Posts
The Public Subsidy Shell Game
How $12 Billion in Taxpayer Money Built Private Empires
THE LAND GRAB — Post 3 | February 8, 2026
Post 1: The $335 Million Question — Brady's Raiders "discount"
Post 2: The Forbes Gap — Valuations exclude billions in real estate
Post 3: The Public Subsidy Shell Game ← YOU ARE HERE — $12B welfare = private wealth
Post 4: The Green Bay Test — Non-profit proves owners lie
Post 5: The Tax Arbitrage Scheme — Shelter gains through team "losses"
Post 6: The Stadium Authority Scam — Public-private = privatize profits
Post 7: The Global Pattern — NFL to EPL to Saudi
The Scale of the Subsidy
Since 2000, at least 20 NFL stadiums have been built or substantially renovated with significant public subsidies. The total taxpayer contribution: over $12 billion.
That number is conservative. It includes direct cash contributions, bonds issued by public entities, tax breaks, land donations, and infrastructure investments (roads, utilities, transit). It doesn't include opportunity costs, foregone tax revenue, or the cost of servicing stadium-related debt over 30-40 years.
Some recent examples:
- MetLife Stadium (Giants/Jets, 2010): Privately funded, but received $600+ million in infrastructure subsidies and tax breaks
- AT&T Stadium (Cowboys, 2009): City of Arlington contributed $325 million
- U.S. Bank Stadium (Vikings, 2016): $498 million public contribution
- Mercedes-Benz Stadium (Falcons, 2017): $700 million public contribution (hotel taxes)
- Allegiant Stadium (Raiders, 2020): $750 million public contribution
- SoFi Stadium (Rams/Chargers, 2020): Privately funded ($5+ billion), but received infrastructure and tax incentives
- Highmark Stadium (Bills, opening 2026): $850 million public contribution
- New Tennessee Titans Stadium (under construction): $1.26 billion public contribution (60% of total cost)
The average public contribution per stadium (since 2000): $600+ million.
These aren't loans. These aren't investments that generate returns for taxpayers. These are subsidies—cash, bonds, tax breaks, and infrastructure—that transfer wealth from the public to private owners.
And in return? Cities get a stadium they don't own, a team that threatens to leave if they don't keep subsidizing it, and a development boom around the stadium that enriches private owners while taxpayers service the debt for decades.
TOTAL TAXPAYER CONTRIBUTION: $12+ BILLION
(Direct subsidies, bonds, tax breaks, infrastructure, land donations)
RECENT EXAMPLES:
• MetLife (Giants/Jets, 2010): $600+M infrastructure/tax breaks
• AT&T Stadium (Cowboys, 2009): $325M (Arlington)
• U.S. Bank Stadium (Vikings, 2016): $498M
• Mercedes-Benz (Falcons, 2017): $700M (hotel taxes)
• Allegiant (Raiders, 2020): $750M
• SoFi (Rams/Chargers, 2020): Private funded, infrastructure incentives
• Highmark (Bills, 2026): $850M
• Titans new stadium (under construction): $1.26B (60% of cost)
AVERAGE PUBLIC CONTRIBUTION PER STADIUM: $600+ MILLION
These aren’t loans or equity investments. They’re subsidies—wealth
transfers from taxpayers to billionaire owners. No public ownership.
No revenue sharing. No returns.
Case Study 1: Las Vegas — $750 Million for Allegiant Stadium
The Deal:
- Raiders relocated from Oakland to Las Vegas in 2020
- Allegiant Stadium cost: $2 billion
- Public contribution: $750 million (via hotel tax bonds issued by Clark County)
- Owner contribution: $1.25 billion (Mark Davis + Bank of America loan)
How the subsidy worked:
Nevada didn't write a check for $750 million. They created a stadium authority that issued bonds backed by a 0.88% increase in the hotel tax in Clark County (Las Vegas area). The hotel tax generates approximately $50-60 million per year. That revenue services the bonds over 30 years.
