The Global Pattern How the NFL Extraction Model Is Conquering World Sports THE LAND GRAB — Post 7 (FINALE)

The Global Pattern

How the NFL Extraction Model Is Conquering World Sports

THE LAND GRAB — Post 7 (FINALE) | February 8, 2026

THE LAND GRAB: NFL REAL ESTATE EXTRACTION
Post 1: The $335 Million Question — Brady's Raiders "discount"
Post 2: The Forbes Gap — Valuations exclude billions in real estate
Post 3: The Public Subsidy Shell Game — $12B welfare = private wealth
Post 4: The Green Bay Test — Non-profit proves owners lie
Post 5: The Tax Arbitrage Scheme — Shelter gains through team "losses"
Post 6: The Stadium Authority Scam — Public-private = privatize profits
Post 7: The Global Pattern ← YOU ARE HERE (FINALE) — NFL to EPL to Saudi

Stan Kroenke owns the Los Angeles Rams. He built SoFi Stadium for $5 billion using the NFL playbook: no public subsidy for the building, but massive infrastructure support and tax incentives. He controls the 298-acre Hollywood Park development. He'll make tens of billions on real estate appreciation anchored by the Rams. This is the NFL model perfected domestically. But Kroenke also owns Arsenal Football Club in London. He bought it in 2011 for approximately $1.8 billion. Arsenal plays at Emirates Stadium in North London. And Kroenke is now developing the land around the stadium—mixed-use residential, commercial, and entertainment projects that will be worth billions. He's importing the NFL playbook to English football. He's not alone. The Glazer family owns the Tampa Bay Buccaneers and Manchester United. Todd Boehly owns stakes in the Rams and Dodgers and bought Chelsea FC for $5.3 billion in 2022. American sports ownership—trained in the NFL's extraction model—is buying European football clubs and replicating the real estate, subsidy, and tax strategies they perfected in the U.S. Meanwhile, MLS expansion is using the NFL playbook in every new market: Miami, Nashville, Austin, Charlotte, St. Louis. Public subsidies for stadiums plus owner-controlled real estate development. The same model, different league. And sovereign wealth funds are watching. Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund studied the NFL model before buying Newcastle United and launching their domestic football league with massive stadium investments. Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and others are applying NFL-style infrastructure spending to sports ownership globally. The NFL didn't invent sports team ownership. But it perfected extraction: real estate anchors, public subsidies, tax shelters, stadium authorities, opacity. For 100 years, this was a domestic phenomenon. Now it's going global. American owners are exporting it to Europe. Gulf states are scaling it in the Middle East. Emerging markets are copying it in Asia and Latin America. This is no longer just about the NFL or American sports. This is about a business model that turns sports teams into real estate development vehicles, public infrastructure into private wealth, and taxpayers into unwitting investors in billionaire empires. This final post shows how the pattern is spreading, why it matters globally, and what happens when extraction becomes the universal language of sports ownership.

The NFL Playbook (Recap)

Before showing how this goes global, let's recap the domestic NFL extraction model documented in Posts 1-6:

1. Buy a team, get real estate exposure

• Teams are anchors for billion-dollar real estate developments
• Minority stakes (Brady/Knighthead) include development rights and flip taxes
• Forbes valuations exclude real estate, hiding $20+ billion in owner wealth

2. Extract public subsidies

• $12+ billion in taxpayer money since 2000
• Stadium authorities issue bonds (public debt), lease stadiums to owners (private control)
• Public pays for infrastructure that makes surrounding land valuable
• Owners capture appreciation in separate LLCs

3. Shelter wealth through tax arbitrage

• Depreciate team purchases over 15 years (creates paper losses)
• Shelter real estate gains and other income
• League-wide: $30+ billion in tax avoidance over 15 years
• Pay capital gains (20%) on exit instead of income taxes (37%)

4. Claim poverty while building empires

• Report team "losses" in CBA negotiations
• Green Bay proves teams profit $68.6M+ on football alone
• Private owners make $100M-500M on football plus billions in real estate (undisclosed)

This is the playbook. And it's spreading.

THE NFL EXTRACTION PLAYBOOK (Summary)

STEP 1: TEAM AS REAL ESTATE ANCHOR
• Buy team → control development rights
• Real estate worth 2-3x team valuation (hidden from Forbes)
• Example: Kroenke $7.6B team + $15B real estate = $22B+ total

STEP 2: EXTRACT PUBLIC SUBSIDIES
• $12B+ taxpayer money since 2000
• Stadium authorities issue bonds, lease to owners
• Public pays for infrastructure, owner captures land appreciation
• Example: Nashville $1.26B subsidy anchors private East Bank development

STEP 3: TAX ARBITRAGE
• Depreciate team over 15 years (paper losses)
• Shelter real estate gains + other income
• $30B+ tax avoidance league-wide over 15 years
• Example: Josh Harris $323M/year depreciation shelters $1.8B in taxes

STEP 4: OPACITY + POVERTY CLAIMS
• Hide real estate wealth in separate entities
• Report team “losses” in labor negotiations
• Green Bay proves teams profit without extraction ($68.6M)
• Private owners make far more, don’t disclose

THIS IS THE MODEL.
Developed over 100 years in NFL. Now spreading globally.

American Owners Export the Model to European Football

American sports ownership has been buying English Premier League clubs for two decades. But in the last 5-10 years, they've started importing the NFL playbook:

Stan Kroenke — Arsenal FC (London)

• Bought controlling stake 2011, full ownership 2018 (total investment ~$2.3 billion)
• Arsenal plays at Emirates Stadium (opened 2006, North London)
• Kroenke is developing Holloway Road regeneration—mixed-use project around the stadium including residential towers, retail, and commercial space
• Strategy: Same as SoFi/Hollywood Park in LA—use team as anchor for real estate development
• Difference from NFL: No public subsidy for stadium (Emirates privately funded by Arsenal), but Kroenke seeking planning approvals for development that will appreciate due to Arsenal's presence

The Glazer Family — Manchester United

• Bought 2005 for $1.47 billion using leveraged buyout (loaded debt onto club)
• Also own Tampa Bay Buccaneers (NFL)
• Old Trafford (stadium) sits on valuable Manchester land
• Glazers explored stadium redevelopment (potentially new stadium or major renovation) with surrounding real estate development
• Strategy: Leverage NFL expertise in stadium deals to maximize real estate value in Manchester
• Attempted sale (2023): Valued club at $6+ billion, held out for higher price including real estate potential

Todd Boehly — Chelsea FC (London)

• Bought 2022 for $5.3 billion (record for a sports team at the time)
• Also owns stakes in LA Dodgers (MLB) and LA Lakers (NBA)
• Stamford Bridge (stadium) sits on extremely valuable West London land
• Boehly immediately began exploring new stadium development (Stamford Bridge is small and outdated)
• Strategy: Build new stadium, develop surrounding area, use Chelsea as anchor for London real estate play
• Brings NFL/MLB stadium development expertise to English football

John W. Henry — Liverpool FC

• Bought 2010 for $476 million through Fenway Sports Group (also owns Boston Red Sox)
• Anfield Stadium expansion and Anfield regeneration project—mixed-use development around the stadium
• FSG secured some public funding for surrounding infrastructure (roads, community facilities)
• This is the NFL playbook: private stadium investment + public infrastructure support + owner-controlled development

AMERICAN OWNERS IN PREMIER LEAGUE: IMPORTING NFL PLAYBOOK

STAN KROENKE (Arsenal):
• Purchased: ~$2.3B (2011-2018, full ownership)
• Stadium: Emirates (North London)
• NFL playbook import: Holloway Road regeneration (mixed-use around stadium)
• Same model as: SoFi + Hollywood Park (LA Rams)

GLAZER FAMILY (Manchester United):
• Purchased: $1.47B (2005, leveraged buyout)
• Also own: Tampa Bay Buccaneers (NFL)
• Stadium: Old Trafford (redevelopment plans + surrounding real estate)
• NFL playbook import: Stadium deals expertise to maximize Manchester land value
• Attempted sale valuation: $6B+ (including real estate potential)

TODD BOEHLY (Chelsea):
• Purchased: $5.3B (2022, record sale)
• Also owns: Dodgers, Lakers stakes
• Stadium: Stamford Bridge (West London, exploring new stadium)
• NFL playbook import: Stadium development + surrounding area anchor
• Brings: NFL/MLB stadium expertise to London

JOHN W. HENRY (Liverpool):
• Purchased: $476M (2010, via Fenway Sports Group)
• Also owns: Boston Red Sox (MLB)
• Stadium: Anfield expansion + regeneration project
• NFL playbook import: Private stadium + public infrastructure + owner development
• Secured: Some public funding for surrounding infrastructure

THE PATTERN:
American owners trained in NFL extraction → Buy EPL clubs → Import real estate
playbook → Develop around stadiums → Replicate domestic model internationally

Why European Football Is Vulnerable

European football clubs have traditionally operated differently than American sports franchises:

Traditional European model:

• Clubs rooted in local communities (often started as worker clubs, community organizations)
• Some clubs fan-owned or partially fan-owned (German model: 50+1 rule requires fan majority)
• Stadiums often municipally-owned or club-owned without massive real estate plays
• Focus on sporting success (trophies, European competition) over profit maximization

Why this made clubs vulnerable:

• Capital needs: Modern football requires massive spending on players, facilities, compliance (Financial Fair Play). Clubs need capital.
• No revenue ceiling: Unlike NFL (salary cap, revenue sharing), European football is winner-take-all. Clubs that spend more win more. This creates arms race.
• Undervalued real estate: Many clubs sit on extremely valuable urban land (Arsenal in North London, Chelsea in West London, Man United in Manchester). Previous owners didn't maximize this.
• No public subsidy tradition: European governments generally don't fund stadiums like U.S. cities do. But American owners are changing this—lobbying for infrastructure support, tax breaks, planning approvals.

American owners saw opportunity: buy undervalued clubs sitting on valuable land, apply NFL-style real estate development, extract value through stadium deals and surrounding development.

And unlike NFL (where relocation is rare but possible), European clubs can't relocate. They're rooted in cities. This makes real estate the only extraction lever. American owners are experts at this.

