Will the next pandemic be downloaded from the internet? 
I do hope that GCHQ is monitoring my computer. That’s not something you hear every day – especially since Edward Snowden. But anyone who, like me, has been searching for "DNA synthesisers" and "type H botulinum toxin" might be worth checking out. Whenever we debate security and privacy online, both sides have their go-to staples: terrorists/paedophiles versus Orwell/Stasi. But there are other risks looming on the horizon. Could the next deadly pandemic be downloaded from the internet? According to a recent article by Andrew Synder-Beattie from the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, it’s possible.
To those in the know, synthetic biology is one of the most exciting fields in life sciences. Broadly speaking, it applies engineering and computer science to biology: trying to design and engineer new biological parts or systems for socially useful purposes. This is done at the genetic level, which means reprogramming DNA sequences to give biological organisms new functions not naturally found. Before you recoil in horror, it might mean, for example, we could safely programme bacteria to produce fuel incredibly efficiently and cheaply. If it can be done carefully, the potential to feed and fuel the world is phenomenal. The UK is a leader in the field, and in July the government wisely poured £60 million into the development of the field.
But it is also quite frightening, mainly because of the risk of what the nuclear non-proliferation experts call "dual-use". A dual use technology is a technology that has a legitimate purpose, but can also be used in illicit products or weaponry. You won't be surprised to learn that some DNA sequences are harmful, and others, if modified, could be extremely dangerous. As it stands, the field is fairly good at self-regulating. In 2010, the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, which brings together scientists, public health officials and defence experts released a report on synthetic biology. It noted that biosafety could be managed with the right mechanisms of oversight, but also "strongly urged" the federal government to develop and implement a policy "for the review and conduct of dual use research of concern". That still hasn’t happened. And according to a 2014 paper from the University of Virginia, there is currently no country that has legislation that explicitly addresses synthetic biology. It’s all self-regulation.
The big worry is of course sensitive information getting online, because once it's out it tends to stay there. There are a growing number of open source biology movements, such as bio-hackers, biopunks, the users of "openwetware" and DIY-BIO fans, who pursue synthetic biology outside of the lab. So far these groups are regarded by experts as pretty responsible. But that could change of course, and the consequences could be high. When scientists late last year sequenced the DNA for type H botulinum toxin, it was not placed on any public databases because of security fears. This was the first time that a genetic code was not shared publicly, and for good reason. It is the most deadly substance ever discovered: 2 billionths of a gram is enough to kill one person. One reason it’s been published is because DNA synthesisers, machines that can take lines of DNA and turn it into molecules, are also surprisingly easy to get hold of. You can buy one for a few thousand dollars on eBay. With DNA code and a synthesiser, you too may be able to make some DNA of your own.
Of course, it’s probably not only rogue DIY biologists we should be worried about. WikiLeaks reports have alleged that the US intelligence community is interested in DNA collection, and even asked US diplomatic staff to collect the DNA of African leaders. Others I have spoken to about this subject off the record have expressed a worry what other, less scrupulous countries, might be up to in this burgeoning field.
Before you panic, this has been going on for a while. The polio virus was successfully reproduced over a decade ago; and the infamous 1918 flu virus was recreated by a DNA synthesiser back in 2005. Neither have been set upon an unsuspecting public. This is presently considered by the UK government to be a potential threat: a low-probability, high-impact problem. The degree of technical know-how required to actually do this is still high, and in the US the FBI has initiated decent oversight systems to monitor how DNA sequences are accessed. Pandora’s box isn’t opened just yet. The problem is that Pandora’s boxes have a tendency to get opened, especially with modern technology and communications. In his recent book Innovation, Dual Use and Security Jonathan Tucker argues that synthetic biology is likely to become easier for the non-specialist in the years ahead – including for non-state actors to use it for nefarious purposes. I have a feeling debates over security and liberty privacy online might change in future. Security might come to mean something slightly different in an age of synthetic biology – and given what's at stake, it's probably better we worrying about this sooner rather than later.
No comments:
Post a Comment