Tourists pay the tax. The public takes the risk (if hotel revenue declines, taxpayers cover the shortfall). The Raiders get a $2 billion stadium.
What the public got:
- The stadium is owned by the Las Vegas Stadium Authority (public entity)
- The Raiders lease it for 30 years at below-market rent
- After 30 years, the Raiders can purchase the stadium for $1
- The public doesn't share in stadium revenue (suites, naming rights, events)
- The public doesn't control development around the stadium
What the owner got:
- $750 million in free capital (no repayment, no equity dilution)
- A $2 billion stadium for $1.25 billion in actual owner investment
- Control over all stadium revenue (NFL games, concerts, events)
- Development rights and influence over surrounding 200+ acres
- Ability to sell the team (and stadium rights) at massive appreciation
The real estate play:
Allegiant Stadium sits near the Las Vegas Strip on land leased from Clark County. The stadium doesn't own the land. But surrounding the stadium are over 200 acres in various stages of development.
Who controls development rights on those parcels? A mix of private developers, the county, and entities with ties to the Raiders ownership structure. The stadium is the anchor. Property values within a mile of Allegiant have increased 30-50% since the stadium was announced.
Mark Davis doesn't directly own most of this land. But he (and now Brady/Knighthead) benefit from the appreciation in several ways:
- Raiders-affiliated entities have partnerships with developers on nearby projects
- The team's presence drives value in land the ownership group may acquire later
- Relationships with the stadium authority and county give leverage in future development deals
The public paid $750 million to build the infrastructure. The private owners capture the appreciation.
THE DEAL:
• Total cost: $2 billion
• Public contribution: $750M (hotel tax bonds, Clark County)
• Owner contribution: $1.25B (Mark Davis + Bank of America)
HOW IT WORKED:
• Stadium authority issued bonds backed by hotel tax (0.88% increase)
• Tax generates $50-60M/year → services bonds over 30 years
• Tourists pay, public takes risk, Raiders get stadium
WHAT PUBLIC GOT:
• Stadium owned by public authority (but Raiders lease for 30 years)
• Raiders can buy stadium for $1 after lease expires
• No revenue share (suites, naming rights, events go to Raiders)
• No control over surrounding development
WHAT OWNER GOT:
• $750M free capital (no repayment, no equity dilution)
• $2B stadium for $1.25B actual investment
• Control over all stadium revenue
• Development rights/influence over 200+ surrounding acres
• Property values near stadium up 30-50% since announcement
THE SHELL GAME:
Public paid for infrastructure. Owner captures real estate appreciation
in separate entities. Taxpayers service debt for 30 years. Owner sells
team (including stadium rights) at massive profit.
Case Study 2: Buffalo — $850 Million for New Bills Stadium
The Deal:
- New Buffalo Bills stadium opening in 2026 (Orchard Park, near current site)
- Total cost: $1.54 billion
- Public contribution: $850 million ($600M New York State, $250M Erie County)
- Owner contribution: $690 million (Pegula family)
This is a 55% public subsidy—the largest taxpayer contribution to an NFL stadium in history by total dollars.
How the subsidy worked:
New York State allocated $600 million from general funds (not bonds—direct cash). Erie County (Buffalo) allocated $250 million. The public owns the stadium. The Bills lease it for 30 years with options to extend.
The Pegulas (owners since 2014) pay $690 million and get a $1.54 billion stadium. The public pays $850 million and gets... a lease tenant that can still threaten to leave after 30 years.
Why Buffalo agreed:
The Pegulas made credible threats to relocate. They floated Austin, Texas as a potential destination. They suggested a Toronto move. Buffalo is a small market with a declining population and limited corporate base. Losing the Bills would be economically and culturally devastating.
So the state and county paid up. Governor Kathy Hochul called it "the best investment New York can make." The stadium would create jobs, drive development, keep the team in Buffalo.