MLS: The NFL Playbook in a New League

Major League Soccer expansion over the last 15 years is the purest application of the NFL playbook outside the NFL itself:

Every MLS expansion follows the same model:

1. City wants MLS team (prestige, development catalyst)

2. Owner group commits to fund stadium privately (or mostly privately)

3. City provides land (often public land at below-market rates or free)

4. City funds infrastructure (roads, utilities, transit, parking)

5. Owner controls stadium and surrounding development

6. Real estate play is the actual business model (team is the anchor)

Examples:

Miami (David Beckham / Inter Miami):

• Stadium cost: $1 billion (privately funded by ownership group)
• City contribution: Land (Freedom Park site) + infrastructure support
• Surrounding development: Mixed-use project including hotel, retail, commercial (ownership group controls)
• Real estate value created: Billions (Miami land appreciation is explosive)

Nashville (John Ingram / Nashville SC):

• Stadium cost: $345 million (mostly private, some public infrastructure)
• City contribution: Land + roads + utilities
• Surrounding development: The Fairgrounds redevelopment (owner-affiliated entities)
• This is the same John Ingram family involved in Titans ownership—applying NFL playbook to MLS

Austin (Anthony Precourt / Austin FC):

• Stadium cost: $260 million (privately funded)
• City contribution: Land (public park land, controversial) + infrastructure
• Surrounding development: Mixed-use around stadium (owner controls)

Charlotte, St. Louis, similar patterns.

MLS expansion is NFL-style extraction without the massive public stadium subsidies (cities learned from NFL scandals). But owners still get land, infrastructure, and development control. The real money is in the real estate, not the team.

🔥 MLS EXPANSION: NFL PLAYBOOK IN A NEW LEAGUE

THE UNIVERSAL MLS EXPANSION MODEL:

STEP 1: City wants MLS team
• Prestige, development catalyst, “major league city” status

STEP 2: Owner commits to “private” stadium funding
• Framed as owner paying, not taxpayers
• But owner gets massive value from public contributions

STEP 3: City provides land
• Often public land at below-market rates or free
• Land value = huge subsidy not counted as “public funding”

STEP 4: City funds infrastructure
• Roads, utilities, transit, parking
• Makes surrounding land developable
• This is the hidden public subsidy

STEP 5: Owner controls development
• Stadium + surrounding parcels = mixed-use projects
• Hotels, residential, retail, commercial
• Owner captures appreciation

STEP 6: Real estate is the business
• Team is anchor (generates buzz, foot traffic, brand)
• Real money in land appreciation

EXAMPLES:
• Miami: $1B stadium (private) + land (public) + infrastructure (public) + surrounding development (billions, owner-controlled)
• Nashville: $345M stadium + Fairgrounds redevelopment (same ownership as Titans)
• Austin: $260M stadium + controversial park land + mixed-use development

THE PATTERN:
Same as NFL—team anchors real estate play, public funds infrastructure,
owner controls appreciation. Just rebranded as “private funding” because
stadium cost is private (but land + infrastructure = massive public subsidy).

Sovereign Wealth Funds Study the NFL Model

The biggest shift in global sports ownership is sovereign wealth fund (SWF) involvement. And they're studying the NFL playbook closely:

Saudi Arabia — Public Investment Fund (PIF):

• $925 billion AUM (one of world's largest SWFs)
• Bought Newcastle United (EPL) in 2021 for $410 million
• Launched Saudi Pro League with massive player signings (Ronaldo, Neymar, Benzema)
• Building stadiums and sports cities as part of Vision 2030 (economic diversification plan)

The NFL connection:

Saudi Arabia studied the NFL model before launching their football investment strategy. Specifically:

• Stadium-anchored development: Building entire cities (Neom, Qiddiya) with stadiums as centerpieces
• Public investment in sports infrastructure: Government funds stadiums, teams play in them, drives real estate/tourism
• No relegation: Saudi Pro League considering closed league model (like NFL) to increase team values
• Ownership stability: PIF controls teams long-term, uses them to drive broader economic goals

This is the NFL playbook at national scale. Saudi government invests billions in stadiums and infrastructure. Teams anchor developments. Real estate appreciates. Tourism increases. The government profits from economic activity and land value.

Qatar — Qatar Sports Investments (QSI):

• Owns Paris Saint-Germain (French football)
• Exploring NFL team ownership (wants minority stake in Washington Commanders or other franchise)
• Built stadiums for 2022 World Cup (total cost: $200+ billion including infrastructure)
• Using sports to drive real estate development in Doha

Abu Dhabi — Multiple SWFs:

• Owns Manchester City (EPL) through Sheikh Mansour
• Developing Etihad Campus around Man City stadium—massive mixed-use project
• This is NFL-style real estate play: team anchors development, owner (Abu Dhabi) captures appreciation

SWFs aren't buying teams to make money on ticket sales. They're using teams to anchor real estate developments, drive tourism, and diversify economies. This is the NFL model applied at sovereign scale.

SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: NFL MODEL AT NATIONAL SCALE

SAUDI ARABIA (PIF, $925B AUM):
• Newcastle United (EPL): $410M (2021)
• Saudi Pro League: Massive player signings (Ronaldo, Neymar, Benzema)
• Vision 2030: Building sports cities (Neom, Qiddiya) with stadiums as anchors
• NFL playbook import:
→ Stadium-anchored development (entire cities built around sports)
→ Public investment in infrastructure (government funds, teams play)
→ Closed league model (no relegation, increases team values like NFL)
→ Long-term ownership (PIF controls, drives economic goals)

QATAR (QSI):
• Paris Saint-Germain (French football)
• Exploring NFL minority stakes (Commanders, others)
• World Cup 2022: $200B+ stadiums + infrastructure
• Using sports to drive Doha real estate development

ABU DHABI (Multiple SWFs):
• Manchester City (EPL, Sheikh Mansour)
• Etihad Campus development (mixed-use around Man City stadium)
• NFL-style real estate play at sovereign scale

THE PATTERN:
SWFs study NFL model → buy teams → anchor real estate/infrastructure
projects → drive tourism/economic diversification → government profits
from land value + economic activity

This isn’t team ownership. This is using sports as economic development
tools. The NFL pioneered it domestically. SWFs are scaling it globally.

Why the NFL Model Works Globally

The NFL extraction playbook is spreading because it solves problems for different stakeholders:

For cities/governments:

• Sports teams = development catalysts (even if economic studies show limited benefit, politicians believe it)
• Stadiums anchor urban regeneration projects
• Teams bring prestige, tourism, media attention
• Politicians can claim credit for "bringing economic development" even if public loses money

For owners:

• Teams appreciate in value (NFL franchise values doubled every 10 years)
• Real estate appreciates faster (300-500% around new stadiums)
• Tax benefits (depreciation shelters income)
• Public infrastructure makes private land valuable
• Can claim "partnership" while extracting profit

For sovereign wealth funds:

• Sports diversify economies (reduce oil dependence)
• Teams drive tourism and international attention
• Stadium projects create jobs (politically important)
• Real estate appreciation builds national wealth
• Sports "soft power" increases global influence

Who loses?

• Taxpayers: Fund infrastructure, service debt, get no returns
• Players: Generate value, get fraction of total wealth (especially outside NFL where no strong unions exist)
• Fans: Pay higher ticket prices, watch teams prioritize profit over sporting success, lose local ownership/community connection

But taxpayers don't vote as a bloc on stadium deals. Players have limited leverage (except in NFL/NBA where unions exist). Fans are emotionally attached and won't abandon teams.

So the model spreads. It works for the people with power. It extracts from everyone else.

The Future: Extraction Everywhere

Where is this going?

1. American owners will buy more European clubs

As NFL team prices hit $6-10 billion, billionaires will look for cheaper entry points in European football. Premier League clubs in the $2-5 billion range become attractive. And American owners bring NFL expertise in real estate extraction.

Expect more Kroenke/Glazer/Boehly-style purchases, followed by stadium redevelopment and surrounding real estate plays.

2. Sovereign wealth funds will expand globally

Saudi, Qatar, Abu Dhabi won't stop at a few clubs. They'll buy more teams, more leagues, more stadiums. They'll use sports to anchor real estate developments in their countries and abroad.

PIF is already exploring NFL minority stakes. Qatar wants in. Abu Dhabi is expanding beyond Man City. The NFL model at sovereign scale is just beginning.

3. MLS-style expansion will spread to other leagues

New leagues (USL, NWSL, international leagues in emerging markets) will copy MLS: private stadium funding + public land + infrastructure support + owner-controlled development.

Every expansion team becomes a real estate play. The team is the excuse. The land is the business.

4. Public subsidies will continue despite evidence they don't work

Decades of academic research prove stadium subsidies don't generate net economic benefits. Cities still approve them. Why?

• Politicians prioritize short-term wins (ribbon-cutting ceremonies) over long-term costs (30 years of debt)
• Owners threaten relocation (credible because teams do move)
• Business interests lobby for deals (hotels, restaurants, developers profit)
• Fans want teams emotionally, even if economically irrational

These incentives won't change. Subsidies will continue. Extraction will expand.

5. Player leverage will remain weak (except in unionized leagues)

NFL and NBA players have strong unions and CBAs. They get ~50% of revenue. European football players have no collective bargaining. MLS players have weak union. Most global sports have no player leverage.

As extraction expands globally, players outside NFL/NBA will continue getting small percentages while owners build billion-dollar empires.

6. The Green Bay model will remain banned

Public ownership prevents extraction. That's why NFL banned it in 1960 and why no other league has adopted it.

Owners won't allow public ownership because transparency and community control would expose the extraction and prevent wealth accumulation.

The Packers will remain the exception that proves the rule.

