFANTINO'S ETHICS INVESTIGATIONS: CLEARED BY COMPROMISED SYSTEM

INVESTIGATION 1: PRIVATE JET TRAVEL (2016-2017)
• Allegation: Infantino used private jets provided by sponsors/confederation officials
• Conflict: Sponsors providing perks may receive favorable treatment
• Ethics committee: Investigated
• Result: No action taken

INVESTIGATION 2: SWISS AG MEETINGS (2020)
• Allegation: Infantino held undisclosed meetings with Swiss Attorney General
• Context: AG Michael Lauber was investigating FIFA corruption
• Undisclosed meetings = potential obstruction/influence
• Fallout: Lauber resigned (2020), Infantino faced no consequences
• Ethics probe: Opened, then quietly closed

INVESTIGATION 3: RESIDENTIAL ARRANGEMENTS (2021)
• Allegation: Questions about Infantino’s living situation
• Potential issue: FIFA improperly covering personal expenses
• Ethics committee: Investigated
• Result: No wrongdoing found

THE PATTERN:
• Infantino gets investigated
• Ethics committee (now controllable via FIFA Council) reviews
• No wrongdoing found
• Infantino continues operating

WHY THIS HAPPENS:
• 2017: Infantino’s FIFA Council fired independent ethics chairs
• Replacements know they serve at Council’s pleasure
• Watchdogs who investigate Infantino risk removal
• Result: Ethics system investigates everyone except the President

When you can fire the watchdogs, the watchdogs learn not to bark.

What Actually Changed After 2015

Let's assess what FIFA's reforms actually accomplished:

What improved:

• Cash bribes are rarer (too risky post-DOJ prosecutions)
• Financial disclosures slightly better (though still limited)
• Some governance structures formalized (FIFA Council, clearer rules)

What didn't change:

• FIFA still awards World Cups to authoritarian regimes (Russia 2018, Qatar 2022, Saudi 2034)
• FIFA still sits on billions in reserves while paying players 3%
• FIFA executives still negotiate opaque deals with undisclosed payments
• Ethics oversight is still controlled by the people it's supposed to investigate

What got worse:

• Corruption is now hidden in corporate structures (harder to prosecute)
• Sovereign wealth funds buy influence through "legitimate" partnerships
• Private equity profits from FIFA data monopolies with undisclosed terms
• Players have even less leverage (no CBA, no revenue sharing framework)

The 2015 reforms addressed symptoms (individual bribes) but not the disease (FIFA's structure allows systematic extraction).

And when those reforms threatened people in power — as they did when ethics chairs investigated Infantino — the reforms were dismantled.

Why Reform Is Impossible From Within

FIFA can't reform itself because FIFA's structure is designed to prevent reform.

Here's why:

1. FIFA is controlled by national federations, not by independent oversight. The FIFA Council and Congress are made up of representatives from member federations. These federations benefit from FIFA funding (development grants, tournament revenue). They won't vote to reduce FIFA's power or revenue because that would reduce their own funding.

2. The FIFA President is elected by the same federations FIFA funds. This creates a patronage system: Infantino can direct FIFA Forward grants and other funding to federations that support him. Federations that oppose him risk losing funding. So federations vote for whoever controls the money.

3. Ethics oversight can be overridden by political bodies. The 2017 purge proved this. When "independent" ethics chairs became inconvenient, the FIFA Council (a political body) removed them. Any watchdog that threatens powerful people can be fired.

4. FIFA has no external accountability. FIFA is a Swiss non-profit. Swiss law is permissive for non-profits (allows reserve accumulation, limited disclosure). FIFA faces no shareholders, no board elected by players/fans, no democratic accountability. The only check on FIFA's power is criminal prosecution (which is rare and difficult).

5. Players have no power. Unlike the NFL (where players have a union and can strike), FIFA players have no collective bargaining framework. They can't withhold labor. They can't force revenue sharing. They're atomized across national federations that prioritize federation interests over player interests.

The result: FIFA is structurally unreformable from within. The only reforms that survive are reforms that don't threaten power. And reforms that threaten power get dismantled.

The Legacy of Failed Reforms

Ten years after the 2015 scandal, FIFA operates nearly identically to how it operated before:

• Generates billions (now $11B per cycle, up from $7.57B)
• Pays players nothing (3% indirect via club release fees)
• Awards World Cups to authoritarian regimes (Saudi 2034)
• Takes money from sovereign wealth funds and state-owned enterprises (PIF, Aramco)
• Negotiates opaque commercial deals with undisclosed payments (Stats Perform)
• Sits on billions in reserves ($3.9B) while claiming to reinvest in development

The only difference: the corruption is harder to see because it's structured through corporate partnerships instead of cash bribes.

Post 5 will document why players can't fight back: no CBA, no union with negotiating power, zero leverage. FIFA extracts 16 times more from players than the NFL does — and players can't do anything about it.

HOW WE BUILT THIS POST — FULL TRANSPARENCY

WHAT’S CONFIRMED (Primary Sources):
• 2015 scandal: 14 indicted, $150M in bribes documented (DOJ indictment)
• Infantino elected Feb 2016: On reform platform (FIFA announcement)
• 2017 ethics purge: Borbély and Eckert removed May 2017 (FIFA statement, media reports)
• 100+ open investigations: Reported at time of removal (multiple sources)
• Infantino ethics probes: Private jets, Swiss AG meetings, residential arrangements (documented in media)
• Michael J. Garcia reaction: Called removal “setback for reform” (quoted in press)

WHAT’S INFERRED (Clearly Labeled):
• “Reforms dismantled”: Our characterization of 2017 ethics purge + subsequent changes
• “New corruption model”: Our analysis connecting Saudi deals, Stats Perform, PIF web
• “Structurally unreformable”: Our conclusion based on FIFA’s governance structure

WHY THIS MATTERS:
FIFA promised reform after 2015 scandal. Implemented changes for 15 months. Then
dismantled ethics oversight when it threatened people in power. Corruption didn’t
end — it evolved from cash bribes to corporate partnerships. Harder to prosecute,
same extraction model.