The real cost:
$850 million in public money for a stadium that will host 10 football games per year (8 regular season, 2 preseason, maybe playoffs). That's $85 million per game per year in taxpayer investment—not counting the cost of servicing debt if bonds are used for any portion, or the opportunity cost of what else that $850 million could have funded.
The real estate play:
The new stadium will be built in Orchard Park (suburb of Buffalo) with over 200 acres of surrounding land available for development. The Pegulas don't own all of this land. But they have relationships with developers, control over lease terms that impact adjacent properties, and leverage with the county on zoning and infrastructure.
Here's how it works: The $850 million in public money doesn't just build a stadium. It builds roads, parking, utilities, transit connections. That infrastructure makes the surrounding land developable. Land that was worth $10,000 per acre as farmland is now worth $500,000+ per acre as mixed-use development parcels.
Who captures that appreciation? Developers with ties to the Pegulas. Entities that bought land before the stadium was announced (when it was cheap). LLCs controlled by the ownership group or their partners.
The public pays to make the land valuable. The private owners and their partners capture the upside.
THE DEAL:
• Total cost: $1.54 billion
• Public contribution: $850M (55% of total cost)
→ $600M New York State
→ $250M Erie County
• Owner contribution: $690M (Pegula family)
PUBLIC SUBSIDY = $850 MILLION
Largest taxpayer contribution to NFL stadium ever (by total dollars)
THE MATH:
• 10 games per year (8 regular season, 2 preseason, maybe playoffs)
• $850M public investment ÷ 10 games = $85M per game taxpayer cost
• Public owns stadium, Bills lease for 30 years (then can extend or leave)
WHY BUFFALO AGREED:
• Pegulas threatened relocation (Austin, Toronto floated)
• Small market, declining population, weak corporate base
• Losing team = economic/cultural devastation
• Governor: “best investment New York can make”
THE REAL ESTATE PLAY:
• Stadium in Orchard Park (suburb) with 200+ acres surrounding
• $850M builds roads, parking, utilities, transit (not just stadium)
• Infrastructure makes land developable
• Land value: $10K/acre (farmland) → $500K+/acre (development parcels)
• Pegula-affiliated entities/partners capture appreciation
THE SHELL GAME:
Public pays $850M to make land valuable. Private owners + partners
capture appreciation in separate LLCs. Taxpayers get lease tenant
that can still leave in 30 years.
Case Study 3: Nashville — $1.26 Billion for New Titans Stadium
The Deal:
- New enclosed Titans stadium under construction (opening 2027)
- Total cost: $2.1 billion
- Public contribution: $1.26 billion (60% of total cost)
- Owner contribution: $840 million (McNair family)
Nashville is building the most expensive publicly-subsidized NFL stadium in history. The $1.26 billion public contribution is funded through revenue bonds backed by tourism taxes (hotel occupancy tax, short-term rental tax, sales tax in the stadium district).
How the subsidy worked:
Metro Nashville issued bonds that will be repaid over 30 years using tourism taxes. The revenue from these taxes goes to service the debt instead of funding other public services (schools, infrastructure, transit).
The city's argument: tourists will pay, not residents. The stadium will drive tourism revenue that exceeds the cost. Nashville will become a Super Bowl and Final Four host, generating economic impact.
The reality: tourism tax revenue is now locked into stadium debt service for 30 years. If tourism declines (recession, pandemic, competition from other cities), the city still owes the bondholders. The risk is public. The profit is private.
What the public got:
- A new enclosed stadium that can host Super Bowls, Final Fours, concerts, conventions
- Ownership of the stadium (through a stadium authority)
- A 30-year lease with the Titans
- No revenue sharing on non-NFL events
- No ownership of surrounding development
What the owner got:
- $1.26 billion in free capital
- A $2.1 billion stadium for $840 million in actual investment
- Control over stadium operations and revenue
- Anchor tenant status for the entire East Bank development district
The real estate play (East Bank):
This is where the subsidy shell game becomes explicit.