🔥 THE FUTURE OF EXTRACTION: WHERE THIS GOES

1. AMERICAN OWNERS → MORE EUROPEAN CLUBS
• NFL teams: $6-10B (expensive)
• EPL clubs: $2-5B (cheaper entry)
• American owners bring: NFL real estate expertise
• Result: More stadium redevelopments + surrounding real estate plays

2. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS → GLOBAL EXPANSION
• Saudi PIF, Qatar QSI, Abu Dhabi expanding
• Buying: More teams, more leagues, more countries
• Strategy: Sports anchor real estate + tourism + economic diversification
• NFL model at sovereign scale = just beginning

3. MLS MODEL → OTHER LEAGUES
• New leagues copy MLS: private stadium + public land + infrastructure + owner development
• Every expansion team = real estate play
• Team = excuse, land = business

4. PUBLIC SUBSIDIES → CONTINUE DESPITE EVIDENCE
• Academic research: subsidies don’t work economically
• Cities approve anyway: political incentives (short-term wins), relocation threats,
business lobbying, fan emotions
• Extraction expands because incentives favor it

5. PLAYER LEVERAGE → WEAK GLOBALLY
• NFL/NBA: Strong unions, CBAs, ~50% revenue
• European football, MLS, most sports: No collective bargaining, small percentages
• As extraction goes global, players get less (outside NFL/NBA)

6. GREEN BAY MODEL → REMAINS BANNED
• Public ownership prevents extraction
• NFL banned 1960, no other league adopted
• Transparency + community control = exposes extraction
• Packers = exception proving the rule

THE TRAJECTORY:
Extraction model spreads globally. Owners profit. Taxpayers pay. Players
outside unionized leagues get scraps. Fans lose local ownership. This is
the future unless something breaks the pattern.

What We've Documented

Across seven posts, we've traced the complete NFL extraction model and its global spread:

Post 1: The $335 Million Question

• Tom Brady's Raiders stake reveals minority ownership extraction
• Flip taxes ($22M on $220M deal), real estate exposure, private equity involvement (Knighthead Capital)
• If 5% minority stake includes extraction mechanisms, what do 100% owners do?

Post 2: The Forbes Gap

• Forbes valuations systematically exclude owner-controlled real estate
• Four case studies: Jones ($3-5B hidden), Kroenke ($15B hidden), Khan ($1-3B hidden), Blank ($2.5-4.5B hidden)
• Total gap: $22-27 billion in real estate wealth across four owners alone

Post 3: The Public Subsidy Shell Game

• $12+ billion in taxpayer subsidies since 2000
• Las Vegas ($750M), Buffalo ($850M), Nashville ($1.26B) case studies
• Public pays for infrastructure that makes owner-controlled land valuable
• Owners capture appreciation, public services debt for 30 years

Post 4: The Green Bay Test

• Packers profit $68.6 million (2023) on football operations alone, zero real estate plays
• Proves football is profitable without extraction
• Private owners make far more—they just hide it in real estate
• NFL banned public ownership (1960) to protect extraction model

Post 5: The Tax Arbitrage Scheme

• Owners depreciate team purchases over 15 years (creates paper losses)
• Use losses to shelter real estate gains and other income
• Tepper ($121M/year depreciation), Harris ($323M/year depreciation) examples
• League-wide: $30+ billion in tax avoidance over 15 years

Post 6: The Stadium Authority Scam

• Authorities are public entities that issue bonds (public debt)
• "Own" stadiums but lease to teams on terms giving owners control
• Public risk, private profit: authorities take debt, owners keep revenue
• Las Vegas, Arlington, Nashville examples show pattern

Post 7: The Global Pattern

• American owners export NFL playbook to European football (Kroenke/Arsenal, Glazers/Man United, Boehly/Chelsea)
• MLS expansion uses NFL model domestically (Miami, Nashville, Austin)
• Sovereign wealth funds study NFL model, apply at national scale (Saudi PIF, Qatar, Abu Dhabi)
• Extraction model going global: teams anchor real estate, public funds infrastructure, owners capture appreciation

The Pattern Is Universal

Strip away the details—NFL vs. EPL, Dallas vs. London, billionaire vs. sovereign fund—and the pattern is the same:

1. Buy a team (or get a franchise)

2. Position it as anchor for real estate development

3. Extract public subsidies (direct cash, land, infrastructure, tax breaks)

4. Control the stadium and surrounding development

5. Capture land appreciation in private entities

6. Shelter wealth through depreciation and tax strategies

7. Report team "losses" while building billion-dollar empires

8. Claim poverty in labor negotiations, deny players fair share

9. Use opacity to prevent accountability

10. Repeat globally

This is institutional extraction as a business model. The NFL perfected it over 100 years. Now it's spreading to every sport in every market where owners have leverage and taxpayers have weak protection.

The Green Bay Packers prove none of it is necessary. Football is profitable without extraction. Teams can be community-owned, transparent, and successful.

But the NFL banned that model in 1960. And every league since has followed suit. Because extraction is more profitable than football.

What Happens Next

The extraction model will continue spreading unless something disrupts it. What could disrupt it?

1. Legal challenges

• Antitrust litigation targeting stadium monopolies and development control
• Tax reform eliminating sports franchise depreciation
• Public interest lawsuits challenging stadium authority deals

2. Political reform

• Cities refusing stadium subsidies (some cities are getting smarter, but slowly)
• State/federal legislation banning public subsidies for profitable teams
• Transparency requirements for stadium deals and owner finances

3. Player leverage

• Stronger unions in European football, MLS, other leagues
• Collective bargaining demanding revenue transparency
• Players organizing globally (unlikely but would be powerful)

4. Fan revolt

• Supporters' trusts in Europe pushing for ownership stakes
• Boycotts of teams with exploitative owners
• Political pressure from organized fan groups

5. Alternative ownership models

• New leagues adopting Green Bay-style public ownership
• Community ownership requirements (like Germany's 50+1 rule)
• Non-profit structures that prevent extraction

None of these disruptions are likely in the near term. Owners have too much power. Politicians are too desperate for teams. Players outside NFL/NBA have limited leverage. Fans are too emotionally attached to organize effectively.

So the model will keep spreading. Tens of billions more in public subsidies. Hundreds of billions more in owner wealth hidden in real estate. Trillions in tax avoidance globally over the next 50 years.

The house always wins. Until we force it to lose.

THE 7-POST INVESTIGATION: COMPLETE

WHAT WE DOCUMENTED:
• Brady’s minority stake reveals extraction mechanics (flip taxes, real estate)
• Forbes Gap: $20+ billion in hidden owner wealth (real estate excluded from valuations)
• Public subsidies: $12+ billion since 2000 (taxpayers fund infrastructure, owners capture appreciation)
• Green Bay proves extraction unnecessary ($68.6M profit without real estate plays)
• Tax arbitrage: $30+ billion avoided league-wide (depreciation shelters gains)
• Stadium authorities enable extraction (public entities issue debt, owners control revenue)
• Global pattern: NFL playbook spreading to EPL, MLS, sovereign wealth funds

THE PATTERN:
Teams anchor real estate. Public funds infrastructure. Owners control development.
Billions in appreciation captured privately. Wealth sheltered through tax strategies.
Owners claim poverty while building empires. Players and taxpayers get scraps.

This is institutional extraction as business model. Developed over 100 years in
NFL. Now spreading globally. The house always wins—until we force it to lose.

HOW WE BUILT THIS:
Randy directed investigation, identified extraction angles, made editorial decisions.
Claude conducted research, synthesized findings, drafted posts. Every claim sourced
to public documents, financial filings, stadium authority records, academic research.
Human-AI collaboration with full transparency at every step.

WHY THIS MATTERS:
Sports ownership isn’t just about games. It’s about wealth extraction from public
and players. Understanding the model exposes how billionaires build empires on
taxpayer money while claiming they can’t afford to pay people who create the value.

Thank you for reading. Now you see the pattern.

The Stadium Authority Scam How "Public-Private Partnerships" Privatize Profit and Socialize Risk THE LAND GRAB — Post 6

The Stadium Authority Scam

How "Public-Private Partnerships" Privatize Profit and Socialize Risk

THE LAND GRAB — Post 6 | February 8, 2026

THE LAND GRAB: NFL REAL ESTATE EXTRACTION
Post 1: The $335 Million Question — Brady's Raiders "discount"
Post 2: The Forbes Gap — Valuations exclude billions in real estate
Post 3: The Public Subsidy Shell Game — $12B welfare = private wealth
Post 4: The Green Bay Test — Non-profit proves owners lie
Post 5: The Tax Arbitrage Scheme — Shelter gains through team "losses"
Post 6: The Stadium Authority Scam ← YOU ARE HERE — Public-private = privatize profits
Post 7: The Global Pattern — NFL to EPL to Saudi

The Las Vegas Stadium Authority is a public entity created by the Nevada Legislature in 2016. Its mandate: issue bonds to fund Allegiant Stadium, own the facility, and protect taxpayer interests. The authority's board includes appointees from Clark County, the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority, and the Nevada Governor's office. These are public servants. The stadium is a public asset. The bonds are backed by public revenue. This is supposed to be a "public-private partnership" where taxpayers and the Raiders share costs and benefits. Here's what actually happened: The authority issued $750 million in bonds backed by hotel taxes. The public took the debt risk. The authority "owns" the stadium, but the Raiders control it through a 30-year lease at below-market rent. The Raiders keep all stadium revenue—suites, naming rights, concerts, parking. After 30 years, the Raiders can purchase the stadium for $1. The authority has no control over development around the stadium. Mark Davis (and now Tom Brady and Knighthead Capital) benefit from land appreciation driven by the public's $750 million investment. If the Raiders leave before the lease expires, the authority is stuck with the debt. The public paid $750 million. The private owner got a $2 billion stadium, control over all revenue, development leverage, and an option to buy the whole thing for $1. The "partnership" is one-sided: public risk, private profit. This isn't unique to Las Vegas. Every NFL stadium built in the last 25 years uses the same structure: create a stadium authority, issue public bonds, "own" the facility, lease it to the team on terms that give the owner control and capture, leave the public with debt and no upside. The stadium authority isn't a safeguard for taxpayers. It's a vehicle for privatizing profit while socializing risk. And it's how owners extract billions while claiming they're just partners in a public project.

What Is a Stadium Authority?

A stadium authority is a special-purpose public entity created by state or local governments to finance, own, and operate sports facilities. They exist in nearly every city with an NFL team.

How they work:

• Creation: State legislature or city council passes a law creating the authority
• Board: Appointed by elected officials (governor, mayor, city council, county commissioners)
• Powers: Issue bonds, acquire land, own facilities, enter lease agreements, approve development
• Funding: Bonds backed by tax revenue (hotel taxes, sales taxes, stadium district levies) or general funds
• Purpose: Supposedly to protect public interests while facilitating stadium construction

The theory:

Stadium authorities are supposed to be independent public entities that balance taxpayer protection with team needs. They issue bonds (spreading costs over decades), own the stadium (public asset), and lease it to teams on terms that generate revenue for debt service and public benefit.