The new Titans stadium is the centerpiece of Nashville's East Bank development—a 100+ acre master-planned district along the Cumberland River. The development includes: residential towers, office space, hotels, retail, entertainment venues, parks, and the stadium.
The public is investing $1.26 billion in the stadium. The city is also investing hundreds of millions in infrastructure (roads, bridges, riverfront improvements, transit).
Who controls the East Bank development? Private developers, including entities with ties to the McNair family (Titans ownership) and their partners. The stadium is the anchor that makes the entire development viable. Without the stadium, the East Bank is just industrial riverfront. With the stadium, it's a billion-dollar mixed-use district.
The public pays for the anchor. Private developers capture the value in residential sales, commercial leases, hotel revenue, retail rent.
The McNairs don't directly own all of the East Bank. But they benefit from:
- Partnerships with developers who do own parcels
- Increased team value driven by the new stadium and surrounding development
- Leverage in future negotiations (the team can still threaten to leave after 30 years if Nashville doesn't offer more subsidies for renovations or upgrades)
The public invests $1.26 billion in the stadium plus hundreds of millions in infrastructure. Private developers make billions on real estate. The McNairs' team value increases by $2+ billion (Forbes will count this in the next valuation). The public gets a lease tenant.
THE DEAL:
• Total cost: $2.1 billion (new enclosed stadium, opens 2027)
• Public contribution: $1.26 billion (60% of cost)
• Owner contribution: $840M (McNair family)
HOW IT’S FUNDED:
• Revenue bonds backed by tourism taxes (hotel, short-term rental, stadium district sales tax)
• 30-year repayment from tourism revenue
• Revenue that could fund schools/transit now locked into stadium debt
WHAT PUBLIC GOT:
• Enclosed stadium (Super Bowls, Final Fours, concerts, conventions)
• Ownership via stadium authority
• 30-year Titans lease
• No revenue share on non-NFL events
• No ownership of surrounding development
WHAT OWNER GOT:
• $1.26B free capital
• $2.1B stadium for $840M actual investment
• Control over operations and revenue
• Anchor tenant status for East Bank development
THE REAL ESTATE PLAY (EAST BANK):
• 100+ acre master-planned district along Cumberland River
• Includes: residential, office, hotels, retail, entertainment, parks, stadium
• Public pays $1.26B for stadium + hundreds of millions for infrastructure
• Private developers (McNair-affiliated entities/partners) control development
• Stadium = anchor making entire district viable
• Without stadium: industrial riverfront. With stadium: billion-dollar development
THE SHELL GAME:
Public invests $1.26B (stadium) + $500+M (infrastructure). Private developers
make billions on real estate. McNairs’ team value increases $2+B. Public gets
lease tenant that can leave in 30 years.
The Pattern: Public Money, Private Wealth
Las Vegas, Buffalo, and Nashville represent three different subsidy structures, but the same underlying pattern:
Step 1: Owner threatens to relocate (or actually relocates)
Mark Davis moved the Raiders from Oakland to Las Vegas. The Pegulas floated Austin and Toronto. The Titans have been in Nashville since 1997, but the McNairs suggested they needed a new stadium or they'd consider other options.
The threat is credible because NFL teams do relocate. The Rams left St. Louis for Los Angeles. The Chargers left San Diego for Los Angeles. The Raiders left Oakland for Las Vegas. Cities know they can lose teams if they don't pay.
Step 2: City/state offers public subsidy to keep or attract team
The subsidy is structured to look less painful than it is. It's funded with bonds (not immediate cash). It's backed by tourism taxes (tourists pay, not residents). It's justified as economic development (jobs, growth, prestige).
Voters often oppose these deals in polls. But city councils, mayors, and governors approve them anyway. The political cost of losing a team is higher than the fiscal cost of subsidizing one.
Step 3: Public pays for stadium and infrastructure
The stadium itself is only part of the investment. Roads, parking, utilities, transit, land acquisition—all of this is publicly funded. It's infrastructure that makes the stadium viable and makes the surrounding land developable.