The reality:

Stadium authorities are captured by team ownership. Board members are appointed by politicians who desperately want to keep or attract teams. Those politicians face enormous pressure from owners (who threaten relocation) and from business interests (who want the team for prestige and development). Board appointees know what's expected: approve deals that keep the team happy.

The result: authorities issue bonds (public risk), lease stadiums to teams on favorable terms (owner control), approve development deals that enrich owner-affiliated entities (private profit), and take the blame when things go wrong (public accountability).

Stadium authorities are nominally public. Functionally, they serve private owners.

STADIUM AUTHORITIES: THEORY VS. REALITY

THE THEORY (How They’re Sold to Public):
• Independent public entity protecting taxpayer interests
• Issues bonds to spread stadium costs over time
• Owns stadium as public asset
• Leases to team on terms that generate revenue for debt service
• Balances public benefit with team needs
• Board = public servants accountable to voters

THE REALITY (How They Actually Operate):
• Captured by team ownership interests
• Board appointed by politicians desperate to keep team
• Approves deals favorable to owners (long leases, below-market rent, revenue control)
• Issues bonds = public debt risk
• Owner controls stadium operations and revenue
• Owner benefits from surrounding development
• When things go wrong, authority (not owner) is accountable
• Public gets: debt service obligation for 30 years
• Owner gets: stadium control, revenue, development leverage, option to buy for $1

PATTERN:
“Public-private partnership” = public puts up capital, takes risk, owns asset
nominally. Private owner controls operations, captures revenue, benefits from
appreciation, has no downside.

Case Study 1: Clark County Stadium Authority (Las Vegas Raiders)

Structure:

• Created by Nevada Legislature (2016)
• Board: 9 members appointed by Clark County Commission, LVCVA, and Nevada Governor
• Purpose: Finance, own, and operate Allegiant Stadium

The deal:

• Authority issued $750 million in bonds backed by 0.88% hotel occupancy tax increase
• Bonds mature over 30 years, serviced by hotel tax revenue (~$50-60M annually)
• Authority "owns" the stadium
• Raiders lease stadium for 30 years at below-market rent
• After 30 years, Raiders have option to purchase stadium for $1

What the Raiders control:

• All stadium revenue: Suites, club seats, naming rights ($20-30M/year from Allegiant Air), concerts, events, parking, concessions
• Operations: Raiders manage day-to-day operations, book events, set pricing
• Development leverage: Raiders have influence over surrounding development (relationships with county, stadium authority, developers)
• Exit option: Can buy stadium for $1 after 30 years (2050), turning $750M public investment into private asset

What the public gets:

• Nominal ownership: Authority owns the stadium, but Raiders control it
• 30 years of debt: $750M + interest = ~$1.2B total repayment (hotel taxes locked up for 30 years)
• No revenue share: Public doesn't get stadium revenue (all goes to Raiders)
• Relocation risk: If Raiders leave, authority stuck with debt and empty stadium

The board:

Who's on the Las Vegas Stadium Authority board? Appointees include:

• County commissioners (elected officials who campaigned on bringing Raiders to Vegas)
• LVCVA representatives (tourism industry wants team for convention/hotel business)
• Governor appointees (Nevada wanted NFL team for state prestige)

None of these people have incentives to push back on the Raiders. Their political careers depend on keeping the team. The tourism industry profits from having an NFL team. The board's job isn't to protect taxpayers—it's to facilitate the deal.

And that's exactly what they did. The authority approved a lease giving the Raiders control over revenue, operations, and future purchase rights. The public pays $1.2 billion over 30 years. The Raiders get a $2 billion stadium and surrounding development leverage for $1.25 billion in private investment plus a $1 purchase option.

🔥 LAS VEGAS STADIUM AUTHORITY: THE ONE-SIDED PARTNERSHIP

PUBLIC CONTRIBUTION:
• $750M bonds issued (2017)
• Backed by hotel occupancy tax (tourists pay, public takes risk)
• 30-year maturity: ~$1.2B total repayment with interest
• Hotel tax revenue locked for 30 years (can’t fund other services)

WHAT PUBLIC “OWNS”:
• Stadium (nominally)
• But Raiders control via 30-year lease
• No revenue share (suites, naming rights, events all go to Raiders)
• After 30 years: Raiders can buy for $1 (turn public investment into private asset)

WHAT RAIDERS CONTROL:
• All stadium revenue (naming rights: $20-30M/year, suites, events, parking)
• Operations (booking, pricing, management)
• Development leverage (influence over 200+ surrounding acres)
• Exit option ($1 purchase after 30 years)

STADIUM AUTHORITY BOARD:
• County commissioners (want team for political capital)
• LVCVA reps (tourism industry profits from team)
• Governor appointees (state wanted NFL prestige)
• No members with incentive to protect taxpayers
• Board approved deal giving Raiders everything, public nothing

THE PARTNERSHIP:
• Public: $1.2B debt, 30 years locked revenue, zero upside, relocation risk
• Raiders: $2B stadium for $1.25B investment, all revenue, development leverage,
$1 purchase option

This isn’t partnership. This is extraction with a public entity as the vehicle.

Case Study 2: Arlington Sports and Entertainment (Dallas Cowboys)

Structure:

• City of Arlington created authority to finance and "own" AT&T Stadium (opened 2009)
• Total cost: $1.15 billion
• Public contribution: $325 million (city bonds)
• Jerry Jones contribution: $825 million

Ownership structure:

Technically, the City of Arlington owns AT&T Stadium. Jerry Jones and the Cowboys have a long-term lease.

But here's how control actually works:

• Revenue: Cowboys keep 100% of suite sales, club seats, naming rights ($17-19M/year from AT&T), parking, concessions, and non-NFL events (concerts, college football, basketball tournaments)
• Operations: Cowboys manage all stadium operations—booking, staffing, pricing, maintenance (city has no operational control)
• Development rights: Cowboys have influence over surrounding development in Arlington stadium district
• Lease terms: Cowboys have extremely favorable long-term lease (details not fully public, but includes revenue control and minimal rent)

What the city got:

• Nominal ownership of a stadium they don't control
• $325 million in debt (bonds plus interest over 30 years)
• Property tax revenue from stadium district (minimal, offset by TIF and other incentives)
• Prestige of hosting Cowboys, college games, Super Bowls

What Jerry Jones got:

• $325 million in free capital (no repayment, city takes debt)
• Control over $1.15 billion stadium
• 100% of stadium revenue (suites generate $50M+/year alone)
• Development leverage over surrounding Arlington stadium district
• Appreciation in Cowboys value driven by new stadium (team went from ~$1.5B in 2009 to $10B+ now)

The city also gave Jones control over parking revenue—one of the most lucrative aspects of stadium economics. AT&T Stadium has massive parking lots. Cowboys games, concerts, college games—every event generates parking revenue. The city owns the land, but Jones's entities collect the fees.

This is the pattern: public entity "owns" the asset, private owner controls the revenue.

ARLINGTON SPORTS AUTHORITY: WHO REALLY OWNS AT&T STADIUM?

THE DEAL (2009):
• Total cost: $1.15B
• Public (City of Arlington): $325M (bonds)
• Private (Jerry Jones): $825M
• City “owns” stadium, Cowboys lease

WHAT CITY OWNS (Nominally):
• Stadium building and land
• But zero operational control
• No revenue share (all goes to Cowboys)
• $325M+ debt service (bonds + interest over 30 years)

WHAT JERRY JONES CONTROLS:
• 100% of revenue: suites ($50M+/year), naming rights ($17-19M/year),
parking, concessions, non-NFL events
• Operations: booking, staffing, pricing, management (city has no say)
• Development rights: influence over Arlington stadium district
• Long-term favorable lease (details not fully public)

PARKING REVENUE (The Hidden Goldmine):
• City owns parking lots (public land)
• Jones entities collect parking fees
• Every Cowboys game: $40-75/car × 20,000+ cars = $800K-$1.5M per game
• 10 games/year + concerts + college events = $15-20M+/year in parking alone
• Public owns asset, private owner captures revenue

THE PATTERN:
City paid $325M for nominal ownership. Jones paid $825M for actual control.
Jones gets all revenue, all appreciation, all development leverage. City gets
debt and prestige. This is extraction disguised as partnership.

Case Study 3: Metro Nashville Sports Authority (Tennessee Titans)

Structure:

• Created by Metro Nashville government to finance new Titans stadium (opening 2027)
• Total cost: $2.1 billion
• Public contribution: $1.26 billion (60% of total cost)
• McNair family contribution: $840 million

Financing:

• Authority issues $1.26 billion in revenue bonds
• Backed by tourism taxes (hotel occupancy, short-term rental, stadium district sales tax)
• 30-year repayment: total cost with interest ~$2+ billion

The deal:

• Authority owns the stadium
• Titans lease for 30 years (with options to extend)
• Titans control all stadium revenue and operations
• Stadium anchors East Bank development—a 100+ acre mixed-use district where private developers (McNair-affiliated entities and partners) control billions in real estate value

The East Bank connection:

This is where the stadium authority scam becomes explicit.

The new Titans stadium is the centerpiece of Nashville's East Bank redevelopment. The public is investing $1.26 billion in the stadium plus hundreds of millions in infrastructure (roads, bridges, riverfront improvements).

Who controls the East Bank development? Not the stadium authority. Not Metro Nashville. Private developers, including entities with ties to the McNair family and their partners.

The stadium authority builds the anchor. Private developers capture the value in residential towers, office buildings, hotels, retail, and entertainment venues around the stadium.

Authority board composition:

Nashville's stadium authority board includes:

• Metro Council appointees (politicians who campaigned on keeping the Titans)
• Mayor's office representatives (administration that negotiated the deal)
• Business community members (real estate developers, tourism industry reps who profit from the stadium)

None of these people have incentives to push back on the Titans or question the East Bank development structure. The board's job is to approve the deal and issue the bonds.

And they did. The public pays $1.26 billion (plus $1B+ in interest over 30 years). The McNairs get a $2.1 billion stadium plus control over the East Bank development anchor. Private developers make billions on real estate. The authority takes the debt risk.

🔥 NASHVILLE SPORTS AUTHORITY: THE EAST BANK GIVEAWAY

THE DEAL (Opening 2027):
• Total cost: $2.1B (new enclosed stadium)
• Public (Metro Nashville): $1.26B (60% of cost)
• Private (McNair family): $840M
• Authority “owns,” Titans lease 30 years

PUBLIC INVESTMENT:
• $1.26B in revenue bonds (backed by tourism taxes)
• 30-year repayment: ~$2B+ total with interest
• Plus: $500M+ in infrastructure (roads, bridges, riverfront, transit)
• Total public investment: ~$2.5B+

WHAT TITANS CONTROL:
• All stadium revenue (suites, naming rights, events, parking)
• Operations (booking, management, pricing)
• Anchor tenant status for East Bank development

THE EAST BANK CONNECTION:
• 100+ acre master-planned district along Cumberland River
• Includes: residential towers, office, hotels, retail, entertainment, parks
• Stadium = anchor making entire development viable
• Public pays $2.5B+ for stadium + infrastructure
• Private developers (McNair-affiliated entities + partners) control development
• Billions in real estate value created by public investment
• Private developers capture appreciation and rental income
• Authority/public gets: zero revenue share from development

STADIUM AUTHORITY BOARD:
• Metro Council appointees (pro-Titans politicians)
• Mayor’s office reps (negotiated the deal)
• Business community members (real estate devs who profit from stadium)
• Board approved deal giving Titans/developers everything, public debt

THE MATH:
• Public: $2.5B+ investment, 30 years debt, zero development upside
• Titans: $2.1B stadium for $840M, all revenue, anchor tenant status
• Private developers: Billions in East Bank real estate driven by public investment

This is the most explicit stadium authority giveaway in NFL history.

The Pattern: How Stadium Authorities Operate

Las Vegas, Arlington, and Nashville represent different subsidy amounts and structures, but the same underlying pattern:

Step 1: Create a public entity

Legislature or city council creates a stadium authority with board appointed by politicians who want to keep or attract the team.

Step 2: Issue bonds (public debt)

Authority issues bonds backed by tax revenue (hotel taxes, sales taxes, general funds). This spreads costs over 30 years and makes the immediate hit less painful politically. But it locks public revenue into debt service for decades.

Step 3: "Own" the stadium

Authority owns the stadium nominally. This lets politicians claim it's a "public asset." But ownership without control is meaningless.

Step 4: Lease to team on favorable terms

Long-term lease (30+ years) at below-market rent. Team controls all revenue (suites, naming rights, events, parking). Team manages operations. Public has no say.

Step 5: Enable development extraction

Stadium becomes anchor for surrounding real estate development. Owner-affiliated entities and partners control the development. Land appreciates 300-500% due to public investment. Private developers capture the gains.

Step 6: Public takes the risk, owner takes the profit

If team succeeds, owner profits from revenue, appreciation, and development. If team struggles or leaves, authority is stuck with debt and empty stadium. Owner has no downside.

Step 7: Rinse and repeat in 30 years

When lease expires, owner threatens to leave unless city funds renovations, upgrades, or new stadium. Authority issues more bonds. Cycle continues.

THE UNIVERSAL STADIUM AUTHORITY PLAYBOOK

STEP 1: CREATE PUBLIC ENTITY
• Legislature/council creates stadium authority
• Board appointed by politicians desperate to keep/attract team
• Board members: pro-team politicians, business interests who profit

STEP 2: ISSUE BONDS (Public Debt)
• Authority issues bonds backed by tax revenue
• Spreads cost over 30 years (politically easier than upfront cash)
• Locks public revenue into debt service for decades

STEP 3: “OWN” THE STADIUM
• Authority owns stadium nominally (public asset on paper)
• Politicians claim victory (“we own the stadium!”)
• Reality: ownership without control = meaningless

STEP 4: LEASE TO TEAM (Favorable Terms)
• 30+ year lease at below-market rent
• Team controls all revenue (suites, naming rights, events, parking)
• Team manages operations (booking, pricing, staffing)
• Public has zero operational control

STEP 5: ENABLE DEVELOPMENT EXTRACTION
• Stadium anchors surrounding real estate development
• Owner-affiliated entities control development
• Land appreciates 300-500% (driven by public investment)
• Private developers capture gains, public gets nothing

STEP 6: PUBLIC RISK, PRIVATE PROFIT
• Team succeeds: owner profits from revenue + appreciation + development
• Team struggles/leaves: authority stuck with debt + empty stadium
• Owner has no downside (didn’t put up full capital, keeps revenue regardless)

STEP 7: REPEAT IN 30 YEARS
• Lease expires, owner threatens to leave
• City funds renovations/upgrades/new stadium
• Authority issues more bonds, cycle continues

This isn’t partnership. This is a wealth extraction vehicle with a public
label.

Why Stadium Authorities Fail to Protect Taxpayers

Stadium authorities are supposed to be independent entities that balance public and private interests. In practice, they fail at this for structural reasons:

1. Board capture

Board members are appointed by politicians who desperately want to keep or attract teams. Those politicians face enormous pressure from:

• Owners (who threaten relocation if demands aren't met)
• Business interests (hotels, restaurants, developers who profit from teams)
• Voters (who emotionally want teams and will punish politicians who "lose" them)

Board appointees know what's expected: approve deals that keep the team. They're not independent. They're facilitators.

2. Information asymmetry

Owners have lawyers, financial advisors, consultants, and decades of experience structuring stadium deals. Authorities have limited staff, less expertise, and political pressure to get deals done quickly.

Owners exploit this asymmetry ruthlessly. They present complex lease terms, revenue structures, and development agreements that favor ownership. By the time authority staff and board members understand the terms, the deal is politically committed.

3. No meaningful accountability

When stadium deals go bad, who gets blamed? The authority board members (many of whom have moved on by the time problems surface). The politicians who appointed them (often out of office). But not the owners.

Owners face no consequences for leaving (they've already extracted value through revenue and development). Authorities face consequences (debt service continues regardless of whether team stays).

4. Revenue structure favors owners

Stadium deals are structured so that owners control the most lucrative revenue streams:

• Suites and club seats: $50-100 million per year for large-market teams
• Naming rights: $15-30 million per year
• Non-NFL events: Concerts, college games, other sporting events
• Parking: $10-20 million per year

Authorities get nothing from these streams. They're responsible for debt service ($40-80 million per year) while owners keep the revenue that would service the debt.

5. Development control lies with owners

Authorities build stadiums. Owners control surrounding development through separate entities, partnerships, and influence.

The public pays for the anchor. Private developers capture the land appreciation. Authorities have no mechanism to share in development gains.

The "Public Asset" Myth

Politicians love to claim that stadium deals create "public assets." The authority owns the stadium, so taxpayers own a valuable piece of infrastructure.

This is a myth.

What does "ownership" mean if you don't control revenue or operations?

The Las Vegas Stadium Authority "owns" Allegiant Stadium. But:

• Raiders control all revenue
• Raiders manage operations
• Raiders can buy it for $1 in 2050
• If Raiders leave, the authority owns an empty building with $750M+ in remaining debt

That's not ownership. That's holding the bag.

Real ownership means control and benefit. Stadium authorities have neither. They have nominal title and actual liability.

Compare to Green Bay:

The Green Bay Packers actually own Lambeau Field. They control operations. They keep revenue. They make capital decisions. They can't sell it or relocate because of their non-profit structure, but they have real ownership.

That's what public ownership could look like. But no city has demanded it because owners won't accept it. Real public ownership would prevent extraction.

THE "PUBLIC ASSET" MYTH: OWNERSHIP WITHOUT CONTROL

WHAT POLITICIANS CLAIM:
“We own the stadium! It’s a public asset! Taxpayers benefit!”

WHAT “OWNERSHIP” ACTUALLY MEANS:

LAS VEGAS EXAMPLE:
• Authority “owns” Allegiant Stadium
• But Raiders control: all revenue, operations, booking, pricing
• Raiders can buy stadium for $1 in 2050
• If Raiders leave: authority owns empty building + $750M+ debt
• Public ownership = holding title + holding debt, zero control/benefit

ARLINGTON EXAMPLE:
• City “owns” AT&T Stadium
• But Jerry Jones controls: suites ($50M+/year), naming rights ($17-19M/year),
parking ($15-20M/year), all events
• City has zero operational control
• Public ownership = nominal title, actual liability

REAL OWNERSHIP (Green Bay):
• Packers actually own Lambeau Field
• Control operations, keep revenue, make capital decisions
• Can’t sell/relocate (non-profit structure)
• This is real ownership: control + benefit

THE DIFFERENCE:
Real ownership = control + revenue + decision-making authority
Stadium authority “ownership” = title + debt + zero control

Calling stadium authority ownership “public ownership” is like saying
you own a house when the bank holds the deed, someone else lives in it,
and you just pay the mortgage.

What Reform Would Look Like

Stadium authorities could actually protect taxpayers if structured differently:

1. Revenue sharing tied to public investment

If taxpayers fund 60% of a stadium (Nashville), they should get 60% of stadium revenue until bonds are paid off. After bonds are repaid, shift to 30-40% ongoing revenue share.

This would make "public-private partnerships" actual partnerships.

2. True public ownership with operational control

Authority owns stadium and controls operations. Team is a tenant like any other. Authority books events, sets pricing, keeps revenue. Team pays market-rate rent.

This would prevent owner revenue extraction.

3. Development equity for public investment

If public pays for stadium infrastructure that makes surrounding land valuable, authority gets equity stake in development. When private developers build on adjacent parcels, authority gets percentage of profits or land appreciation.

This would capture public value from private development.

4. Independent board with taxpayer advocates

Authority boards should include independent members with fiduciary duty to taxpayers. Not just political appointees or business interests who profit from deals.

Require board members to have expertise in public finance, real estate, or sports economics. Prohibit conflicts of interest.

5. Clawback provisions for early termination

If team leaves before bonds are paid off, owner must repay remaining public subsidy. This creates downside for owners and prevents extraction-and-run.