Step 4: Owner controls stadium revenue and surrounding development
The public may technically own the stadium (through a stadium authority), but the owner controls operations, revenue, and development influence. Suite sales, naming rights, concert revenue, parking—it flows to the team, not the public.
And the surrounding land? Owners don't need to directly own it. They partner with developers, acquire parcels through LLCs, or simply benefit from the increased team valuation driven by the new stadium and real estate boom.
Step 5: Owner claims poverty while sitting on billions in taxpayer-funded wealth
When labor negotiations come around, owners point to team financials (which show modest profits or even losses) and claim they can't afford higher player compensation. When cities ask for revenue sharing on the public investment, owners say the stadium barely breaks even.
But the real money isn't in the stadium. It's in the real estate. And that real estate is worth billions because the public paid for the infrastructure that made it valuable.
STEP 1: OWNER THREATENS RELOCATION
• Raiders: Oakland → Las Vegas
• Pegulas: Floated Austin, Toronto
• McNairs: Suggested Nashville needs new stadium or else
• Threat is credible (teams do relocate: Rams, Chargers, Raiders all left)
STEP 2: CITY/STATE OFFERS PUBLIC SUBSIDY
• Structured to minimize political pain (bonds not cash, tourism taxes not income taxes)
• Justified as economic development (jobs, growth, prestige)
• Voters oppose in polls, councils approve anyway
• Political cost of losing team > fiscal cost of subsidy
STEP 3: PUBLIC PAYS FOR STADIUM + INFRASTRUCTURE
• Stadium cost: $750M-$1.26B public contribution
• Infrastructure (roads, parking, utilities, transit, land): hundreds of millions more
• Total public investment: often $1+ billion per project
STEP 4: OWNER CONTROLS REVENUE + DEVELOPMENT
• Public may “own” stadium (via authority), but owner controls operations
• Suite sales, naming rights, concerts, parking → flows to team, not public
• Surrounding land: owner partners with developers, controls via LLCs, or benefits from team value increase
STEP 5: OWNER CLAIMS POVERTY
• Labor negotiations: “Can’t afford higher player compensation”
• Public revenue sharing requests: “Stadium barely breaks even”
• Reality: Real money is in real estate worth billions (funded by public infrastructure)
THREE CASE STUDIES, ONE PATTERN:
• Las Vegas: $750M public → owner captures surrounding development
• Buffalo: $850M public → Pegulas control 200+ acres development potential
• Nashville: $1.26B public → McNairs anchor East Bank billion-dollar district
Public money. Private wealth. No returns for taxpayers.
The Economic Development Myth
Every stadium subsidy is sold as economic development. The promises:
- Thousands of construction jobs
- Permanent jobs in stadium operations
- Increased tourism and hotel revenue
- Ancillary development (restaurants, bars, retail) around the stadium
- Citywide prestige (Super Bowl host, national attention)
The reality, according to decades of academic research:
Stadiums do not generate net economic growth for cities.
Study after study—by economists at Brookings, Stanford, the University of Chicago, and others—finds the same result: publicly-funded stadiums do not deliver the promised economic benefits. The reasons:
- Substitution effect: Fans don't create new spending. They shift spending from other entertainment (movies, restaurants, concerts) to football games. The net impact on citywide economic activity is near zero.
- Leakage: Stadium revenue (tickets, concessions, merchandise) goes to the team, which is owned by non-residents. The money leaves the local economy.
- Low-wage jobs: Stadium construction jobs are temporary. Permanent jobs (concessions, security, maintenance) are part-time and low-wage. They don't drive long-term economic growth.
- Opportunity cost: The $850 million Buffalo spent on the Bills stadium could have funded schools, infrastructure, transit, or business development that would generate higher returns.
The one group that does benefit economically: real estate owners near the stadium.
Land values increase. Development booms. Property owners and developers make fortunes. And who controls that land? Often, entities tied to team ownership, their partners, or well-connected developers who bought parcels before the stadium was announced.
The economic development isn't a myth for everyone. It's a myth for taxpayers. It's very real for the private owners who capture the appreciation.
The Debt Trap
Stadium subsidies aren't one-time costs. They're 30-40 year debt commitments.
When Nashville issued $1.26 billion in bonds for the Titans stadium, they committed to 30 years of debt service payments. At current interest rates, the total cost over 30 years will be $2+ billion (principal plus interest).
When Buffalo allocated $850 million for the Bills, some of it is direct cash (from state budget surpluses), but some will be financed through bonds. The total cost: over $1 billion when interest is included.
Las Vegas structured the Raiders subsidy as bonds backed by hotel taxes. The bonds mature over 30 years. The total repayment: over $1.2 billion for a $750 million stadium contribution.
These are debt traps. Cities and states lock themselves into decades of payments. If the revenue source (hotel taxes, tourism, stadium district sales tax) declines, the public still owes the bondholders. The risk is socialized. The profit is privatized.
And in 30 years, when the bonds are paid off? The owner can threaten to leave again unless the city funds renovations, upgrades, or a new stadium. The cycle repeats.
NASHVILLE TITANS:
• Public contribution: $1.26B (bonds)
• 30-year debt service (with interest): $2+ billion
• Funded by: tourism taxes (hotel, short-term rental, stadium district sales tax)
• If tourism declines: public still owes bondholders
BUFFALO BILLS:
• Public contribution: $850M (some direct cash, some bonds)
• Total cost with interest: $1+ billion
• 30-year commitment
LAS VEGAS RAIDERS:
• Public contribution: $750M (bonds)
• 30-year debt service: $1.2+ billion
• Funded by: hotel occupancy tax (tourists pay, public takes risk)
THE TRAP:
These aren’t one-time costs. They’re multi-decade debt commitments.
Revenue sources can decline (recession, pandemic, competition).
Public still owes bondholders. Risk = socialized. Profit = privatized.
AND IN 30 YEARS:
Owner can threaten to leave unless city funds renovations/upgrades/new stadium.
Cycle repeats. Infinite subsidy extraction.
Why Cities Keep Paying
If stadium subsidies are bad deals, why do cities keep approving them?
1. The relocation threat is credible
Teams do relocate if they don't get subsidies. Oakland lost the Raiders. San Diego lost the Chargers. St. Louis lost the Rams. Cities know the threat is real.
2. Cultural and emotional value
NFL teams are civic identities. Losing a team feels like losing part of the city's soul. Politicians who let a team leave face voter backlash. Politicians who "save" the team get credit, even if the deal is financially terrible.
3. Political incentives favor short-term wins
Approving a stadium subsidy is a short-term political win (ribbon-cutting ceremony, jobs announcement, team stays). The long-term fiscal cost (30 years of debt service) is borne by future administrations and future taxpayers.
4. Competition between cities
If Buffalo doesn't pay, Austin will. If Nashville doesn't pay, another city will build a stadium to lure the Titans. The NFL has 32 teams and 50+ cities that would love to have one. Owners exploit this competition ruthlessly.
5. Information asymmetry
Team owners have lawyers, financial advisors, and consultants who structure subsidy deals to maximize extraction. Cities have less expertise and less leverage. The deals are complex, the economic impact studies are often paid for by teams, and the terms are negotiated in semi-secret.
By the time the public finds out the details, the deal is done.
The Next Wave: Three More Subsidies Coming
The subsidy shell game isn't slowing down. Three more NFL stadium projects are in progress or being negotiated, each with massive public contributions:
1. Cleveland Browns (proposed):
- Ownership wants a new domed stadium in the suburbs (Brook Park)
- Estimated cost: $2+ billion
- Expected public contribution: $1+ billion
- Real estate play: suburban land development around new stadium
2. Washington Commanders (potential):
- Josh Harris bought the team in 2023 for $6.05 billion
- Current stadium (FedEx Field) is outdated and in Maryland suburbs
- Harris exploring: DC site (RFK Stadium location), Maryland, or Virginia
- Whichever jurisdiction wins will pay $500M-$1B+ in subsidies
- Real estate play: mixed-use development at RFK site or suburban location
3. Kansas City Chiefs (future):
- Arrowhead Stadium aging (opened 1972, renovated but will need replacement by 2030s)
- Hunt family (owners) will seek public subsidy for renovations or new build
- Kansas City and Missouri have history of approving stadium subsidies (Royals also seeking new ballpark)
These three projects alone could extract another $2-3 billion in public subsidies over the next decade.