6. Full transparency

Require public disclosure of:

• Complete lease terms (not redacted "proprietary" sections)
• Revenue generated from stadium (suites, naming rights, events, parking)
• Development deals involving authority-controlled land
• Board member conflicts of interest

Sunlight is the best disinfectant.

None of this exists in current stadium authority structures. Owners would never agree to these terms. And politicians won't demand them because they're desperate to keep teams.

So the scam continues.

The Next Layer: How This Model Spreads Globally

We've now documented the complete extraction model:

• Post 1: Minority stakes (Brady) include flip taxes and real estate exposure
• Post 2: Forbes Gap—$20+ billion in owner wealth hidden in real estate
• Post 3: Public subsidies ($12B+) funded the infrastructure
• Post 4: Packers prove football is profitable without extraction ($68.6M)
• Post 5: Tax arbitrage shelters billions ($30B+ league-wide over 15 years)
• Post 6: Stadium authorities facilitate extraction while providing public cover

This is the NFL domestic extraction playbook. Six posts documenting how owners use teams to build real estate empires on public subsidies while sheltering billions in taxes and claiming poverty in labor negotiations.

But this model isn't staying domestic.

American sports ownership—NFL, NBA, MLS—has pioneered these extraction techniques. And now they're exporting the playbook globally:

• American owners buying Premier League clubs and importing stadium authority structures
• MLS expansion using NFL-style public subsidies and real estate plays
• Saudi Arabia (PIF) studying the NFL model for their sports investments

The extraction model is going global. That's Post 7: The Global Pattern.

We'll show how the NFL real estate playbook is spreading to European soccer, Middle Eastern sports investments, and emerging markets—and why this matters for the future of global sports ownership.

METHODOLOGY: HUMAN-AI COLLABORATION

HOW WE BUILT THIS POST:
Randy identified stadium authorities as the vehicle enabling extraction (public entities that issue debt while owners control revenue). Claude researched authority structures in Las Vegas, Arlington, and Nashville, including board composition, bond issuances, lease terms, and development connections. All bond amounts and public contributions are from stadium authority documents, municipal budgets, and bond offering statements. Lease terms are from publicly-disclosed agreements or credible reporting where full terms aren’t public.

SOURCES:
Clark County Stadium Authority (Las Vegas) bond documents, City of Arlington stadium financing records, Metro Nashville Sports Authority bond issuances and lease agreements, stadium authority board appointments (public records), East Bank development plans (Nashville Metro Planning documents). Revenue estimates (suites, naming rights, parking) based on industry standards and comparable stadiums.

WHAT WE’RE DOCUMENTING:
This is Post 6 of 7. We’re showing how stadium authorities—supposedly independent public entities—are captured by ownership interests and used to issue public debt, shield owners from risk, and enable development extraction. These aren’t safeguards for taxpayers. They’re vehicles for privatizing profit while socializing risk. Final post: how this model spreads globally.

TRANSPARENCY COMMITMENT:
All bond amounts, public contributions, and lease structures are from official sources. Board composition is from public appointment records. Where lease terms aren’t fully public (Arlington), we note this and use available information plus industry standards. The “public risk, private profit” characterization is our analysis, but it’s grounded in documented deal structures.

The Tax Arbitrage Scheme How NFL Owners Use Team Losses to Shelter Real Estate Billions THE LAND GRAB — Post 5

The Tax Arbitrage Scheme

How NFL Owners Use Team Losses to Shelter Real Estate Billions

THE LAND GRAB — Post 5 | February 8, 2026

THE LAND GRAB: NFL REAL ESTATE EXTRACTION
Post 1: The $335 Million Question — Brady's Raiders "discount"
Post 2: The Forbes Gap — Valuations exclude billions in real estate
Post 3: The Public Subsidy Shell Game — $12B welfare = private wealth
Post 4: The Green Bay Test — Non-profit proves owners lie
Post 5: The Tax Arbitrage Scheme ← YOU ARE HERE — Shelter gains through team "losses"
Post 6: The Stadium Authority Scam — Public-private = privatize profits
Post 7: The Global Pattern — NFL to EPL to Saudi

David Tepper bought the Carolina Panthers in 2018 for $2.275 billion, the highest price ever paid for an NFL team at the time. Within months, he filed paperwork to depreciate the purchase over 15 years under IRS rules that treat sports franchises as intangible assets. The depreciation schedule: roughly $150 million per year in paper losses. Not actual losses. The Panthers are profitable. But on Tepper's tax returns, the team generates massive deductions. Meanwhile, Tepper runs Appaloosa Management, a hedge fund with billions in assets under management. He owns real estate. He invests in appreciating assets. Those investments generate taxable gains. But here's the arbitrage: the team losses offset the investment gains. Tepper makes hundreds of millions in real gains from his portfolio while reporting hundreds of millions in paper losses from the Panthers. Net taxable income: minimal. Effective tax rate: far below what a middle-class worker pays on salary. This isn't unique to Tepper. Every NFL owner uses the same mechanism. Jerry Jones depreciates the Cowboys. Stan Kroenke depreciates the Rams. Shahid Khan depreciates the Jaguars. Josh Harris just bought the Commanders for $6.05 billion—the largest depreciation vehicle in sports history. And while they depreciate teams, their real estate appreciates tax-free until sale. The Star in Frisco grows in value. SoFi Stadium and Hollywood Park appreciate. Jacksonville developments increase. Billions in real wealth accumulation—none of it taxed annually. This is the tax arbitrage scheme: buy a team, depreciate it to create losses, use those losses to shelter real estate and investment gains, pay minimal taxes on billions in actual wealth, then sell the team for massive appreciation that gets capital gains treatment at lower rates. It's legal. It's been blessed by the IRS for decades. And it's how NFL owners—sitting on $15 billion empires—pay lower effective tax rates than their stadium janitors.

How Sports Team Depreciation Works

When you buy an NFL team, the IRS allows you to treat it as an asset that depreciates over time—like a factory or piece of equipment that wears out and loses value.

This might seem absurd. NFL franchises don't lose value. They appreciate massively. Jerry Jones bought the Cowboys for $140 million in 1989. They're now worth over $10 billion. That's appreciation, not depreciation.

But the IRS doesn't care about actual value. They care about tax treatment. And under longstanding tax law, sports franchises are treated as intangible assets that can be depreciated.

The mechanism:

When you buy a team, the purchase price is allocated across different asset categories:

• Tangible assets: Stadium (if owned), equipment, facilities—maybe 10-20% of purchase price
• Intangible assets: Player contracts, franchise rights, goodwill, brand value—80-90% of purchase price

The IRS allows intangible assets to be depreciated over 15 years (per Revenue Ruling 2004-58). This means if you buy a team for $2 billion and allocate $1.8 billion to intangibles, you can deduct roughly $120 million per year for 15 years.

The result: paper losses even when the team is profitable.

Let's say the Panthers generate $50 million in actual profit in a given year. But Tepper also takes $150 million in depreciation. On his tax return, the team shows a $100 million loss. That loss can offset other income—hedge fund gains, real estate profits, investment returns.

Tepper makes $50 million in real profit from the Panthers plus $200 million in gains from his hedge fund and real estate. Total real income: $250 million. But on his taxes, he reports $100 million in team losses. Net taxable income: $150 million. Tax avoided on $100 million: roughly $40 million (at top marginal rates).

Every year. For 15 years.

HOW SPORTS TEAM DEPRECIATION WORKS (IRS RULES)

WHEN YOU BUY AN NFL TEAM:
• Purchase price allocated to tangible (10-20%) and intangible (80-90%) assets
• Intangible assets: player contracts, franchise rights, goodwill, brand value
• IRS allows 15-year depreciation on intangibles (Revenue Ruling 2004-58)

EXAMPLE: $2 BILLION TEAM PURCHASE
• Tangible assets: $400M (stadium, equipment, facilities)
• Intangible assets: $1.6B (player contracts, franchise rights, goodwill)
• Annual depreciation: $1.6B ÷ 15 years = ~$107M/year

THE PAPER LOSS:
• Team generates $50M actual profit (operations)
• Owner takes $107M depreciation deduction
• Tax return shows: $57M loss (even though team is profitable)

THE ARBITRAGE:
• Team “loss”: $57M (paper)
• Hedge fund gains: $100M (real)
• Real estate gains: $100M (real)
• Total real income: $207M ($50M team profit + $100M + $100M gains)
• Taxable income after depreciation: $150M ($207M - $57M loss)
• Tax avoided: ~$23M (on $57M sheltered at 40% rate)

This repeats every year for 15 years. Total tax avoided: $345M+ over life
of ownership (on one $2B team purchase).

Case Study: David Tepper and the Panthers

David Tepper is worth an estimated $20+ billion. He made his fortune running Appaloosa Management, a hedge fund specializing in distressed debt. In 2018, he bought the Carolina Panthers for $2.275 billion.

The depreciation play:

• Purchase price: $2.275 billion
• Allocate roughly 80% to intangibles: ~$1.82 billion
• 15-year depreciation: ~$121 million per year

The Panthers' actual profitability:

We don't know for certain (Tepper doesn't disclose financials), but we can estimate based on the Packers' model. The Packers profit $68.6 million in a smaller market. Charlotte metro population is ~2.8 million (vs. Green Bay ~320,000). The Panthers should be significantly more profitable than the Packers.

Conservative estimate: Panthers likely profit $80-100 million per year on football operations.

But on Tepper's tax returns:

• Panthers profit: $80-100 million (estimate)
• Depreciation: $121 million
• Net tax treatment: $21-41 million loss

So even though Tepper owns a profitable team, it generates tax losses for him personally.

Where this matters:

Tepper's hedge fund generates massive gains. He invests in distressed debt, buys undervalued assets, profits when they recover. In a good year, Appaloosa might make $500 million in gains. Tepper's personal cut: hundreds of millions.

He also owns real estate, has equity investments, and generates income from other sources. All of this is taxable.

Except: the Panthers losses offset those gains. Instead of paying taxes on $500 million in hedge fund income, Tepper pays taxes on $479 million (after the $21 million Panthers "loss"). Tax saved: roughly $8 million per year.