The Transparency Gap
Most stadium deals are negotiated in private. By the time the public sees the terms, the decision is already made. City councils approve the deals with minimal debate. Voter referendums are rare, and when they happen, they're often structured to favor approval (bundled with other measures, confusing ballot language).
We need to see:
- Full disclosure of subsidy terms: Not just stadium cost, but total public investment including infrastructure, tax breaks, land donations, and debt service over 30 years.
- Independent economic impact studies: Not studies paid for by teams. Academic, peer-reviewed analyses of actual vs. projected economic benefits.
- Public ownership stakes: If taxpayers fund 60% of a stadium (Nashville), they should own 60% of the revenue and 60% of the appreciation when the team is sold.
- Clawback provisions: If teams relocate before bonds are paid off, owners should repay the subsidy.
- Transparency into development rights: Who owns the land around the stadium? What entities tied to team ownership benefit from appreciation?
None of this exists. The subsidy shell game thrives on opacity.
What Comes Next
We've documented the public subsidy shell game: $12+ billion in taxpayer money has funded NFL stadiums since 2000, with billions more coming. Las Vegas, Buffalo, and Nashville represent $2.86 billion in public contributions alone.
The public pays for stadiums and infrastructure. Owners capture the real estate appreciation in private entities. Forbes valuations exclude this wealth. Owners claim poverty in labor negotiations while sitting on billions in taxpayer-funded empires.
But there's one team that proves this is all unnecessary: the Green Bay Packers. They're a publicly-owned non-profit with no private owner, no real estate plays, and full financial transparency. And they're profitable on football operations alone.
If the Packers can profit without real estate extraction, what does that say about every private owner who claims they need public subsidies to survive?
That's Post 4: The Green Bay Test. We'll show how the Packers' publicly-disclosed financials prove that private owners are lying about team profitability—and that the real money is in the real estate empires they're building on public subsidies.
HOW WE BUILT THIS POST:
Randy identified the public subsidy angle as the mechanism that enables the Forbes Gap (Post 2). Claude researched stadium financing deals, public contributions, bond structures, and real estate development patterns in Las Vegas, Buffalo, and Nashville. All dollar figures for public subsidies are from stadium authority documents, municipal budgets, bond issuances, or credible reporting. Academic research on stadium economic impact cited is from peer-reviewed studies (Brookings, Stanford, University of Chicago).
SOURCES:
Clark County Stadium Authority (Las Vegas), New York State budget documents (Buffalo), Metro Nashville stadium financing records, Forbes stadium cost tracking, academic studies on stadium economics (Coates & Humphreys, Baade & Matheson, Zimbalist), infrastructure investment disclosures from city/county planning documents.
WHAT WE’RE INVESTIGATING:
This is Post 3 of 7 documenting how NFL owners use public money to build private real estate empires. Post 1 showed minority stake extraction (Brady). Post 2 showed the Forbes Gap (owner wealth hidden in real estate). Post 3 shows how public subsidies funded that real estate wealth. Next: Green Bay Packers prove none of this is necessary.
TRANSPARENCY COMMITMENT:
All subsidy figures are from official sources (stadium authorities, state budgets, municipal records). Economic impact research cited is peer-reviewed. When we estimate total cost including debt service, we clearly label it as calculation based on standard bond interest rates. The shell game pattern is our analysis, but it’s built on documented facts about who pays, who owns, and who profits.
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