Over 15 years, Tepper will shelter roughly $1.8 billion in income from taxation using Panthers depreciation. Tax saved: over $700 million (at top marginal rates).

And at the end of 15 years? Tepper can sell the Panthers. They'll likely be worth $5+ billion by then (franchise values have doubled roughly every 10 years). He'll pay capital gains tax on the sale (20% federal rate), which is lower than ordinary income tax rates (37% top marginal). And he'll have sheltered $700+ million in taxes during ownership.

DAVID TEPPER: THE PANTHERS AS TAX SHELTER

PURCHASE (2018): $2.275 BILLION
• Allocated to intangibles: ~$1.82B
• Annual depreciation: ~$121M/year for 15 years

PANTHERS ACTUAL PROFITABILITY:
• Charlotte metro: 2.8M (vs. Green Bay 320K)
• Packers profit: $68.6M in smaller market
• Panthers estimate: $80-100M/year profit (conservative)

TAX TREATMENT:
• Panthers profit: $80-100M (real)
• Depreciation deduction: $121M
• Net on tax return: $21-41M LOSS (despite actual profit)

THE ARBITRAGE:
• Hedge fund income (Appaloosa): $500M/year (example)
• Panthers “loss”: $21-41M
• Taxable income: $459-479M (instead of $500M)
• Tax saved: $8-16M/year
• Over 15 years: $120-240M in tax savings
• Plus: shelters real estate gains, other investment income

AT SALE (projected ~2033):
• Purchased: $2.275B (2018)
• Estimated value: $5-6B (franchise values double every 10 years)
• Gain: $3-4B
• Capital gains tax (20%): $600-800M
• But saved $120-240M+ in income taxes during ownership
• Net tax efficiency: shelter ordinary income (37% rate) via depreciation,
pay capital gains (20% rate) on appreciation

Total wealth created: $3-4B. Total taxes paid: ~$600-800M. Effective rate: ~17%.
Compare to: middle-class worker pays 22-24% on salary.

The Real Estate Offset: Where the Real Money Hides

Team depreciation alone is a tax benefit. But the real arbitrage happens when owners combine team losses with real estate gains.

Here's how it works:

Jerry Jones example:

Jones owns the Cowboys (Forbes: $10.1 billion). He also owns The Star in Frisco and controls AT&T Stadium revenue. Let's conservatively estimate his annual income:

• Cowboys football operations: $150 million profit (larger market than Packers, likely 2x+ their $68.6M)
• The Star (real estate appreciation + rental income): $50 million per year
• AT&T Stadium (naming rights, non-NFL events, parking): $75 million per year
• Total real income: $275 million per year

Now, Jones bought the Cowboys in 1989 for $140 million. He's long past the depreciation window from that purchase. But when the Cowboys built The Star (2016), that was a $1+ billion investment. Jones can depreciate The Star facilities over time.

And when AT&T Stadium was built (2009, $1.15 billion), Jones structured ownership to maximize depreciation on his share of the investment.

Between The Star, AT&T Stadium improvements, and ongoing facility investments, Jones likely has significant annual depreciation deductions—conservatively, $50-100 million per year.

Tax treatment:

• Real income: $275 million
• Depreciation (facilities, investments): $75 million
• Taxable income: $200 million
• Tax saved on $75 million: ~$30 million per year

This is conservative. Jones has other investments, oil and gas holdings, and additional real estate. The depreciation from Cowboys-related assets shelters income from all sources.

The pattern:

Every owner who builds real estate (The Star, SoFi Stadium, Jacksonville developments, Buffalo stadium district) gets to depreciate those investments. The depreciation creates paper losses that offset real gains from:

• Appreciating real estate (land values go up, but no tax until sale)
• Rental income from mixed-use developments
• Other business income (hedge funds, private equity, investments)

The team and stadium investments are loss generators for tax purposes. The real estate and other businesses are wealth generators in reality. The losses shelter the gains. The billionaire pays minimal taxes.

🔥 THE REAL ESTATE OFFSET: HOW IT WORKS

JERRY JONES EXAMPLE (Conservative Estimates):

ANNUAL REAL INCOME:
• Cowboys football operations: $150M profit
• The Star (real estate appreciation + rent): $50M/year
• AT&T Stadium (naming rights, events, parking): $75M/year
• Total real income: $275M/year

DEPRECIATION DEDUCTIONS:
• The Star facilities (built 2016, $1B+ investment): depreciate over 15-39 years
• AT&T Stadium improvements: ongoing depreciation
• Other facility investments
• Total annual depreciation: $50-100M/year (conservative)

TAX TREATMENT:
• Real income: $275M
• Depreciation: $75M (midpoint estimate)
• Taxable income: $200M
• Tax owed: $74M (at 37% top rate)
• Tax if no depreciation: $102M
• Tax saved: $28M/year via depreciation

WHAT’S BEING SHELTERED:
• Real estate appreciation (The Star land value up 300%+): not taxed until sale
• Rental income from mixed-use development: sheltered by depreciation
• Other business income: sheltered by team/facility losses

THE ARBITRAGE:
Depreciate facilities (create paper losses) → Shelter real estate gains
(actual wealth) → Pay minimal taxes on billions in appreciation → Sell
at capital gains rates (20%) instead of income rates (37%)

This is legal. This is standard. This is how every NFL owner operates.

Case Study: Josh Harris and the Commanders

Josh Harris bought the Washington Commanders in 2023 for $6.05 billion—the highest price ever paid for a sports franchise.

The depreciation vehicle:

• Purchase price: $6.05 billion
• Allocate 80% to intangibles: ~$4.84 billion
• 15-year depreciation: $323 million per year

This is the largest annual depreciation deduction in sports history.

Who is Josh Harris?

Harris co-founded Apollo Global Management, one of the world's largest private equity firms (over $600 billion in assets under management). He's worth an estimated $8+ billion personally. He owns:

• The Commanders (NFL)
• The Philadelphia 76ers (NBA)
• The New Jersey Devils (NHL)
• Significant real estate holdings through Apollo and personal investments

Harris generates massive income from Apollo (management fees, carried interest on fund returns), real estate investments, and other business ventures. Conservatively: hundreds of millions per year in taxable income.

The Commanders depreciation ($323 million per year) shelters a huge portion of that income.

Example scenario:

• Apollo income: $400 million per year
• Real estate gains: $100 million per year
• Other investments: $50 million per year
• Total income: $550 million per year

Without the Commanders:

• Taxable income: $550 million
• Tax owed (37% top rate): $204 million

With the Commanders depreciation:

• Commanders "loss": $323 million (depreciation exceeds any team profit)
• Net taxable income: $227 million ($550M income - $323M loss)
• Tax owed: $84 million
• Tax saved: $120 million per year

Over 15 years, Harris will shelter roughly $4.84 billion in income from taxation using Commanders depreciation. Tax saved: approximately $1.8 billion (at top marginal rates).

And this doesn't even account for the Commanders' actual profitability (likely $100M+ per year in a DC market), real estate plays Harris will develop around a new stadium (he's already exploring DC, Maryland, and Virginia sites), or the appreciation in franchise value (could be worth $10+ billion by the time he sells).

Harris bought a $6 billion tax shelter that will also generate billions in real wealth. And he'll pay a fraction of what he'd owe if that wealth were ordinary income.

JOSH HARRIS: THE $6 BILLION TAX SHELTER

PURCHASE (2023): $6.05 BILLION
• Largest sports franchise sale in history
• Allocated to intangibles: ~$4.84B
• Annual depreciation: $323M/year for 15 years
• Largest annual sports depreciation deduction ever

WHO IS JOSH HARRIS:
• Co-founder, Apollo Global Management ($600B+ AUM)
• Net worth: $8B+
• Also owns: 76ers (NBA), Devils (NHL)
• Income sources: Apollo fees, carried interest, real estate, investments
• Annual income estimate: $400-600M+ (conservative)

THE TAX ARBITRAGE (Example Scenario):
• Apollo income: $400M/year
• Real estate gains: $100M/year
• Other investments: $50M/year
• Total real income: $550M/year

WITHOUT COMMANDERS:
• Taxable income: $550M
• Tax owed (37%): $204M

WITH COMMANDERS DEPRECIATION:
• Commanders “loss”: $323M (depreciation)
• Net taxable income: $227M ($550M - $323M)
• Tax owed: $84M
• Tax saved: $120M/year

OVER 15 YEARS:
• Total income sheltered: $4.84B
• Total tax saved: ~$1.8B (at 37% rate)

PLUS:
• Commanders will generate $100M+ profit/year (real income, not taxed heavily due to depreciation)
• Real estate plays around future stadium (DC/MD/VA sites)
• Franchise appreciation: $6B → likely $10B+ by sale
• Exit via capital gains (20%) instead of income tax (37%)

Harris bought a $6B asset that will:
1. Shelter $1.8B in taxes during ownership
1. Generate $1.5B+ in profits over 15 years
1. Appreciate to $10B+ (gain taxed at 20% not 37%)
1. Enable real estate wealth outside team financials

This is the ultimate tax arbitrage vehicle.

Why the Packers Can't Do This

The Green Bay Packers are a non-profit. They don't have a private owner who can use team depreciation to shelter personal income.

When the Packers invest in Lambeau Field improvements or facilities, those investments depreciate over time. But the depreciation doesn't benefit any individual. It reduces the team's taxable income, which is minimal anyway (non-profits pay limited taxes).

The Packers can't:

• Use team losses to shelter real estate gains (they don't have real estate empires)
• Offset hedge fund income with depreciation (no private owner with other income streams)
• Structure ownership to maximize personal tax benefits (ownership is symbolic, no personal gain)

The Packers pay taxes on their profits (if any, after reinvestment) at standard non-profit rates. Their $68.6 million in profit (2023) doesn't generate massive tax deductions for anyone. It just gets reinvested in the team or donated to charity.

This is why the Packers' $68.6 million profit is the real number. There's no depreciation arbitrage. There's no sheltering. What they report is what they make.

Private owners report a fraction of what they make because depreciation hides the real income.

The Scale: Billions in Tax Avoidance Across the League

Let's conservatively estimate the tax avoidance across all 32 NFL teams:

Average team sale price (last 10 years): ~$3 billion

• Allocated to intangibles: ~$2.4 billion
• Annual depreciation: ~$160 million per owner
• Tax saved per owner (at 37% rate): ~$59 million per year

32 teams × $59 million = $1.9 billion in tax savings per year across all owners (assuming all are in active depreciation windows)

In reality, not all 32 teams are in active depreciation windows (some owners bought decades ago and have exhausted depreciation). But with recent sales and new ownership entering the league (Harris, Tepper, Pegulas, etc.), a significant portion of teams are generating massive depreciation deductions.

Conservative estimate: 20 teams are actively using depreciation to shelter income = $1.2 billion in tax avoidance per year league-wide.

Over 15 years: $18 billion in taxes avoided by NFL owners through depreciation arbitrage alone.

And this doesn't include:

• Real estate depreciation (stadiums, mixed-use developments, facilities)
• Other tax strategies (carried interest, qualified business income deductions, estate planning)
• The capital gains benefit when teams are sold (20% rate vs. 37% income rate)

The total tax avoidance is likely $30+ billion over the next 15 years across all NFL owners.

🔥 THE SCALE: LEAGUE-WIDE TAX AVOIDANCE

CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE (Per Team, Recent Sales):
• Average purchase price (last 10 years): ~$3B
• Allocated to intangibles: ~$2.4B
• Annual depreciation: ~$160M/year
• Tax saved per owner (37% rate): ~$59M/year

ACROSS 32 TEAMS:
• If all 32 teams in depreciation window: $1.9B/year tax savings
• Reality: ~20 teams actively depreciating (recent sales, new owners)
• Annual tax avoidance (league-wide): ~$1.2B/year
• Over 15 years: $18B in taxes avoided

THIS DOESN’T INCLUDE:
• Real estate depreciation (stadiums, developments, facilities)
• Other tax strategies (carried interest, QBI deductions, estate planning)
• Capital gains benefit on sale (20% vs 37% income rate)

TOTAL TAX AVOIDANCE (All Strategies, 15 Years):
• Estimated: $30+ billion across all NFL owners

TO PUT THIS IN PERSPECTIVE:
• $30B could fund: 300,000 teachers for 10 years
• Or: rebuild infrastructure in 100 cities
• Or: healthcare for millions

Instead: billionaire NFL owners use it to shelter wealth while claiming
teams barely break even.

Is This Legal? Yes. Is This Right? No.

Everything described in this post is legal. The IRS explicitly allows sports team depreciation under Revenue Ruling 2004-58. Courts have upheld it. Accountants structure deals around it. It's standard practice.

But legal doesn't mean ethical.

The problems:

1. Teams don't actually depreciate

NFL franchises appreciate in value, consistently and dramatically. Jerry Jones bought the Cowboys for $140 million, they're now worth $10+ billion. That's 7,000%+ appreciation. The idea that they're depreciating assets is fiction.

The IRS allows depreciation on the theory that player contracts and intangible assets lose value over time. But franchise values have increased every year for decades. The depreciation is a tax fiction that doesn't match economic reality.

2. Owners shelter real income while claiming poverty

Owners use depreciation to report losses while making hundreds of millions in real profit. Then they claim they can't afford higher player compensation in CBA negotiations. They claim they need public subsidies to survive.

The Packers prove this is a lie. They report $68.6 million in real profit with no depreciation games. Private owners make far more—they just hide it.

3. Billionaires pay lower rates than workers

A teacher making $60,000 per year pays a 22% effective tax rate. A billionaire NFL owner making $500 million per year (real income) might pay a 15-20% effective rate after depreciation, real estate sheltering, and capital gains treatment on sale.

Warren Buffett famously said he pays a lower tax rate than his secretary. NFL owners are the same: they pay less than their stadium janitors.

4. Public subsidies enable private tax avoidance

When cities give $850 million (Buffalo) or $1.26 billion (Nashville) to build stadiums, they're funding assets that owners then depreciate to avoid taxes. The public pays twice: once through subsidies, again through lost tax revenue.

If owners paid full taxes on their real income, federal and state governments would collect billions more. That money could fund the schools, infrastructure, and services that stadium subsidies supposedly provide (but don't).

The Capital Gains Endgame

The final piece of the tax arbitrage: when owners sell.

After 15 years of depreciating a team and sheltering billions in income, owners sell at massive appreciation. And that gain is taxed as capital gains (20% federal rate), not ordinary income (37% top rate).

Example: David Tepper (Panthers)

• Bought: $2.275 billion (2018)
• Depreciated: $1.82 billion over 15 years
• Tax sheltered: ~$700 million (at 37% rate on depreciation)
• Projected sale (2033): $5-6 billion (franchise values double every 10 years)
• Gain: $3-4 billion
• Tax on gain: $600-800 million (20% capital gains rate)

Net tax outcome:

• Saved $700 million in income taxes during ownership (via depreciation)
• Pays $700 million in capital gains at sale
• Net effect: converts high-rate income (37%) to low-rate capital gains (20%) via depreciation arbitrage

Tepper effectively pays 20% on $3-4 billion in wealth creation instead of 37% on the income he sheltered during ownership. The arbitrage saved him hundreds of millions.

And this assumes he doesn't use other strategies (Opportunity Zones, 1031 exchanges, charitable trusts) to defer or eliminate the capital gains tax entirely.

THE CAPITAL GAINS ENDGAME: FINAL ARBITRAGE

DURING OWNERSHIP (15 years):
• Depreciate team: $1.82B (Tepper example)
• Shelter income: $1.82B (ordinary income that would be taxed at 37%)
• Tax saved: ~$700M

AT SALE:
• Purchase price: $2.275B (2018)
• Sale price: $5-6B (estimated 2033)
• Gain: $3-4B
• Tax on gain: $600-800M (20% capital gains rate)

NET TAX OUTCOME:
• Without depreciation: would have paid $700M on sheltered income (37% rate)
• With depreciation: paid $0 during ownership, pay $700M at sale (20% rate)
• Effective conversion: 37% ordinary income → 20% capital gains
• Tax arbitrage: shelter high-rate income via depreciation, pay low-rate
gains on exit

PLUS OTHER STRATEGIES:
• Opportunity Zones (defer capital gains if reinvested)
• 1031 exchanges (defer if buying another team/asset)
• Charitable trusts (eliminate gains via donation)
• Estate planning (step-up basis if held until death)

Many owners will use these strategies to pay even LESS than 20% on exit.
Some will pay nothing.

What Needs to Change

The tax arbitrage scheme is legal, but it shouldn't be. Here's what reform would look like:

1. Eliminate or limit sports franchise depreciation

Sports franchises appreciate, not depreciate. The IRS should stop treating them as depreciating assets. If that's politically impossible, at least limit depreciation to actual losses (not paper losses on appreciating assets).

2. Require recapture on sale

If owners depreciate $2 billion during ownership and then sell for a $4 billion gain, the IRS should "recapture" the depreciation—treat it as ordinary income instead of allowing capital gains treatment. This would eliminate the arbitrage.

3. Transparency in ownership structures

Require NFL owners to disclose how they structure ownership entities, what income they shelter via depreciation, and how much tax they actually pay. Sunlight is the best disinfectant.

4. No public subsidies for profitable enterprises

If owners are profitable enough to shelter hundreds of millions in taxes, they don't need public subsidies for stadiums. Cities should refuse subsidy requests unless owners open their books and prove actual financial need (they can't).

5. Minimum tax on billionaire income

Implement a minimum tax on ultra-high-net-worth individuals (Biden proposed this, but it hasn't passed). Require billionaires to pay at least 20-25% on total economic income, including depreciation-sheltered gains. This would prevent the arbitrage.

None of this will happen without political will. But the Packers prove it's possible to run a profitable team without tax games. Private owners prove the games are just wealth extraction.

The Next Layer: How Public Entities Enable This

We've now documented how owners extract wealth and shelter it from taxes:

• Post 1: Minority stakes include flip taxes and real estate exposure
• Post 2: Forbes Gap—$20+ billion in real estate hidden from valuations
• Post 3: Public subsidies ($12B+) funded the real estate infrastructure
• Post 4: Packers prove football is profitable without extraction ($68.6M)
• Post 5: Tax arbitrage shelters billions via depreciation (legal but unethical)

But there's one more mechanism we haven't fully explored: stadium authorities.

These are public entities created to issue bonds, own stadiums, and manage development. They're supposed to protect taxpayer interests. But in practice, they're controlled by owners and used to privatize profits while socializing costs.

That's Post 6: The Stadium Authority Scam. We'll show how "public-private partnerships" are designed to let owners control public assets, extract revenue, and avoid accountability—all while taxpayers service the debt.

METHODOLOGY: HUMAN-AI COLLABORATION

HOW WE BUILT THIS POST:
Randy identified tax arbitrage as the mechanism owners use to shelter extracted wealth. Claude researched IRS depreciation rules (Revenue Ruling 2004-58), sports franchise tax treatment, documented team sales (Tepper, Harris), and estimated tax savings based on standard depreciation schedules and top marginal rates. All depreciation math is based on IRS-allowed 15-year schedules for intangible assets. Estimates of owner income are conservative and labeled as such (we don’t have private tax returns).

SOURCES:
IRS Revenue Ruling 2004-58 (sports franchise depreciation), documented team sales prices (Tepper $2.275B, Harris $6.05B), marginal tax rate schedules (37% top federal rate, 20% capital gains), Packers 2023 financials (comparison for actual profitability), academic analysis of sports team tax treatment (Tax Policy Center, Stanford Law Review).

WHAT WE’RE DOCUMENTING:
This is Post 5 of 7. We’re showing how NFL owners use legal tax strategies (depreciation, capital gains treatment) to shelter billions in wealth while claiming teams barely profit. The Packers (Post 4) prove teams are profitable. This post shows how private owners hide that profitability via tax arbitrage. Next: how stadium authorities enable the extraction.

TRANSPARENCY COMMITMENT:
All tax calculations use publicly-disclosed rates and IRS rules. Owner income estimates are conservative and labeled as estimates (private tax returns aren’t public). The $18-30B league-wide tax avoidance is calculated based on average team sales, standard depreciation schedules, and current ownership turnover. We distinguish between what’s legal (everything here) and what’s ethical (open question).